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Abstract 
 
Controlled and automatic processes in Pavlovian-instrumental transfer 
Tina Seabrooke 
The current research aimed to further current knowledge on the psychological processes 
that underpin human outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) effects. 
PIT reflects the capacity of a Pavlovian stimulus to selectively potentiate an 
instrumental response that predicts a common rewarding outcome. PIT effects are often 
suggested to reflect a relatively automatic S-O-R mechanism, where the stimulus 
activates the sensory properties of the outcome, which then automatically triggers 
associated instrumental responses. The current research tested this S-O-R account of 
PIT against a propositional expected utility theory, which suggests that PIT effects 
reflect verbalizable inferences about the probability and value of each outcome. Chapter 
1 reviews the relevant literature. Chapters 2-4 then report 11 experiments that aimed to 
set the S-O-R and propositional theories against one another. In Chapter 2, two 
experiments demonstrated that PIT is sensitive to a reversal instruction (Experiment 2), 
but is robust against a time pressure (Experiment 1) and concurrent load (Experiment 2) 
manipulation. Chapter 3 details the development of a novel outcome devaluation 
procedure, and reports four experiments that examined the effect of both outcome 
devaluation and verbal instructions on PIT. These experiments demonstrated that a 
typical PIT procedure produces PIT effects that are insensitive to a very strong 
devaluation manipulation. Furthermore, PIT effects were observed for a devalued 
outcome even when an S-O-R mechanism was unlikely to control behaviour. Chapter 4 
reports five experiments that show that PIT is highly sensitive to outcome devaluation 
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when multiple outcomes and responses are cued on every transfer test trial. Chapter 5 
therefore concludes that, on balance, the results provide converging support for the 
propositional expected utility theory of PIT.   
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Chapter 1: Pavlovian-instrumental 
transfer 
1.1 Introduction  
Reward-related cues exert a profound influence on behaviour. Cues that predict 
food availability, for example, can motivate actions to obtain food rewards (Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1988; Estes, 1943; Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, & Duka, 2007; 
Kruse, Overmier, Konz, & Rokke, 1983; Watson, Wiers, Hommel, & de Wit, 2014). 
Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) tasks are a very popular way to measure such cue 
reactivity in the laboratory. The research in this thesis aims to extend current knowledge 
of the psychological processes that underlie the cue reactivity that is seen in PIT tasks. 
PIT reflects an interaction between Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning 
processes. The thesis therefore begins with an introduction to these two fundamental 
forms of associative learning. The various forms of PIT and the dominant psychological 
theories are then examined. A core aim of this thesis is to test whether PIT effects are 
best explained by an associative link mechanism, a controlled reasoning process, or 
both. To this end, Chapters 2-4 report eleven experiments that test the dominant 
associative link account of PIT (S-O-R theory) against a recently developed 
propositional account (using expected utility [EU] theory). These experiments use 
verbal instructions with time pressure and concurrent load manipulations (Chapter 2), 
and a novel outcome devaluation procedure (Chapters 3 and 4). The results are finally 
discussed in Chapter 5. To pre-empt the results, Chapter 5 concludes that, on balance, 
the data provide converging evidence to support the propositional EU account of PIT.  
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1.2 Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning 
PIT effects reflect the ability of a Pavlovian stimulus to potentiate an 
instrumental response. To understand PIT effects, it is therefore necessary to provide an 
introduction to Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. Figure ‎1.1, which was inspired 
by Hogarth, Balleine, Corbit, and Killcross (2013), depicts the learning structures that 
are commonly thought to mediate Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning.  
 
 
Figure ‎1.1. Theoretical learning structures mediating Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. 
S-O refers to a Pavlovian stimulus-outcome association. R-O refers to a goal-directed, 
bidirectional response-outcome association. S-R refers to an automatic or habitual stimulus-
response association.  
 
Pavlovian conditioning reflects the learning of a relationship between a stimulus 
(S) and an outcome (O). Pavlovian relationships (or contingencies) are often denoted as 
stimulus-outcome (S-O) associations (see Figure ‎1.1). Pavlov (1927) provided the iconic 
demonstration of Pavlovian conditioning. When food delivery was repeatedly preceded 
by a ringing bell, Pavlov's dogs came to salivate to the sound of the bell. In associative 
learning terminology, the ringing bell became a conditioned stimulus (CS) that 
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predicted food delivery – a biologically significant, unconditioned stimulus (US). The 
dogs then salivated – a conditioned response (CR) – upon hearing the bell.  
Instrumental conditioning is another important form of associative learning 
(Grindley, 1932; Mackintosh & Dickinson, 1979; Miller & Konorski, 1969; Skinner, 
1932; Thorndike, 1911). Consider a hungry rat that learns to press a lever to obtain a 
food pellet. Here, the food pellet is contingent on the rat pressing the lever, and so the 
response (R) has a causal role in producing the outcome (O). Contemporary dual-
process theories propose that instrumental learning can be either habitual or goal-
directed, with each controller dominating under different circumstances (Balleine & 
O’Doherty, 2010; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 1985, 2016; Hogarth & Chase, 
2011). This dual-process account is reviewed briefly below because it has informed 
many of the key theories of PIT.  
Dual-process accounts of instrumental learning propose that habitual responses 
are mediated by the stimulus-response (S-R) mechanism shown in Figure ‎1.1. 
According to this account, instrumental conditioning produces an association between 
the contextual stimuli that are present in the animal’s environment and the instrumental 
response. When the instrumental response R is reinforced by a rewarding outcome O in 
the presence of a stimulus S, the S-R association is strengthened (Hull, 1943). Notably, 
this association does not incorporate a representation of the outcome O. Rather, the 
outcome is a catalyst that strengthens the S-R association (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). 
According to S-R theory, instrumental responses are habitual responses that are 
automatically triggered by contextual stimuli.  
Goal-directed instrumental responses are thought to be mediated by the 
bidirectional R-O mechanism shown in Figure ‎1.1. Two criteria must be met for an 
instrumental response to be classified as goal-directed (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
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Heyes & Dickinson, 1990). First, the behaviour must satisfy the belief criterion, which 
means that the response must reflect knowledge about the relationship between the 
response and the outcome. Second, the response must meet the desire criterion, which 
means that it must be sensitive to changes in outcome value. That is, the response 
should only be performed when the outcome is desired. There is continued debate about 
the precise structure of the mental representations that underlie goal-directed behaviour 
(de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 1985, 1994; Rescorla, 1992b). For the sake of 
simplicity, however, it will suffice to say at this point that a goal-directed action is 
usually thought to reflect either a response-outcome (R-O) or an outcome-response (O-
R) association. This debate is of direct relevance to the key theories of PIT and is 
therefore discussed more thoroughly below.  
1.3 Pavlovian-instrumental transfer  
This thesis concerns the psychological processes that mediate human PIT effects. 
Learning theorists have, in recent years, uncovered several effects that are all classed 
under the umbrella term of ‘PIT’ (Corbit & Balleine, 2005; Estes, 1943; Kruse et al., 
1983; Lovibond, 1981; Walker, 1942). The current research concentrates on the 
outcome-selective form of PIT (described below), but a brief overview of the other types 
of PIT is also provided below for clarity.  
1.3.1 Non-selective PIT 
Estes (1943) provided one of the earliest demonstrations of PIT. He trained two 
groups of rats to first press a lever to obtain a food pellet reward. For an experimental 
group, the levers were then removed and a tone was repeatedly paired with a food pellet. 
During the subsequent transfer test, the levers were restored and lever-press responses 
in both groups were measured in extinction (without reinforcement). Crucially, the tone 
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was presented twice during the transfer test for the experimental group, to assess the 
effect of the tone on lever-press responses.  
A classic extinction curve was observed in both groups; instrumental lever-
pressing was initially high and declined throughout the transfer test because of non-
reinforcement. However, the tones also increased the rate of lever-press responding in 
the experimental group. Estes' (1943) results provided one of the earliest demonstrations 
of PIT, where a Pavlovian stimulus potentiated an instrumental response that was 
associated with a common rewarding outcome. 
Subsequent experiments used non-selective designs (shown in Table ‎1.1) to 
extend Estes' (1943) work. Lovibond (1983), for example, trained rabbits to perform a 
head-raising instrumental response (R) to earn a sucrose rewarding outcome (O). In a 
separate session, one stimulus (S1) was paired with sucrose (S1 – O), while another 
stimulus was presented but not paired with sucrose (S2 – no O). During the transfer test, 
instrumental responding was assessed both at baseline and during the presence of each 
stimulus. Consistent with Estes' (1943) results, the sucrose-paired stimulus facilitated 
instrumental responding above baseline responding, but the unpaired stimulus did not. 
Lovibond's design built upon the original design of Estes, because it showed that 
reward-predictive stimuli preferentially increase instrumental responding. This ability 
of a Pavlovian stimulus to enhance instrumental responding for a single rewarding 
outcome is referred to as a non-selective PIT effect (Holmes, Marchand, & Coutureau, 
2010). Lovibond's (1983) procedure has also been successfully translated for use in 
human experiments in recent years, where similar results have been observed (Bezzina, 
Lee, Lovibond, & Colagiuri, 2016; Colagiuri & Lovibond, 2015; Lovibond & Colagiuri, 
2013; Lovibond, Satkunarajah, & Colagiuri, 2015; Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 
2008).  
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Table ‎1.1 
Design of non-selective PIT experiments. 
Instrumental training Pavlovian conditioning Transfer test 
R-O S1-O 
S2- no O 
S1: R? 
S2: R? 
Note: R refers to an instrumental response, O refers to an appetitive outcome, and S1 and S2 
refer to Pavlovian stimuli.  
 
1.3.2 Outcome-selective PIT  
The early PIT research demonstrated that Pavlovian reward-predictive stimuli 
can facilitate instrumental responses that predict rewarding outcomes. Subsequent 
research confirmed that Pavlovian cues preferentially enhance instrumental responses 
that predict the same outcome, as opposed to any rewarding outcome – an effect known 
as outcome-selective PIT (Colwill & Rescorla, 1988; Kruse et al., 1983). Outcome-
selective PIT can be defined as the ability of a Pavlovian stimulus S to selectively 
potentiate an instrumental response R that is associated with a common rewarding 
outcome O. Table ‎1.2 shows a typical outcome-selective PIT design. First, rats or 
humans
1
 learn to perform two instrumental responses (R1 and R2) to earn distinct 
rewarding outcomes (O1 and O2) to establish R1-O1 and R2-O2 associations. In a 
separate Pavlovian conditioning phase, two neutral stimuli (S1 and S2) are also paired 
with either outcome O1 or O2 (S1-O1, S2-O2). Hence, each outcome (e.g., O1) is 
associated with one Pavlovian stimulus (S1) and one instrumental response (R1). The 
Pavlovian stimuli and instrumental responses should not be directly associated with one 
another, however, because they were not presented together. 
In the final transfer test, both instrumental responses are measured in extinction 
in the presence of each Pavlovian stimulus, relative to baseline ‘no stimulus’ periods. 
                                                 
1
 PIT effects have also been observed in other species (see Holmes et al., 2010), but the vast majority of 
research has used either rats or human participants.  
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The classic result is that the Pavlovian stimuli selectively elevate the instrumental 
response that is associated with the same outcome. That is, stimulus S1 increases 
response R1 more than R2, and S2 increases R2 more than R1. This is referred to as an 
outcome-selective PIT effect, because each Pavlovian stimulus S preferentially 
potentiates the instrumental response R that is paired with a common outcome O.  
Table ‎1.2  
 
Outcome-selective PIT design and typical result. 
Instrumental conditioning Pavlovian conditioning Transfer test 
R1-O1 
R2-O2 
S1-O1 
S2-O2 
S1: R1 > R2 
S2: R1 < R2 
Note: R1 and R2 refer to instrumental responses. O1 and O2 refer to appetitive outcomes. S1 
and S2 refer to Pavlovian stimuli. Instrumental responding in the presence of the Pavlovian 
stimuli during the transfer test is usually assessed relative to either a baseline ‘no-stimulus’ 
period or a neutral stimulus.  
 
Outcome-selective PIT procedures were developed in rodents, but they are now 
also widely used in human experiments (e.g., Bray, Rangel, Shimojo, Balleine, & 
O’Doherty, 2008; Hogarth et al., 2007; Paredes-Olay, Abad, Gámez, & Rosas, 2002). 
There is, however, substantial variation in the procedures used to measure outcome-
selective PIT effects in humans. For example, some researchers use the approach that is 
used in animal experiments, and train neutral stimuli to predict rewarding outcomes in a 
Pavlovian conditioning phase (e.g., Bray et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 2007; Watson et al., 
2014). In contrast, others use pictorial stimuli that have pre-established Pavlovian 
associations with rewarding outcomes (Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; 
Hogarth, Maynard, & Munafò, 2015). The response measurement technique also varies. 
Some researchers allow unconstrained responding during the instrumental training and 
transfer test phases (e.g., Quail, Morris, & Balleine, 2016; Watson et al., 2014). Others 
use a forced-choice procedure in which response choice is assessed on every discrete 
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trial (e.g., Bray et al., 2008; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Martinovic et al., 2014). Finally, 
some researchers use real rewards during the training phases (Watson et al., 2014), 
while others use symbolic points or pictures (Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016; Hogarth, 2012; 
Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Quail et al., 2016). Each procedure has advantages and 
disadvantages, but they essentially give rise to a similar result: reward-associated 
stimuli tend to facilitate instrumental responses that are associated with a common 
rewarding outcome.  
1.3.3 General PIT 
 Corbit and Balleine (2005) provided perhaps the clearest demonstration of a PIT 
effect that is separable from outcome-selective PIT; they called this general PIT
2
. 
During instrumental training, rats were trained to perform two instrumental responses to 
earn distinct rewarding outcomes (R1-O1, R2-O2). Two stimuli were subsequently 
paired with each outcome (S1-O1, S2-O2), and a third stimulus was paired with a novel 
third outcome (S3-O3). In the critical transfer test, R1 and R2 responses were assessed 
in the presence of each Pavlovian stimulus, relative to a baseline ‘no-stimulus’ period. 
Rats also received either basolateral amygdala (BLA), amygdala central nucleus (CN), 
or sham lesions at the start of the experiment to explore the neural substrate of PIT.  
 The sham-lesioned rats demonstrated a clear outcome-selective PIT effect 
during the transfer test; S1 and S2 selectively increased R1 and R2 responses 
respectively, relative to the baseline response rate. Furthermore, a general PIT effect 
was also observed, where Pavlovian stimulus S3 increased R1 and R2 responses 
indiscriminately compared to the baseline response rate. The data therefore demonstrate 
a clear behavioural distinction between outcome-selective and general PIT. Similar 
                                                 
2
 Non-selective PIT designs measure instrumental responding for a single rewarding outcome. They 
therefore do not distinguish between outcome-selective and general PIT (Cartoni, Balleine, & Baldassarre, 
2016). 
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results have also recently been obtained in the human literature (Nadler, Delgado, & 
Delamater, 2011; Prévost, Liljeholm, Tyszka, & O’Doherty, 2012; Quail et al., 2016; 
Watson et al., 2014). Moreover, Corbit and Balleine (2005) reported a double 
dissociation at the neural level; BLA lesions abolished outcome-selective but not 
general PIT, while CN lesions abolished general but not outcome-selective PIT. 
Furthermore, lesions or inactivation of the nucleus accumbens (NAC) shell abolish 
outcome-selective but not general PIT, while lesions or inactivation of the NAC core 
abolish general but not outcome-selective PIT (Corbit & Balleine, 2011). Together, 
these data provide compelling evidence for two distinct ways in which Pavlovian cues 
influence instrumental behaviour.  
1.3.4 Non-appetitive forms of PIT 
The overview presented above might give the impression that PIT has only been 
studied in the appetitive domain (that is, by using biologically relevant outcomes such 
as food and drink). Whilst most PIT research has indeed used appetitive outcomes, non-
appetitive PIT effects have also been obtained. In humans, for instance, PIT effects have 
been observed for money, a rewarding but non-biologically relevant outcome (Allman, 
DeLeon, Cataldo, Holland, & Johnson, 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a). Aversive 
(sometimes called avoidance) PIT effects have also been obtained. Aversive PIT effects 
reflect the capacity of a Pavlovian stimulus that predicts a negative outcome to increase 
instrumental responses that have been trained to cancel or avoid that negative outcome. 
Thus, aversive PIT effects are fundamentally different from appetitive PIT effects, 
which demonstrate a tendency for reward-predictive stimuli to increase instrumental 
responses to obtain the same outcome. There is a growing body of literature exploring 
the psychological and neural basis of aversive PIT effects, with regard to non-selective, 
outcome-selective and general PIT (Campese, McCue, Lázaro-Muñoz, LeDoux, & Cain, 
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2013; Lewis, Niznikiewicz, Delamater, & Delgado, 2013; Trick, Hogarth, & Duka, 
2011). However, the current research focuses largely on appetitive PIT effects, so a 
comprehensive review of this literature is not provided here.  
1.4 PIT as a model of cue reactivity 
The literature discussed so far demonstrates that Pavlovian stimuli can influence 
instrumental responding in several distinct and important ways. The current research 
focuses primarily on the outcome-selective form of PIT, and it is therefore abbreviated 
to ‘PIT’ hereafter unless otherwise stated. PIT effects are widely researched for three 
primary reasons. First, PIT effects are theoretically interesting because they demonstrate 
an interaction between Pavlovian and instrumental processes. Second, PIT effects are 
extremely robust effects that persist even following experimental manipulations that 
aim to undermine their integrity (e.g., Delamater, 1996; Rescorla, 1994b). These 
manipulations are discussed more thoroughly below. Finally, PIT effects are of 
considerable applied interest. PIT effects have been implicated in a wide range of 
dysfunctional behaviours, including relapse to drug addiction (Everitt, Dickinson, & 
Robbins, 2001; Hogarth et al., 2013), alcohol dependency (Garbusow et al., 2015) and 
overeating behaviours (Watson et al., 2014; Watson, Wiers, Hommel, Ridderinkhof, & 
de Wit, 2016). In summary, PIT effects are studied because they are of both basic and 
applied interest. The section below now details some of the dominant psychological 
theories of PIT. 
1.5 Theories of PIT 
Psychological theories of PIT generally posit one of two fundamentally different 
mechanisms: an associative link mechanism, or a higher-order propositional process. 
The research in this thesis seeks evidence for each of these processes. The distinction 
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between associative links and propositions also accords with a long-standing debate in 
the human associative learning literature more generally (see Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009 for a review). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a 
comprehensive review of this debate, but a summary is provided below. 
1.5.1 The propositional versus dual-process debate 
Human associative learning is often suggested to reflect the formation of 
associative links between mental representations (e.g., de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
Dickinson, 2012; McLaren et al., 2014; Sternberg & McClelland, 2012). Repeatedly 
pairing a stimulus S with an outcome O during Pavlovian conditioning, for example, is 
suggested to produce an associative link between their mental representations. 
Importantly, associative links allow mental representations to transmit excitation or 
inhibition to other mental representations (Dickinson, 2012). Once an associative link 
has formed, activation can then automatically pass from one representation (e.g. the 
stimulus) to another (the outcome). The term “automatic” is used here in the sense that 
the activation is said to be fast, unintentional and non-strategic (Moors & De Houwer, 
2006). The ability of the stimulus S to activate the outcome O is not therefore suggested 
to be affected by deliberate decision processes. This link-based mechanism has been 
proposed to account for many associative learning phenomena. 
The “link-based” account of learning can be contrasted to the propositional 
account, which assumes that higher order cognitive processes are necessary for human 
associative learning (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; De Houwer, Vandorpe, & Beckers, 2005; 
Mitchell et al., 2009; Mitchell, Livesey, & Lovibond, 2007). Associative learning, 
therefore, is suggested to reflect an effortful, cognitively-demanding process that 
produces beliefs about the world in the form of propositions. It should be recognised 
that few proponents of the link-based process deny that humans can also learn through 
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propositional reasoning. Rather, they advocate a dual-process model of associative 
learning, suggesting that both propositions and associative links produce various 
associative learning phenomena (Heyes, 2012; McLaren et al., 2014). The key 
distinction here is that the propositional approach omits any reference to the link-
formation mechanism. According to the propositional account, human associative 
learning can only occur through the formation of conscious propositions that arise from 
inferential reasoning processes.  
The current research examines whether human PIT effects are best explained by 
an associative link mechanism, a higher-order propositional process, or a combination 
of both (a dual-process model). The dominant account of PIT, S-O-R theory, advocates 
an associative link mechanism (Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016; Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; de 
Wit & Dickinson, 2009, 2015; Watson et al., 2014). It therefore assumes that human 
PIT effects are, at least sometimes, mediated by automatic associative links. Alternative 
theories have also been proposed, including a hierarchical S:R-O model (e.g., Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1990b) and a propositional account of PIT (Hogarth et al., 2014; Seabrooke, 
Hogarth, & Mitchell, 2016). The sections below provide an overview of the evidence 
for each of these theories. 
1.5.2 S-O-R theory 
S-O-R theory is a widely supported model of PIT (Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016; 
Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; de Wit & Dickinson, 2015; 
Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Watson et al., 2014, 2016). It is 
an associative link-based account that derives from two-process models of instrumental 
learning (Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Trapold & Overmier, 1972). S-O-R theory 
proposes that, in a typical PIT task, Pavlovian conditioning fosters associative links 
between the mental representations of each stimulus S and outcome O (S-O). Hence, 
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presenting a Pavlovian stimulus during the transfer test should automatically activate 
the associated outcome representation. Instrumental training is similarly assumed to 
produce associative links between the mental representations of each instrumental 
response R and outcome O, but there is continued debate about the formation and 
structure of this association. Some researchers suggest that a bidirectional response-
outcome (R-O/O-R) association forms because of the direct contingency between the 
instrumental response and the outcome (Asratyan, 1974; Pavlov, 1932). Others propose 
that Pavlovian associations form between the outcomes and contextual stimuli that are 
present during instrumental training. The contextual stimuli then activate the outcome 
representation while the instrumental response is performed. Consequently, the 
contiguous activation of the outcome and response representation is suggested to 
produce a backwards outcome-response (O-R) association (Trapold & Overmier, 1972). 
For the sake of simplicity these accounts will be collectively referred to as outcome-
response (O-R) theory, because the learning processes are assumed to result in the same 
associative structure (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; de Wit, Niry, Wariyar, Aitken, & 
Dickinson, 2007). In each case, O-R associative links are suggested to control 
instrumental behaviour.   
S-O-R theory proposes that presenting a Pavlovian stimulus S during the PIT 
transfer test activates the associated outcome O via the S-O associative link. The 
outcome representation then activates and triggers the associated instrumental response 
R through the O-R associative link. Hence, PIT effects are suggested to operate via a 
stimulus-outcome-response (S-O-R) associative chain. S-O-R theory successfully 
predicts the selectivity of the PIT effect, because the stimulus activates only the 
outcome with which it was paired during Pavlovian conditioning. The outcome 
representation then activates only the instrumental response that it was paired with 
during the instrumental training phase (e.g., S1-O1-R1).  
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Notably, popular ideomotor theories of action control make very similar 
predictions to (S)-O-R theory with regard to the emergence of voluntary action control 
(e.g., Dutzi & Hommel, 2009; Elsner & Hommel, 2001, 2004; Hommel, 2013). Elsner 
and Hommel (2001), for example, suggested that actions are initially carried out 
randomly, and their sensory effects are registered. The mental representations 
underlying the motor responses then become associated with the sensory effect 
representations through a process of Hebbian learning (Hommel, 2015). In associative 
learning terminology, associative links form between the mental representations of 
responses and outcomes, providing the events are presented in a contingent and 
contiguous manner (Elsner & Hommel, 2004). Importantly, these response-outcome 
associations are assumed to operate bidirectionally, which allows activation of outcome 
representations to automatically activate associated instrumental responses (Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001; Kunde, 2004). The R-O associations can then be exploited to engage in 
goal-directed behaviour – thinking about goals (outcomes) should facilitate responses 
that have produced them in the past. Ideomotor theory therefore makes a similar 
assumption to S-O-R theory; goal-directed behaviours are suggested to reflect 
associative links between the mental representations of outcomes and associated 
instrumental responses. Although these theories evolved separately, there has been a 
concerted effort to unify them in recent years (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009, 2015; Eder, 
Rothermund, De Houwer, & Hommel, 2014; Watson, van Steenbergen, de Wit, Wiers, 
& Hommel, 2015; Wolfensteller & Ruge, 2012). The S-O-R model of PIT is a testament 
to this integration. The section below examines the key lines of support for S-O-R 
theory. 
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1.5.2.1 S-O-R theory as a model of instrumental behaviour 
Trapold and Overmier (1972) provided some of the earliest support for S-O-R 
theory. The experiment, which was conducted in rats, is outlined in Table ‎1.3 (adapted 
from Balleine and Ostlund, 2007). First, two neutral stimuli were trained to predict 
different rewarding outcomes (S1-O1, S2-O2). These stimuli then served as 
discriminative stimuli that signalled that one response would be reinforced with either 
O1 or O2, and the other response would not be reinforced. Half of the rats received a 
discriminative contingency that was congruent with the previously established 
Pavlovian relations. For example, if S1 and S2 were paired with O1 and O2 respectively 
during Pavlovian conditioning, then S1 might now signal that R1 would produce O1, 
and R2 would not be reinforced (S2 would signal the opposite – R2 would produce O2 
and R1 would produce nothing). The other rats received an incongruent discrimination; 
the stimuli predicted that one response would produce the opposite outcome to what it 
had previously signalled. Crucially, Trapold and Overmier (1972) found that the 
congruent discrimination was acquired more rapidly than the incongruent discrimination. 
This is regarded as evidence for S-O-R theory, because it suggests that the stimuli 
activated the outcomes that they were associated with during Pavlovian conditioning, 
which hindered acquisition of the new discriminative contingencies in the incongruent 
condition. 
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Table ‎1.3  
Design of Trapold and Overmier (1972). 
Group Training Test 
Congruent  
Incongruent 
S1-O1, S2-O2 
S1-O1, S2-O2 
S1: R1-O1, R2- ; S2: R1-, R2-O2 
S1: R1-O2, R2- ; S2: R1-, R2-O1 
Note: S1 and S2 represent stimuli, O1 and O2 represent outcomes, and R1 and R2 represent 
instrumental responses.  
 
More recently, two-stage priming tasks have provided support for ideomotor 
theory, and by extension, S-O-R theory (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Flach, Osman, 
Dickinson, & Heyes, 2006; Watson et al., 2015). In a typical two-stage priming task, 
participants first learn to perform two different responses, which are each followed by 
either a high or a low tone (R1-O1, R2-O2). These tones are then presented as 
imperative stimuli, and participants are required to select either R1 or R2 as quickly and 
as accurately as possible. Half of the participants are allocated to an action-consistent 
group, where the mapping of response to outcome is congruent in the training and test 
phases; presentation of O1 on test signals that participants should execute response R1, 
and O2 signals R2. The mappings are reversed for a second, action-inconsistent group 
(O1-R2 and O2-R1). The classic result is that the action-inconsistent group respond 
more slowly than the action-consistent group. Thus, in the action-inconsistent group, the 
automatic activation of R1 by O1 (due to the O1-R1 binding) is suggested to interfere 
with the execution of the instructed R2 in response to O1. This lends credence to S-O-R 
theory, in which the anticipation of outcomes is suggested to automatically trigger 
associated instrumental responses.   
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1.5.2.2 S-O-R theory as a model of PIT 
The results discussed above provide support for S-O-R theory as a general 
model of instrumental behaviour. There is, however, reason to believe that it may not 
provide a full account of PIT specifically. The primary evidence for this comes from the 
outcome devaluation procedure, which is the diagnostic test for determining whether an 
instrumental response is goal-directed or habitual (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
Dickinson, 1985). Outcome devaluation procedures typically consist of three phases. 
First, an instrumental response R is trained to predict a rewarding outcome O. The value 
of the outcome is then reduced. In rodents, outcome devaluation is typically achieved by 
repeatedly pairing the outcome with a toxin (e.g., Adams, 1982; Adams & Dickinson, 
1981), or by allowing ad libitum consumption to induce satiety (e.g., Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1985b). Human devaluation procedures also use satiation (Tricomi, Balleine, 
& O’Doherty, 2009; Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007) and aversion techniques 
(typically by making the outcome taste unpleasant; e.g., Eder and Dignath, 2016b; Rose, 
Brown, Field, & Hogarth, 2013). Participants are also sometimes given health warnings 
(Hogarth & Chase, 2011) or instructions to devalue the outcomes (Allman et al., 2010; 
de Wit et al., 2007; de Wit, Ridderinkhof, Fletcher, & Dickinson, 2013; Eder & Dignath, 
2016a). Reduced responding for the devalued outcome is regarded as evidence for goal-
directed control, because the response satisfies both the belief and desire criteria for 
goal-directed action. Continued responding for the devalued outcome, by contrast, is 
considered evidence for automatic or habitual control (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
Heyes & Dickinson, 1990). 
One of the most interesting and counterintuitive aspects of PIT is that it is often 
insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990a; Corbit, 
Janak, & Balleine, 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; 
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Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 2014). Hogarth (2012), for example, trained smokers to 
perform one instrumental response to earn tobacco points and another instrumental 
response to earn chocolate points (R1-O1, R2-O2). Either the tobacco or chocolate (O1 
or O2) was then devalued by having participants ingest nicotine replacement therapy 
nasal spray, or consume chocolate until it was no longer desirable. Response choice (R1 
versus R2) was then tested in the presence of pictorial stimuli that were associated with 
the tobacco and chocolate outcomes, and a neutral control stimulus. Overall response 
choice was biased towards the still-valued outcome during the transfer test, indicating 
goal-directed control. Paradoxically, a PIT effect was still observed; the tobacco and 
chocolate cues elevated responding for the outcome with which they had previously 
been paired, and this elevation was similar regardless of whether the outcome had been 
devalued. Thus, the PIT effect was said to be insensitive to outcome devaluation. 
Rodent PIT experiments have consistently observed insensitivity to devaluation 
(Colwill & Rescorla, 1990a; Corbit et al., 2007; Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994b). 
Hogarth's (2012) data are also supported by other human experiments showing that PIT 
effects are robust against health warnings (Hogarth & Chase, 2011) and food satiation 
(Watson et al., 2014). It should be noted that there are also several recent reports of 
sensitivity to devaluation in the human literature (Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 
2016a, 2016b). These latter studies reported that taste aversion (Eder & Dignath, 2016b) 
and instructed devaluation (Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a) procedures 
reduced PIT. Thus, the human literature is mixed. It seems likely that procedural 
differences underlie these inconsistent results. These differences are discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 3, where the effect of outcome devaluation on PIT is examined 
further.  
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Aside from the recent demonstrations of sensitivity to devaluation in the human 
PIT literature, it is fair to say that PIT is often argued to be insensitive to devaluation 
(e.g., Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth et al., 2013). As 
noted above, insensitivity to devaluation is the canonical assay for habitual control (de 
Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 1985). Note that PIT effects do not appear to reflect 
a habitual response that is mediated by a direct stimulus-response (S-R) association 
(Watson et al., 2014; although see Cohen-Hatton, Haddon, George, & Honey, 2013 for 
an alternative interpretation). PIT experiments explicitly avoid presenting and 
reinforcing the Pavlovian and instrumental responses together, precisely to prevent a 
direct stimulus-response association forming. Instead, S-O-R theory proposes that PIT 
effects are mediated by the outcome representation, but they are automatic because they 
are not modulated by changes in outcome value (and hence do not meet the desire 
criterion for goal-directed action). More specifically, the stimulus is suggested to 
activate the identity (through its sensory properties) of the associated outcome, but not 
its value (Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Martinovic et al., 2014; Rescorla, 
1994b). In this way, S-O-R theory successfully reconciles the selectivity of the PIT 
effect with its apparent insensitivity to devaluation. The sections below outline the other 
key advantages of S-O-R theory. 
1.5.2.3 Compulsive cue reactivity 
The amended S-O-R model, in which the stimulus activates only the identity of 
the outcome representation, has become the dominant model of PIT (Alarcón & Bonardi, 
2016; Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; de Wit & Dickinson, 
2015; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; 
Watson et al., 2014, 2016). A key advantage of S-O-R theory is that, by virtue of its 
ability to explain PIT’s insensitivity to devaluation, it provides a straightforward 
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mechanism by which behaviour might become dysfunctional. S-O-R theory is a link-
based model, and therefore assumes that PIT effects can (at least sometimes) be 
automatic or outside of intentional control. This automaticity closely emulates the 
compulsive and pervasive nature of pathological reward-seeking behaviours, including 
drug addiction (Hogarth et al., 2013) and compulsive overeating (Colagiuri & Lovibond, 
2015; Watson et al., 2014). Thus, S-O-R theory is favoured because it provides a 
straightforward and intuitive explanation of the destructive nature of pathological cue 
reactivity. 
1.5.2.4 Irrationality 
 The insensitivity of PIT to outcome devaluation provides good evidence for the 
S-O-R account of PIT. An even stronger argument has also been put forward: PIT 
effects are said to be exclusively predicted by S-O-R theory (de Wit & Dickinson, 2015). 
The argument here is that the Pavlovian stimuli already predict the outcomes - the 
outcomes are not (usually) contingent on instrumental responses during Pavlovian 
conditioning. In the transfer test, the Pavlovian stimuli should (based on their predictive 
history) therefore continue to produce the outcomes, even without an instrumental 
response. PIT effects, where Pavlovian stimuli seemingly arbitrarily potentiate 
responding for the common outcome, are therefore deemed irrational. The implication 
is that PIT effects must then be mediated by an automatic associative link mechanism 
rather than a controlled propositional process (de Wit & Dickinson, 2015).  
 The “irrationality” argument has featured repeatedly in the dual-process versus 
propositional debate of human associative learning (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2009; Shanks, 
2007). In truth, irrational effects are unlikely to provide conclusive evidence for a link-
formation mechanism (De Houwer, 2014). Many associative learning phenomena seem 
irrational, but this does not preclude the role of (albeit sometimes suboptimal) 
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inferential reasoning processes. Irrational effects can, at least in principle, be reconciled 
with the propositional approach by recognising that controlled reasoning processes are 
not always perfect (Mitchell et al., 2009). 
S-O-R theory is, nevertheless, a very successful theory of PIT. Other theories 
have also been proposed, most notably including a hierarchical (S: R-O) theory that has 
provided a long-standing challenge to S-O-R theory (Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; Cartoni, 
Moretta, Puglisi-Allegra, Cabib, & Baldassarre, 2015; Colwill & Rescorla, 1990b; de 
Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth et al., 2014; Rescorla, 1991). The current research 
primarily tests S-O-R theory against a recently developed propositional theory of PIT 
that is discussed below. However, there is compelling evidence for a hierarchical 
mechanism in PIT, and much of this evidence inspired the propositional theory that is 
tested in this thesis. Indeed, although the propositional approach makes some additional 
assumptions, the hierarchical and propositional accounts are largely complementary 
approaches. The hierarchical S: R-O account is therefore outlined briefly below. 
1.5.3 Hierarchical S: R-O theory 
Similar to S-O-R theory, hierarchical S: R-O theory proposes that Pavlovian 
conditioning produces stimulus-outcome (S-O) associations. Importantly, instrumental 
training is suggested to establish forward response-outcome (R-O) associations. In the 
transfer test, the stimulus is then argued to “set the occasion” for the associated 
instrumental relationship. More informally, the stimulus S is suggested to increase the 
perceived probability that the associated response R will be reinforced. The section 
below highlights some key evidence for hierarchical S: R-O theory.  
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1.5.3.1 Biconditional effects 
Rescorla's (1990) biconditional design (summarised in Table ‎1.4) provided some 
of the earliest support for hierarchical S: R-O theory. Two discriminative stimuli (Sd1 
and Sd2) were initially trained to signal opposite response-outcome (R-O) relations. Sd1 
signalled that R1 and R2 responses would produce outcomes O1 and O2, respectively. 
Sd2, by contrast, signalled that R1 and R2 would produce O2 and O1, respectively. A 
further two auditory stimuli (S1 and S2) were also trained to predict these outcomes. S1 
signalled that both responses would produce O1, and S2 signalled that both responses 
would produce O2 (see Table ‎1.4). At the end of training, each instrumental response 
signalled both outcomes equally, but in different contexts. Sd1 and Sd2 were then 
presented in compound with either stimulus S1 or S2, and response choice was tested in 
extinction. S-O-R theory does not predict any response bias under these circumstances, 
because the outcomes are equally associated with each response. The stimulus 
compounds should therefore produce response conflict, and no bias should be observed. 
As can be seen in Table 1.4, however, a clear bias was observed. In compound with Sd1, 
S1 and S2 increased R1 and R2 respectively. The pattern was reversed when S1 and S2 
were presented with Sd2. Thus, the elements of each stimulus compound combined to 
selectively signal the instrumental response that was most likely to be reinforced. Such 
a result depends on hierarchical knowledge of the discriminative stimuli in signalling 
particular response-outcome (R-O) relations.   
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Table ‎1.4 
Design and results of Rescorla (1990, Experiment 4). 
Training Summation test 
Sd1: R1-O1, R2-O2 
Sd2: R1-O2, R2-O1 
S1: R1-O1, R2-O1 
S2: R1-O2, R2-O2 
Sd1 + S1: R1 > R2 
Sd1 + S2: R1 < R2 
Sd2 + S1: R1 < R2 
Sd2 + S2: R1 > R2 
Note: Sd1 and Sd2 refer to visual discriminative stimuli. S1 and S2 refer to auditory Pavlovian 
stimuli. R1 and R2 refer to instrumental responses and O1 and O2 refer to appetitive outcomes. 
 
Rescorla's (1990) data are clearly more consistent with hierarchical S: R-O 
theory than S-O-R theory, because the effect cannot be readily explained by appealing 
to binary S-O and R-O/O-R associations. It is of course possible that both hierarchical S: 
R-O and binary S-O-R associations control instrumental behaviour under different 
circumstances, and that Rescorla’s procedure was not optimised to detect the latter 
process (see Rescorla 1994a for some evidence of this). It should also be noted that 
Rescorla (1990) did not use a true PIT procedure, because the discriminative and 
Pavlovian stimuli were paired with the instrumental responses during training. The 
result has, however, recently been replicated in a human PIT procedure (Hardy, 
Mitchell, Seabrooke, & Hogarth, in revision). Experiment 6 (Chapter 3) extends Hardy 
et al.’s results, so their experimental design and results are discussed more thoroughly in 
that chapter.  
1.5.3.2 Reinforcement probability estimates 
More recent evidence for the hierarchical account in humans comes from 
Cartoni et al. (2015), who established Pavlovian (S1-O1, S2-O2) and instrumental (R1-
O1, R2-O2) contingencies in a typical PIT procedure. Instrumental responses had a 33% 
probability of reinforcement in one group, and a 100% probability of reinforcement in 
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the other group. In the transfer test, instrumental responding was then assessed in the 
presence of Pavlovian stimuli S1 and S2, relative to a baseline period. The hierarchical 
account predicts a stronger PIT effect in the 33% probability group, because there is 
more opportunity for the Pavlovian stimulus to resolve uncertainty about outcome 
probability in this condition. A typical PIT effect was observed in each group, where the 
Pavlovian stimuli selectively increased the response that was paired with a common 
outcome. Crucially, the 33% reinforcement group showed a significantly larger PIT 
effect than the 100% reinforcement group. That is, the PIT effect was more robust when 
the instrumental contingencies were more uncertain during the training phase. Clearly, 
this finding accords very well with hierarchical S: R-O theory. 
It should be noted that Cartoni et al. (2015) observed a PIT effect even in the 
100% contingency condition. This suggests that there may also be other factors 
involved, besides the probability account put forward by the authors. Nevertheless, it is 
a striking demonstration of how PIT effects can be influenced by manipulating the 
schedule of reinforcement. Notably, S-O-R theory predicts the opposite result. More 
probable instrumental training would produce stronger O-R links, which should allow 
the Pavlovian stimuli to prime the instrumental responses more strongly. The 
experiment is therefore useful because it sets the S-O-R and hierarchical S: R-O models 
against one another. As Cartoni et al. (2015) noted, the results provide strong support 
for the hierarchical account of PIT. 
1.5.3.3 Extinction 
Further evidence for the hierarchical account comes from experiments 
demonstrating that PIT is immune to Pavlovian extinction treatments, but is profoundly 
influenced by discriminative extinction training (Delamater, 1996; Gámez & Rosas, 
2005; Hogarth et al., 2014; Rescorla, 1992a; Rosas, Paredes-Olay, García-Gutiérrez, 
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Espinosa, & Abad, 2010; although see Bezzina et al., 2016 and Lovibond et al., 2015 
for recent exceptions in the case of non-selective PIT). Hogarth et al. (2014), for 
example, used the design outlined in Table ‎1.5. Smokers were first trained to perform 
two instrumental responses to earn cigarette and chocolate points (R1-O1, R2-O2). Two 
stimuli were then trained to produce tobacco points (S1-O1, S2-O1), and another two 
stimuli were trained to produce chocolate points (S3-O2, S4-O2). One Pavlovian 
stimulus (S2 and S4) signalling each outcome was then extinguished (i.e. no longer 
reinforced). In the subsequent transfer test, instrumental response choice was tested in 
the presence of each stimulus.  
Table ‎1.5 
Design and results of Hogarth et al. (2014, Experiment 1). 
Instrumental 
conditioning 
Pavlovian 
conditioning 
Pavlovian extinction 
training 
Transfer 
test 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
S1 – O1 
S2 – O1 
S3 – O2 
S4 – O2 
S1 – O1 
S2 – no O1 
S3 – O2 
S4 – no O2 
S1: R1 > R2 
S2: R1 > R2 
S3: R1 < R2 
S4: R1 < R2 
Note: R1 and R2 refer to instrumental responses, S1-S4 refer to Pavlovian stimuli, and O1 and 
O2 refer to appetitive outcomes. 
 
A typical PIT effect was observed, where the non-extinguished Pavlovian 
stimuli selectively enhanced the instrumental response that was paired with the same 
outcome. Crucially, the extinguished stimuli also produced a PIT effect that was of a 
similar magnitude to the non-extinguished cues. It is well known that extinction 
treatments do not erase the original learning, but the strength of the association is still 
usually reduced (Bouton, 2004). S-O-R theory predicts that PIT effects depend on the 
Pavlovian stimulus activating the associated outcome representation. The PIT effect 
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should, therefore, be reduced when the S-O association is weak. Hence, the insensitivity 
of the PIT effect to Pavlovian extinction treatments is problematic for S-O-R theory.  
Direct support for hierarchical S: R-O theory comes from studies showing that 
PIT is sensitive to discriminative extinction training. Hogarth et al. (2014) again 
provided a good example of this. Table ‎1.6 shows their design. Participants first learnt 
to perform one response to earn beer points and another response to earn chocolate 
points (R1-O1, R2-O2). For an extinction group, the R1-O1 contingency was then 
extinguished in the presence of one discriminative stimulus S1, but not in the presence 
of a second stimulus S2 (see Table ‎1.6). A control group experienced these 
discriminative contingencies but did not undergo discriminative extinction training. 
Both groups then learnt to perform two new instrumental responses to earn each 
outcome (R3-O1, R4-O2). Finally, choice of these new instrumental responses (R3 vs 
R4) was assessed in the presence of stimulus S1 and S2. The question was whether the 
discriminative extinction training would influence the ability of S1 to increase R3 to 
obtain O1.  
A PIT effect was observed for O1 in the non-extinction group. Stimulus S1 
selectively increased choice of R3 – both paired with O1 – during the transfer test. 
Crucially, a comparable effect was not observed in the extinction group, which suggests 
that the discriminative extinction training successfully abolished the PIT effect. This 
result lends credence to the hierarchical prediction that the Pavlovian stimuli serve as 
discriminative stimuli in the PIT transfer test. That is, they signal which instrumental 
response is more likely to be reinforced. When training is provided that undermines this 
signalling function, the PIT effect is abolished. Clearly, this result provides strong 
support for the hierarchical S: R-O account of PIT.  
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Table ‎1.6 
Design of Hogarth et al.(2014, Experiment 2). 
Instrumental 
conditioning  
Discriminative 
extinction training 
Instrumental 
conditioning   
Test 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
Extinction group 
S1: R1-no O1, R2-O2 
S2: R1-O1, R2-O2 
Non-Extinction group 
S1: R1-O1, R2-O2 
S2: R1-O1, R2-O2 
R3 – O1 
R4 – O2 
S1: R3/R4 
S2: R3/R4 
Note: R1-R4 refers to instrumental responses, S1 and S2 refer to discriminative stimuli, and O1 
and O2 refer to appetitive outcomes. 
 
The results discussed above provide compelling evidence for the hierarchical 
account of PIT. As noted above, this evidence (alongside other recent experiments 
described below) inspired the propositional EU theory that the current research tests. 
Indeed, both the hierarchical and propositional theories propose that the Pavlovian 
stimulus S signals which response R is more likely to be reinforced during the PIT 
transfer test. The key distinction between the hierarchical and propositional theories is 
that the propositional account makes the explicit claim that the hierarchical mechanism 
is encoded propositionally (Hogarth et al., 2014; Hogarth, Maynard, et al., 2015; 
Hogarth & Troisi, 2015; Seabrooke et al., 2016). That is, PIT effects are assumed to 
require effortful inferential reasoning processes and verbalizable knowledge of the 
Pavlovian and instrumental contingencies.  The section below outlines the propositional 
EU account more thoroughly, and then details two key lines of support.  
1.5.4 Propositional expected utility theory 
The propositional EU account proposes that PIT effects are driven by an EU 
function that reflects judgements about both the outcome’s value (Ov) and probability 
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(Op) (Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009; Mongin, 1997; Schultz, 2006). 
When multiple responses are available, such as in PIT tasks, the response with the 
highest utility estimate is chosen. In a typical PIT transfer test, the Pavlovian stimulus is 
suggested to increase the perceived probability of the associated outcome Op, providing 
the associated instrumental response is performed (Cartoni et al., 2015; Cartoni, Puglisi-
Allegra, & Baldassarre, 2013; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth et al., 2014; Seabrooke et al., 
2016). That is, participants may infer that the cue tells the participant which outcome is 
most likely to be earnt on that trial. This cue-evoked increase in Op is assumed to 
underlie the basic PIT effect: the stimulus S selectively signals the response R that 
shares a common outcome O by increasing the perceived probability of that outcome’s 
Op.  
So how does this propositional ‘decision-making’ account explain PIT’s 
insensitivity to devaluation? When a stimulus signals a devalued outcome, it signals a 
high-probability (high Op) outcome that is of low value (low Ov). The other outcome 
retains a high outcome value Ov, but has a low probability Op. These conditions might 
foster a high utility estimate for the devalued outcome because the probability estimate 
Op is so high in the presence of the cue. Indeed, participants might even infer that the 
cue signals that the alternative, valued outcome is completely unavailable (zero 
probability Op). In other words, participants may respond for the cued, devalued 
outcome because it is perceived to be much more available than the alternative outcome, 
and this difference in availability may outweigh the difference in value. Although this 
account remains to be formally tested, there are two key lines of evidence (discussed 
below) that support the propositional EU model of PIT.  
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1.5.4.1 Contingency awareness  
Initial support for the propositional model came from the observation that 
participants only demonstrate PIT effects when they can verbalise the Pavlovian and 
instrumental contingencies (Hogarth et al., 2007). Similar findings have also been 
reported using non-selective PIT designs (Bezzina et al., 2016; Lovibond et al., 2015; 
Talmi et al., 2008). Indeed, researchers now routinely exclude participants who do not 
demonstrate explicit contingency awareness, precisely because they do not typically 
demonstrate PIT effects (e.g., Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2013; 
Nadler et al., 2011). This dependency on explicit awareness of the relevant 
contingencies is consistent with conclusions from the Pavlovian conditioning literature 
more generally (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009; Shanks & St John, 
1994). Of course, the finding that PIT effects depend on explicit contingency 
knowledge does not mean that PIT effects are necessarily under voluntary control 
(Bezzina et al., 2016). Awareness may correlate with PIT effects without playing a 
causal role in its generation. Nevertheless, the finding that participants only usually 
show PIT effects when they are able to report explicit contingency awareness fits with 
the propositional prediction that PIT effects depend on explicit contingency knowledge. 
1.5.4.2 Verbal instructions 
Further support for the propositional model comes from the finding that PIT is 
sensitive to post-training instructional manipulations. Hogarth et al. (2014), for example, 
trained participants to perform one response to earn beer points and another response to 
earn chocolate points. Response choice was then tested in the presence of pictorial beer 
or chocolate stimuli, or a neutral stimulus. During the transfer test, half of the 
participants were instructed that the pictures did not indicate which response was more 
likely to be rewarded. The non-instructed group showed a PIT effect, where the beer 
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and chocolate stimuli selectively increased responding for their respective outcomes, 
relative to the neutral stimulus. Crucially, the PIT effect was attenuated in the instructed 
group, and was completely abolished in participants who did not believe that the stimuli 
signalled which response would be rewarded. In a similar vein, Seabrooke et al. (2016) 
recently reported a complete reversal of response choice in participants who had been 
instructed that the pictures indicated which response would not be rewarded. In each 
case, the size of the cueing effect correlated with expectancy ratings – that is, 
participants’ self-reported expectation that the stimuli signalled which response was 
more likely to be rewarded during the transfer test. Together, these data support the 
suggestion that PIT might not reflect an automatic process, but rather a high-level, 
propositional process. 
1.6 The current research 
The research discussed above demonstrates a paradox in the PIT literature. On 
the one hand, PIT is often insensitive to outcome devaluation, which implies that it is 
relatively automatic. On the other hand, PIT is sensitive to verbal instructions, which 
suggests that it is mediated by a high-level propositional process. The propositional EU 
account of PIT provides a possible resolution to this paradox. However, there are 
several important aspects of this theory that are currently untested. A core aim of the 
current research, therefore, is to test the propositional EU account of PIT. The 
experiments in Chapter 2 first aim to replicate the reversed cueing effect observed by 
Seabrooke et al. (2016) in a PIT task. They also use either a speeded reaction time task 
or a concurrent load task to seek evidence for an underlying S-O-R mechanism when 
propositional processes are unlikely to control behaviour. Chapter 3 details the 
development of a novel, very strong devaluation procedure to test whether this renders 
PIT sensitive to outcome devaluation. Subsequent experiments also use this devaluation 
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procedure to test whether PIT is insensitive to devaluation even when an S-O-R 
mechanism cannot readily control behaviour. In Chapter 4, both outcome value and 
perceived outcome probability are systematically manipulated to test the propositional 
EU theory of PIT. Finally, the results are discussed in Chapter 5, with the aim of 
providing a cohesive model of PIT that best accounts for the observed data.  
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Chapter 2: Time pressure and 
concurrent load 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined the key theories of PIT. The current work aims to test the dominant 
dual-process theory against the propositional EU theory of PIT. The focus is therefore 
narrowed to these theories henceforth. To briefly reiterate, the dual-process account 
proposes that Pavlovian and instrumental training fosters stimulus-outcome (S-O) and 
outcome-response (O-R) associative links. When a Pavlovian stimulus S is presented 
during the PIT transfer test, it is suggested to activate the mental representation of the 
associated outcome O. The outcome representation then triggers the associated 
instrumental response R via an S-O-R associative chain (Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016; 
Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; de Wit & Dickinson, 2015; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 
2011; Holland, 2004; Watson et al., 2014, 2016). Furthermore, the S-O-R mechanism is 
assumed to operate automatically and without flexible motivational control. The 
automaticity of the S-O-R mechanism allows the dual-process account to explain why 
PIT effects are often insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations (Hogarth, 2012; 
Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Watson et al., 2014).  
The dual-process account of PIT can be contrasted to the propositional account, 
which proposes that PIT effects reflect controlled processes that are based on explicit 
awareness of the Pavlovian and instrumental contingencies. When a Pavlovian stimulus 
is presented during the transfer test, participants are assumed to use effortful reasoning 
processes to infer that the Pavlovian stimulus S signals which instrumental response R 
is more likely to be reinforced. Hence, the Pavlovian stimulus is suggested to increase 
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the perceived probability (Op) of the associated outcome, providing the associated 
instrumental response is performed.  
It is clear that both the dual-process and propositional accounts have received 
empirical support. The insensitivity of PIT to devaluation provides evidence of 
automaticity, and is therefore a key line of support for the dual-process account of PIT 
(Colwill & Rescorla, 1990a; Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; 
Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 2014). The finding that PIT is sensitive 
to instructional manipulations provides the primary support for the propositional 
account (Hogarth et al., 2014; Seabrooke et al., 2016). This instructional sensitivity 
favours the propositional approach because it is consistent with the suggestion that PIT 
effects are mediated by explicit inferences about the signalling role of the Pavlovian 
stimuli presented during the transfer test.  
The instructional sensitivity discussed above suggests that propositional 
processes can play an important role in PIT. However, it does not confirm that an 
automatic S-O-R mechanism does not produce PIT effects in other circumstances. It is 
certainly possible that both propositional and S-O-R link processes contribute to PIT 
effects, but that Hogarth et al. (2014) and Seabrooke et al.'s (2016) instructional 
experiments were not optimised to detect automaticity. This dual-process account, 
which proposes that PIT effects can be mediated by both link-based S-O-R and higher 
order propositional processes, is in line with popular dual-process accounts of 
associative learning more generally (e.g., McLaren et al., 2014; Sternberg & 
McClelland, 2012). 
It is worth emphasising here that the propositional account outlined by Mitchell 
et al. (2009) makes a clear distinction between learning and performance effects 
(section 3.2, page 187). Mitchell et al.'s (2009) propositional approach assumes that 
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human associative learning depends on higher order cognition. However, their theory is 
open to the idea that performance effects may be automatic. PIT is a performance 
(rather than learning) effect, because response choice during the transfer test reflects 
contingency knowledge acquired during the preceding training phases. The 
demonstration of an “automatic” PIT effect would not, therefore, challenge the 
propositional account of associative learning put forward by Mitchell et al. (2009). It 
would, however, provide good evidence against the propositional account of PIT that 
was described in Chapter 1. 
The current experiments sought evidence of an automatic PIT effect when 
propositional processes were unlikely to control behaviour. S-O-R theory assumes that 
PIT effects reflect the automatic operation of associative links. Propositional inferences, 
by contrast, are assumed to require both time and controlled reasoning processes that 
have a finite capacity (Mitchell et al., 2009). The dual-process account suggests that PIT 
effects can be mediated by both an S-O-R link mechanism and propositional processes. 
Importantly, the automatic S-O-R mechanism may only be detectable when the 
propositional system is otherwise engaged (McLaren et al., 2014). One way to test for 
an underlying automatic process, then, is to implement a procedure that renders it 
difficult for participants to use propositional processes. This approach has been widely 
used to test dual-process accounts of other associative learning phenomena (De Houwer 
& Beckers, 2003; de Wit et al., 2013; Karazinov & Boakes, 2007; Le Pelley, Oakeshott, 
& McLaren, 2005; Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren, & Rolland, 2011). The aim here is to 
maximise the opportunity to detect automaticity by reducing participants’ ability to use 
controlled processes. 
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2.2 Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 built on Seabrooke et al.'s (2016) reversal instruction experiment, 
where participants learnt to perform one instrumental response (R1) to earn beer points 
(O1) and another response (R2) to earn chocolate points (O2). Outcomes were presented 
as the statement “You win”, alongside a picture of beer or chocolate, depending on the 
outcome. In the subsequent transfer test, response choice (R1 versus R2) was assessed 
in the presence of the beer and chocolate pictures that were used during training, or a 
neutral stimulus. Crucially, half of the participants were instructed that the pictures 
indicated which response would not be rewarded during the transfer test. Seabrooke et 
al.'s procedure is referred to as an outcome-response (O-R) task, because the outcome 
pictures that were used during training also served as Pavlovian stimuli during the 
transfer test. Thus, it was possible for the instrumental responses and outcome pictures 
to become associated with one another during the training phase. 
Seabrooke et al.’s (2016) design was a hybrid procedure that reflected the 
critical aspects of typical PIT tasks and ideomotor paradigms. It allowed links to be 
made between the two fields, and thus went some way to testing the ideomotor (S-O-R) 
account of PIT. A typical cueing effect was observed in the Non-Reversal group. The 
beer picture increased the response that had produced beer during the training phase, 
and the chocolate picture similarly increased the chocolate response (relative to the 
neutral stimulus). The opposite effect was observed in the Reversal group; the beer and 
chocolate pictures increased the chocolate and beer responses, respectively. This 
sensitivity to the reversal instruction was interpreted as evidence for the role of 
propositional processes in cue-elicited response choice. 
Experiment 1 first aimed to demonstrate Seabrooke et al.'s (2016)  reversal 
effect in a PIT experiment (where the instrumental responses and pictorial stimuli were 
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not presented together prior to the transfer test). A 2 × 2 × 3 design was used, with 
instruction (Non-Reversal, Reversal) and speed group (Slow, Fast) as between-subjects 
variables, and stimulus (beer, neutral and chocolate) as the within-subjects factor. 
Table ‎2.1 outlines the design. Participants first learned to perform one instrumental 
response (R1) to obtain beer points (O1), and another instrumental response (R2) to 
obtain chocolate points (O2). Instrumental response choice (R1 versus R2) was then 
tested in the presence of a stimulus that depicted each outcome (pictures of beer or 
chocolate), or a neutral stimulus. Familiar, pre-trained Pavlovian cues were used to first 
be consistent with the previous instructional experiments (Hogarth et al., 2014; 
Seabrooke et al., 2016), and secondly because these pictorial stimuli have very well-
established associations with their outcomes. They might, therefore, be more likely to 
produce evidence of automaticity than stimuli that are only weakly associated with the 
outcomes.  
Table ‎2.1 
 
Instrumental training and transfer test phases of Experiment 1.  
Instrumental training Transfer test 
R1-O1 
R2-O2 
S0: R1/R2? 
S1: R1/R2? 
S2: R1/R2? 
Note: R1 and R2 refer to instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses). O1 and O2 
refer to outcomes (beer and chocolate points). S0 refers to a neutral stimulus, and S1 and S2 
refer to pictures of O1 and O2, respectively.  
 
A typical PIT effect, where the beer and chocolate pictures increase choice of 
the responses that were trained to produce those outcomes, was expected in the Non-
Reversal group. Consistent with Seabrooke et al. (2016), half of the participants were 
allocated to a Reversal instruction group at the start of the experiment, and were 
instructed just prior to the transfer test that the pictures signalled which response would 
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not be rewarded. A reversed PIT effect, in which the beer and chocolate stimuli 
increased the responses that had not produced those outcomes during instrumental 
training, was anticipated. Such instructional sensitivity would confirm that higher order 
propositional processes play an important role not only in the O-R design used by 
Seabrooke et al. (2016), but also in PIT procedures where the stimuli and responses are 
not paired prior to the transfer test. The demonstration of a standard (non-reversed) PIT 
effect in the Reversal instruction group, by contrast, would suggest that the PIT effect is 
automatic because of its insensitivity to the reversal instruction. 
Participants were also allocated to a Slow or Fast condition at the start of the 
experiment. The Slow group had unlimited time to respond during the transfer test. The 
Fast group, by contrast, were required to respond within time limits that were 
customised for each participant by pre-testing their reaction time in a practice speed task. 
The speed manipulation aimed to reduce participants’ ability to employ effortful and 
time-consuming reasoning processes during the transfer test, and therefore provide a 
better opportunity to detect an automatic S-O-R mechanism. 
The propositional account predicts that PIT effects are entirely dependent on the 
operation of higher order cognitive processes. Both the non-reversed and reversed PIT 
effect should therefore be abolished in the Fast group (assuming the speed manipulation 
completely eliminates participants’ ability to utilise propositional processes). That is, 
the propositional approach predicts that the beer and chocolate stimuli will not influence 
response choice in either the Non-Reversal Fast or the Reversal Fast condition. 
The dual-process account makes different predictions. Associative links are 
assumed to operate automatically, and may therefore be revealed when participants do 
not have sufficient time to reason (e.g., Karazinov & Boakes, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2009; 
Shanks, 2007; Sternberg & McClelland, 2012). Hence, a non-reversal PIT effect should 
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be observed in the Non-Reversal Fast group, because the automatic S-O-R mechanism 
should not be influenced by time pressure. A reversed PIT effect may also be observed 
in the Reversal Slow group, because the dual-process account allows propositional 
processes to control behaviour when the task is not demanding. Crucially, the dual-
process account predicts an automatic non-reversal PIT effect in the Reversal Fast 
group, because the propositional process should be unable to control behaviour. 
Assuming the speed manipulation completely eliminates participants’ ability to reason, 
the dual-process account predicts that evidence of automaticity should be revealed. 
Hence, a standard (non-reversed) PIT effect should be observed in the Reversal Fast 
group. Such a result would provide especially strong evidence for the dual-process 
account of PIT. 
Expectancy ratings for the cued outcome were also reported after the transfer 
test. A correlation between expectancy beliefs and the strength of the PIT effect would 
not necessarily mean that expectancies play a causal role in generating PIT effects. 
However, such a relationship would be consistent with the propositional prediction that 
PIT effects are mediated by a belief that the Pavlovian stimulus signals which response 
is more likely to be rewarded during the transfer test.   
Reaction times were also recorded throughout the transfer test to test whether an 
ideomotor effect, where the Non-Reversal Slow group respond more quickly than the 
Reversal Slow group, would be observed (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Flach et al., 
2006; Watson et al., 2015). Ideomotor theory is often coupled with S-O-R theory in the 
PIT literature (e.g., de Wit & Dickinson, 2009, 2015; Hogarth et al., 2013; Watson et al., 
2015). However, the propositional model also predicts a similar effect. The 
propositional model predicts that the reversed PIT effect should require more time to 
execute than the non-reversal PIT effect because participants must integrate knowledge 
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about the trained instrumental contingencies with the information provided by the 
instruction. The Non-Reversal group, by contrast, need only apply their knowledge of 
the trained instrumental contingencies. Although the theories predict the same result, 
reaction times were nevertheless recorded to test the prediction. 
Finally, participants completed an operation span (OSPAN) task (e.g., Turner & 
Engle, 1989) to measure working memory capacity. The specific task was developed by 
Wills, Milton, Longmore, Hester, and  Robinson (2013). The propositional model 
predicts that PIT effects depend on cognitive variables including working memory. A 
relationship might therefore be expected between OSPAN scores and the size of the PIT 
effect.  
2.2.1 Method 
Participants. Ninety-two participants (61 females, aged between 18 and 30; 
mean, M = 20.20, standard error of the mean, SEM = 0.25 years), completed the 
experiment for course credit. Participants provided written informed consent at the start 
of the experiment. The study was approved by the Plymouth University Ethics 
Committee. 
Apparatus and materials. The experiment was programmed in E-Prime 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.; pstnet.com) and was presented on a 22-inch 
computer monitor. Participants made all responses using a standard keyboard. A 330ml 
bottle of Beck’s beer and a 45 gram Cadbury’s Dairy Milk chocolate bar served as 
reward props. A picture of beer and chocolate presented on the computer screen served 
as Pavlovian stimuli. The neutral stimulus was a simple grey stimulus of equal size to 
the Pavlovian stimuli. Participants wore headphones throughout the experiment. 
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Procedure 
PIT task. Participants were randomly allocated to an Instruction (Non-Reversal 
or Reversal) and Speed (Slow or Fast) condition at the start of the experiment. After 
providing informed consent, they were shown the bottle of beer and the chocolate bar 
and were told that they could win points towards those rewards throughout the 
experiment. These props were removed when the computer task began. 
Speed task. All groups initially completed a speed task in which they responded 
to apple and banana stimuli as quickly as possible. The aim was to establish each 
participant’s individual reaction time so that it could be used as the trial duration in the 
transfer test for the Fast group. Participants first received the following instructions: “In 
this task, you can earn the beer and chocolate in front of you by pressing the left or right 
arrow keys. We will first have a practice round where you can try to win banana and 
apple points. Press the [LEFT/RIGHT] ARROW key when you see a banana. Press the 
[RIGHT/LEFT] ARROW key when you see an apple. The aim of this phase is to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Press any key to begin.” The stimulus-
response instructions were counterbalanced between-subjects. Each trial began with a 
picture of an apple or a banana above a choice symbol (“← or →”), which was 
presented for 1000 milliseconds (ms) or until a response was made (whichever came 
first). Correct responses were followed by the statement “Correct!” in green font. 
Incorrect responses produced a high-pitched tone and the statement “Incorrect” in red 
font. The instructed contingencies were also presented, in the same manner as on the 
original instruction page. Omission trials in which participants failed to respond within 
1000ms of the stimulus onset were followed by a high-pitched tone and the statement 
“Too slow!” (presented in red font). The text remained on-screen until participants 
pressed a key to continue. 
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An instruction to “Please respond as quickly as possible!” was presented 
continuously at the bottom of the screen throughout the speed task. There were ten trials 
in total, with five of each fruit stimulus. Trial order was random, and the trials were 
separated by 750-1250ms intervals. After all ten trials, any incorrect and omission trials 
were repeated in a random order until participants selected the correct response. The 
median reaction time for the ten correct trials was then calculated. 
Instrumental training. Instrumental training commenced with the following on-
screen instructions: “You can now earn beer and chocolate by pressing the left or right 
arrow keys. You will only earn these rewards on some trials. Press any key to begin.” 
There were 24 trials. Each response (left and right arrow key presses) was selectively 
paired with either beer or chocolate points, and this was counterbalanced between-
subjects. The contingencies were also counterbalanced with respect to the fruit 
contingencies that were established in the practice speed task. Each trial began with the 
choice symbol (“←or→”), which remained until participants pressed the left or right 
arrow key. Responses were followed by the statement, “You earn one [beer/chocolate] 
point”, depending on the instrumental contingency and the response chosen. One 
outcome was scheduled to be available on each trial (chosen randomly), and so each key 
had a 50% chance of yielding a reward. If participants responded for an outcome that 
was not available, the text “You win nothing” was presented. Outcomes were presented 
for 1500ms and the trials were separated by 750-1250ms intervals. 
Instrumental knowledge test. Explicit contingency knowledge was then assessed 
with an instrumental knowledge test. On-screen instructions read, “We would now like 
to test whether you know which key earned which reward. Press any key to begin.” Two 
questions were presented in a random order: “Which key earned [beer/chocolate], the 
left or right arrow key? Please choose carefully.” Participants were required to press the 
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left or right arrow key, and response time was not limited. The questions were separated 
by a 750-1250ms interval.  
Transfer test. The transfer test was preceded by the following instructions: “In 
this part of the task, you can earn beer and chocolate by pressing the left or right arrow 
key in the same way as before. You will only be told how many of each reward you 
have earned at the end of the experiment. Also, sometimes a picture of beer or chocolate 
will be presented before you choose the left or right arrow key. Press any key to begin.” 
Participants in the Fast condition were also instructed, “You MUST respond as quickly 
as possible to win rewards.”, while the Reversal group were told, “Pictures indicate 
which arrow key will NOT be rewarded!” The latter instruction also appeared at the 
bottom of the screen throughout the transfer test.  
Each trial began with the presentation of a beer, chocolate or neutral stimulus. 
The choice symbol (“←or→”) was presented below the stimulus, and participants were 
required to choose the left or right arrow key. The Slow group had unlimited time to 
respond. The Fast group were required to respond within their median reaction time on 
the practice speed task (see above). Failure to respond within this duration was regarded 
as an omission trial, and produced a high-pitched tone and the warning, “Too slow! 
Please respond as quickly as possible. Press any key to continue.” No other feedback 
was given, and so the transfer test was conducted in nominal extinction (i.e., 
participants were not told whether or which outcomes had been earned). The term 
nominal extinction is used because although feedback was not presented, participants 
were nevertheless told that rewards were accumulating throughout the transfer test (e.g., 
Garbusow et al., 2015; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Hogarth et al., 2015; Watson et al., 
2014, 2016). Nominal extinction procedures are commonly used to retain high levels of 
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motivation whilst reducing the likelihood of stimulus-response (S-R) associations 
forming during the transfer test (Hogarth & Chase, 2011). 
 If an omission was recorded, the stimulus duration for the next trial was 
increased by 50ms. When a response was registered in time, the time limit for the next 
trial was reduced by 50ms. The latter adjustment was only implemented when it would 
not reduce the time limit to below the original median reaction time of the practice 
speed task (the time limit otherwise remained constant for the next trial). The lower 
time limit was controlled in this way to ensure that the stimulus remained consciously 
visible.  
There were eight cycles of six trials (48 trials in total). In each cycle, the three 
pictures (beer, chocolate or neutral) were presented twice in a random order. In the Fast 
condition, omission trials were randomly repeated at the end of each cycle until a 
response was performed in time. Omission trials were discarded from the main analysis, 
and so 48 completed trials were obtained in each condition for the analysis. The trials 
were separated by 750-1250ms intervals. 
Expectancy ratings. After completing the transfer test, participants read the 
following instructions: “We would now like to examine your thoughts about the beer 
and chocolate pictures. Please think carefully about your answers. Press any key to 
begin.” Two questions were presented, one in the presence of the beer stimulus and the 
other in the presence of the chocolate stimulus: “When this picture was presented, to 
what extent did you think that the [beer/chocolate] key was more likely to be rewarded? 
Press a key from 1 to 7.” The outcome (beer or chocolate) was always consonant with 
the stimulus that was presented. Ratings of one and seven represented “Not at all” and 
“Very much”, respectively. The questions were presented in a random order and were 
separated by a 350-750ms interval. 
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OSPAN task. Participants finally completed an OSPAN task (Wills et al., 2013). 
The OSPAN task measures working memory span by requiring participants to 
remember 2-6 words whilst completing maths problems. A simple maths problem (e.g., 
[2 × 1] + 3 = 5) was presented at the start of each trial, and participants selected the M 
key if the answer was correct, or the Z key if it was incorrect. A word (e.g. BED) was 
presented alongside each equation, and participants were instructed to simultaneously 
memorise the words in the order that they appeared. Each equation/word combination 
was presented for eight seconds or until the participant pressed the M or Z key 
(whichever came first). If a response was not registered within eight seconds, the 
message “TOO SLOW!” appeared for 1500ms. No other feedback was provided. 
The trials were divided into 15 blocks. Each block contained 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 trials, 
and these blocks were presented three times each (60 trials in total). The order of the 
blocks was random. At the end of each block, participants were required to type the 
words that had appeared during that block in the correct order. Word recall was not time 
limited, but participants were not allowed to alter previously submitted answers. 
Feedback was not provided. Participants competed three initial practice blocks that 
consisted of two trials each, before moving on to the main OSPAN task. 
At the end of the experiment, participants received both a written and verbal 
debrief.  
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2.2.2 Results 
Exclusions. Three participants were excluded for failing to correctly report 
either one or both of the instrumental contingencies during the instrumental knowledge 
test.  
Speed manipulation. In the practice speed task, correct responses (collapsed 
across all speed and instruction groups) were performed with a mean reaction time of 
443.35ms (SEM = 8.07). The Fast group performed correct trials with a mean reaction 
time of 444.36ms (SEM = 18.97) in the practice speed task. This served as the mean 
starting duration that participants in the Fast group were required to respond within on 
the first transfer test trial (note that the actual starting duration reflected participants’ 
personal mean reaction time during the speed task, and hence was unique to each 
participant). The starting duration also served as the lower time limit throughout the 
transfer test. The Slow group performed correct trials with a mean reaction time of 
442.33ms (SEM = 11.91), but had an unlimited time to respond during the transfer test. 
Reaction times in the practice speed task did not significantly differ between groups, Fs 
< 1.   
Transfer test 
Omissions. The number of omissions did not significantly differ in the Non-
Reversal Fast (M = 8.71, SEM = 1.02) and Reversal Fast (M = 10.63, SEM = 1.22) 
groups, t (43) = 1.18, p > .05, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [-1.35, 5.17]. 
Response choice. Figure ‎2.1 shows the percent choice of the beer key (versus 
the chocolate key) during the transfer test in each instruction and speed condition. The 
graph indicates that there was a standard PIT effect in both the Non-Reversal Slow and 
Fast condition, where the beer and chocolate stimuli increased choice of the beer and 
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chocolate response, respectively, compared to the neutral stimulus. The stimuli did not 
appear to have any discernible effect in the Reversal instruction group (in either speed 
condition).  
 
Figure ‎2.1. Instrumental response choice during the transfer test of Experiment 1. Response 
choice was tested in the presence of a beer, chocolate or neutral stimulus. The 50% mid-point 
represents no bias in response choice. Scores higher and lower than 50% represent a bias 
towards the beer and chocolate key, respectively. The error bars represent the standard error of 
the mean (SEM).  
 
A 3 (Stimulus: beer, neutral and chocolate) × 2 (Instruction: Non-Reversal and 
Reversal) × 2 (Speed: Slow and Fast) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to 
confirm these impressions. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported where 
necessary to correct for violations of sphericity. There was a main effect of stimulus, F 
(1.41, 119.96) = 29.02, p < .001, 2p  = .26, but not of speed, F (1, 85) = 3.29, p = .07, 
2
p  = .04, or instruction, F < 1. There was a significant interaction between stimulus and 
instruction, F (1.41, 119.96) = 28.66, p < .001, 2p  = .25. No significant interactions 
were observed between the stimulus and speed, or instruction and speed variables, Fs < 
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1. Finally, there was a three-way interaction between the stimulus, instruction and speed 
variables, F (1.41, 119.96) = 4.30, p = .03, 2
p  = .05.  
The significant three-way interaction was further analysed by exploring the 
effect of stimulus and speed in each instruction group. In the Non-Reversal group, there 
was an effect of stimulus, F (2, 80) = 127.60, p < .001, 2
p  = .76, but not of speed, F < 1. 
There was a significant stimulus × speed interaction, indicating that the effect of 
stimulus was reduced in the Fast condition, F (2, 80) = 5.84, p = .004, 2
p  = .13
3
. The 
significant interaction prompted separate, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
that explored the effect of stimulus in each speed condition of the Non-Reversal group. 
In the Slow condition, the beer stimulus increased choice of the beer response compared 
to the neutral stimulus, t (20) = 7.80, p <.001, 95% CI = [28.93, 56.19], and the 
chocolate stimulus, t (20) = 12.60, p < .001, 95% CI = [61.80, 92.37]. Conversely, the 
chocolate stimulus increased choice of the chocolate response compared to the neutral 
stimulus, t (20) = 6.44, p < .001, 95% CI = [21.13, 47.92]. 
 The Fast group demonstrated a similar pattern. The beer stimulus increased 
choice of the beer response compared to the neutral stimulus, t (20) = 5.89, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [18.51, 45.77], and the chocolate stimulus, t (20) = 8.17, p < .001, 95% CI = [34.71, 
65.29]. The chocolate stimulus, by contrast, increased choice of the chocolate response 
compared to the neutral stimulus, t (20) = 3.33, p < .01, 95% CI = [4.46, 31.25]. Thus, a 
PIT effect was observed in both the Non-Reversal Slow and Fast group.  
Comparable analyses in the Reversal instruction group revealed a non-
significant effect of speed, F (1, 45) = 3.23, p = .08, 2p  = .07. Inspection of the means 
revealed a trend towards the Fast group (M = 51.56, SEM = 1.72) performing more beer 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted that the Stimulus × Speed interaction in the Non-Reversal group did not reach 
significance when using the pooled error term, F (1.41, 119.96) = 1.79, p > .05. This interaction is 
therefore interpreted with caution.  
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responses than the Slow group (M = 47.19, SEM = 1.72). There was no effect of 
stimulus, F < 1, nor was there a stimulus × speed interaction, F (1.26, 56.86) = 1.22, 
p > .05, 2
p  = .03. Thus, neither the Reversal Slow nor Fast instruction group 
demonstrated a reversed PIT effect. 
 The failure to observe a significant reversed PIT effect in the Reversal 
instruction group is equivocal. Non-significant results arising from null hypothesis 
significance testing are ambiguous because they may either provide genuine evidence 
for the null hypothesis, or they may simply reflect an insensitivity of the data to 
distinguish the experimental hypothesis from the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2008). Bayes 
Factors provide a useful way to distinguish these possibilities. Values of more than 
three are regarded as evidence for the alternative hypothesis. Bayes Factors of less than 
one third, by contrast, reflect evidence for the null hypothesis. Values in between one 
third and three indicate that the data are insensitive to distinguish the theories (Dienes, 
2011).   
A Bayes Factor was calculated to further explore the null effect of stimulus in 
the Reversal Slow condition. The reversed PIT effect was expected to be of a 
comparable magnitude to that observed by Seabrooke et al. (2016). To calculate the size 
of the reversed PIT effect, the mean difference in the percent choice of the beer key 
between the chocolate and beer stimulus was calculated (Schocolate – Sbeer). Using this 
formula, Seabrooke et al. (2016) observed a mean difference of 51.88. The equivalent 
mean difference score in the Reversal Slow group in the current experiment was 11.68 
(SEM = 16.68). A half-normal distribution with the standard deviation set as the 
plausible mean difference score (51.88) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.57. The Bayes 
Factor was in between the critical values of one third and three, and was therefore 
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inconclusive. That is, there was insufficient evidence for either a reversed PIT effect or 
the null result. 
Reaction times. The reaction time data are shown in Figure ‎2.2. The graph 
suggests that reaction times were longer in the Reversal group than the Non-Reversal 
group, but only in the Slow condition. A 2 (Stimulus: beer and chocolate) × 2 
(Instruction: Non-Reversal and Reversal) × 2 (Speed: Slow and Fast) mixed ANOVA 
confirmed these impressions. The neutral stimulus was not included in the analysis 
because the hypothesis concerned the effect of the reversal instruction on reaction times 
to the beer and chocolate stimuli. Most interestingly, the main effect of instruction 
confirmed that reaction times were longer in the Reversal group than in the Non-
Reversal group, F (1, 85) = 11.68, p = .001, 2
p  =  .12. Unsurprisingly, there was also a 
main effect of speed, with shorter reaction times observed in the Fast group than the 
Slow group, F (1, 85) = 104.65, p < .001, 2p  = .55. There was no effect of stimulus, F 
< 1. There was a significant interaction between the instruction and speed variables, F 
(1, 85) = 13.36, p < .001, 2p  = .14, suggesting that the effect of the reversal instruction 
was modulated by the speed condition. No other two-way interactions reached 
significance, Fs < 1. The three-way interaction between stimulus, instruction and speed 
was not significant either, F < 1.  
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the Non-Reversal Slow 
group responded significantly more quickly than the Reversal Slow group, t (42) = 4.98, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [190.46, 443.89]. This effect was not significant in the Fast 
condition, t < 1.  
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Figure ‎2.2. Mean reaction times during the transfer test of Experiment 1. Error bars represent 
SEM.  
 
Additional correlations were calculated to explore the relationship between 
reaction times and the magnitude of the PIT effect in each group. The size of the beer 
PIT effect was calculated by subtracting the percent choice of the beer key on the 
neutral stimulus trials from the beer stimulus trials (Sbeer – Sneutral). This calculation was 
reversed for the chocolate PIT effect (Sneutral – Schocolate). The beer and chocolate PIT 
effects were then averaged to calculate an overall PIT effect score. Thus, larger PIT 
scores represent stronger non-reversal PIT effects. There was a strong positive 
correlation between reaction times and the size of the overall PIT effect in the Non-
Reversal Fast condition, r = .75, p < .001. This correlation was not significant in any 
other group, ps > .23.  
Expectancy ratings 
Mean ratings. Figure ‎2.3 shows the mean expectancy ratings for each outcome. 
The graph suggests that the Reversal group gave lower expectancy ratings than the Non-
Reversal group, and that overall expectancy ratings were higher for the chocolate than 
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the beer. A mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of instruction, with the Non-Reversal 
group giving higher overall ratings than the Reversal group, F (1, 85) = 9.42, p < .01, 
2
p  = .10. Participants also expected the chocolate more than the beer, which was 
confirmed by a main effect of outcome, F (1, 85) = 9.78, p = .002, 2
p  = .10. There was 
no main effect of speed, F < 1, but there was a significant interaction between the speed 
and outcome variables, F (1, 85) = 5.29, p < .03, 2
p  = .06. The remaining two- and 
three-way interactions did not reach significance, Fs < 1. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed that expectancy ratings were higher for the chocolate than the 
beer in the Slow group, t (43) = 3.81, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.38, 1.22], but not in the 
Fast group, t < 1.  
 
Figure ‎2.3. Mean expectancy ratings reported in Experiment 1. Participants were shown the 
beer and chocolate stimuli in turn and rated the extent to which they thought that the consonant 
key was more likely to be rewarded (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Correlations. Figure ‎2.4 shows the relationship between the size of the overall 
PIT effect and the strength of participants’ self-reported expectancy ratings. Collapsed 
across the instruction and speed groups, expectancy ratings (averaged across the beer 
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and chocolate outcomes) positively correlated with the size of the overall transfer effect, 
r = .53, p < .001. This correlation was present in both the Non-Reversal, r = .56, p 
< .001, and Reversal instruction group, r = .43, p = .002.  
 
Figure ‎2.4. The relationship between self-reported expectancy ratings and transfer effect scores 
in Experiment 1.  
 
OSPAN task. Consistent with Wills et al. (2013), working memory capacity 
was defined as the largest block size in which participants correctly recalled all of the 
words in all three repetitions of that block size. For example, if participants correctly 
reported all of the words in all three blocks in which two words were presented, but not 
when three words were presented per block, they received a working memory score of 
two. Thus, the maximum score was six. The minimum score of zero was given when 
participants failed to correctly report all of the words in all three repetitions of any block 
size. 
According to this criterion, participants had a mean OSPAN score of 2.46 (SEM 
= 0.19). OSPAN scores did not significantly correlate with the overall transfer effect, r 
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= -.16, p > .05. These correlations were not significant in the Non-Reversal, r = -.23, 
p > .05, or Reversal instruction group, r = -.13, p > .05.  
2.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 1 first aimed to establish a PIT effect and then to test whether it 
would be sensitive to a post-training reversal instruction. The effect of time pressure 
was also examined. A typical PIT effect was observed in the Non-Reversal group; the 
beer and chocolate stimuli selectively increased the response that was associated with 
the cued outcome. This outcome-selective PIT effect is consistent with much of the 
literature (e.g., Bray et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 2007; Watson et al., 2014, 2016). 
Several other interesting results were also observed in Experiment 1. Most 
notably, a non-reversal PIT effect was observed in the Non-Reversal Fast group, and a 
reversed PIT effect was not observed in the Reversal instruction group (irrespective of 
the speed manipulation). The expectancy ratings, reaction time data, and the OSPAN 
task also produced some interesting results. All of these results are of theoretical interest, 
so they will now be discussed in turn. 
The first important result came from the significant non-reversal PIT effect 
observed in the Non-Reversal Fast group. This result suggests that PIT effects are not 
reliant on participants having a great deal of time to think. It is of course possible that 
the speed manipulation did not impose sufficient time pressure. The strong positive 
correlation between reaction times and the strength of the PIT effect in the Non-
Reversal Fast condition provides some support for this. This correlation suggests that 
participants who responded more quickly during the transfer test were less likely to 
show a PIT effect. It therefore accords with the suggestion that the Non-Reversal Fast 
group demonstrated a PIT effect because they were not responding quickly enough to 
eliminate the propositional processes required to generate a PIT effect. However, 
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response times were kept within tight boundaries for precisely this reason. A key 
assumption of the propositional approach is that behaviour is the product of a controlled 
process that requires time and effort (Mitchell et al., 2009). The observation of a PIT 
effect under time pressure is therefore problematic for the propositional account of PIT, 
because it suggests that PIT effects can be generated even when there is minimal time to 
think.  
The second noteworthy aspect of the results comes from the failure to 
demonstrate a reversed PIT effect in the Reversal Slow group. The Bayes Factor 
indicated that the data were insensitive to distinguish the null hypothesis from the 
experimental hypothesis (which predicted a reversed PIT effect), which makes 
interpreting the result difficult. It also makes it difficult to assess the effect of the speed 
manipulation on the reversed PIT effect. At first glance, the data appear to be most 
consistent with a dual-process account in which an automatic S-O-R process and a 
higher order propositional process interact to jointly determine response choice. The 
propositional process may have fostered a reversed PIT effect (because it was sensitive 
to the instruction), while the S-O-R link process produced a typical non-reversal PIT 
effect (because it operated automatically). On test, the two processes may have 
combined to produce a net effect that was somewhere between a standard PIT effect and 
a reversed PIT effect.  
The failure to demonstrate a reversed PIT effect in the Reversal Slow group is 
clearly problematic for the propositional approach. It is also inconsistent with 
Seabrooke et al.'s (2016) findings, who reported a complete reversal of response choice 
in a procedure that was very similar to the one employed here. One possibility is that the 
participants either did not understand or believe the reversal instruction in the current 
experiment. If participants were not entirely receptive to the instruction, then the 
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propositional approach would not predict a reversed PIT effect. The expectancy ratings, 
which measured the extent to which participants believed that the pictorial stimuli 
signalled that the cued response was more likely to be rewarded, provide some insight 
into this issue. Sixty-five percent of the Reversal Slow group reported a mean 
expectancy rating of 3.5 or higher (the mid-point on the expectancy scale). This 
suggests that many of the participants believed that the cued response was more likely 
to be rewarded during the transfer test, despite the reversal instruction. Hence, the 
reversal instruction appeared to be ineffective in altering participants’ propositional 
beliefs about the signalling role of the stimulus. Participants who did report beliefs that 
were consistent with the instruction were less likely to show a PIT effect during the 
transfer test. In sum, the data may be reconciled with the propositional approach by 
arguing that the instruction did not successfully alter participants’ propositional beliefs 
about the signalling role of the stimulus.  
The account described above may reconcile the failure to observe a reversed PIT 
effect with the propositional account. However, the questions remains as to why 
participants would understand and believe the instruction in the O-R experiment 
reported by Seabrooke et al. (2016), but not in the current procedure. One possibility is 
that the PIT effect is more ‘automatic’ than the O-R effect, and is hence less sensitive to 
instructional manipulations. It is worth noting that associative link-based approaches 
would typically predict the opposite result. From a link perspective, the O-R effect 
reflects a direct link between the instrumental response and the outcome picture. PIT 
effects, by contrast, reflect indirect S-O-R associations. The association between the 
stimulus S and the response R should therefore be weaker (and hence, less likely to 
produce automaticity) in the PIT procedure than in the O-R task. The fact that the 
opposite result was observed (performance was sensitive to the instruction in the O-R 
task but not in the PIT task) undermines this analysis.  
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Another possibility is that propositional processes mediated response choice in 
both experiments, but that successful reversal was more difficult (i.e. required more 
controlled resources) in the PIT task than in the O-R design. This possibility seems 
somewhat unlikely considering that the failure to reverse was observed even under non-
speeded conditions, when the task was not the particularly challenging. Indeed, the fact 
that a PIT effect was observed in the Non-Reversal Fast condition attests to the fact that 
the task was not especially demanding, because participants generated a clear PIT effect 
even when they were required to respond very quickly.  
An arguably better explanation for the differential success of the reversal 
instruction observed by Seabrooke et al. (2016) and in the current experiment is that it 
arose from differences in exposure to the instruction. In both experiments, the reversal 
instruction was presented at the start of the transfer test and then continuously at the 
bottom of the screen throughout the transfer test. In Seabrooke et al.'s (2016) design, the 
reward stimuli were  presented for 3000ms before participants were able to respond 
(and the reversal instruction was presented at the bottom of the screen during this time). 
The 3000ms delay was not included in the current design so that it did not undermine 
the speed manipulation in the Fast group (by giving participants time to prepare their 
response). The absence of the delay may have inadvertently reduced attention to the 
instruction. This interpretation is clearly speculative, and more research is needed for 
confirmation. A simple test would be to replicate the current experiment, but ensure that 
there is greater opportunity to attend to the instruction. If the failure to demonstrate a 
reversed PIT effect in the current experiment was due to reduced exposure to instruction, 
a reversed PIT effect should now be observed. This possibility was explored in 
Experiment 2 in the context of a concurrent load manipulation. The speed manipulation 
was not very effective in either instruction group in Experiment 1. A concurrent load 
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task was therefore implemented in Experiment 2, in the hope that it would provide 
greater insight into the role of automatic and controlled processes in PIT.  
Before concluding this discussion, it is worth noting some interesting patterns in 
the reaction time data. The Non-Reversal Slow group responded more quickly to the 
beer and chocolate stimuli than the Reversal Slow group. These data are consistent with 
typical priming effects seen in the ideomotor literature (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Flach 
et al., 2006; Watson et al., 2015). Recall that Elsner and Hommel (2001), for example, 
trained participants to perform two responses in an initial training phase. One response 
was followed by a high tone and the other response was followed by a low tone. In the 
subsequent test phase, the tones were presented as imperative stimuli and participants 
were instructed to select one of the trained responses following each tone. For half of 
the participants, the instructed tone-response mappings during the test phase were 
congruent with the learned response-tone mappings during the training phase. The 
trained and instructed test mappings were incongruent for the remaining participants. A 
now-classic ideomotor effect was observed, where the congruent group responded more 
quickly than the incongruent group. The current experiment produced a similar result in 
that the Non-Reversal group was faster to respond than the Reversal group. The result 
therefore demonstrates that very similar results can be obtained in a PIT procedure, 
where there is little opportunity for a direct association to form between the stimulus 
and response.  
 Finally, no significant correlations were observed between the magnitude of the 
PIT effect and working memory capacity (as measured using the OSPAN task). In 
general, OSPAN scores were relatively low. It is possible that there is a relationship 
between working memory capacity and PIT, but that it was not detectable because the 
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range of OSPAN scores was not sufficiently distributed. This issue will be discussed 
further in section 2.4 (General Discussion).  
 In sum, Experiment 1 established a non-reversal PIT effect that was observed 
even under time pressure. The reversal instruction abolished the non-reversal PIT effect 
but produced no clear evidence of a reversed PIT effect. Furthermore, the speed 
manipulation had no significant effect in the Reversal instruction group. The aims of 
Experiment 2 were two-fold. The experiment first aimed to replicate the reversed cueing 
effect observed by Seabrooke et al. (2016) in a typical PIT task. To this end, the PIT 
procedure of Experiment 1 was repeated, but a delay was introduced between the 
stimulus onset and the opportunity to respond during the transfer test (thus making the 
conditions more comparable to that of Seabrooke et al., 2016). The experiment secondly 
aimed to test whether the non-reversal and reversal PIT effects would be sensitive to a 
demanding concurrent load task. Similar to the speed manipulation used in Experiment 
1, the concurrent load task was expected to reduce participants’ capacity to use 
controlled reasoning processes during the transfer test. The speed manipulation did not 
produce any discernible effects on performance, so Experiment 2 tested whether a 
concurrent load task would be more successful.  
2.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 followed the approach of Experiment 1 in that it sought evidence 
of a PIT effect when propositional processes were unlikely to prevail. Participants 
initially learnt to perform one response to earn beer points and another response to earn 
chocolate points (R1-O1, R2-O2). Response choice (R1 versus R2) was then tested in 
the presence of a beer, chocolate or neutral stimulus. Consistent with Experiment 1, 
participants were randomly allocated to a Non-Reversal or Reversal instruction group at 
the start of the experiment. Crucially, half of the participants in each instruction group 
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completed the transfer test whilst engaged in a demanding concurrent load task. The 
concurrent load task aimed to consume controlled propositional processes, and thereby 
seek evidence of underlying automatic cue-control. The concurrent load task was 
developed by Wills et al. (2011), who demonstrated that it was sufficiently demanding 
to generate a switch from inferential, rule-based generalisation to non-deliberative, 
feature-based generalisation.  
The implementation of the concurrent load task during the transfer test meant 
that the average trial duration was considerably longer than in Experiment 1. The No 
Load group did not receive the concurrent load task, but the trial duration was matched. 
Exposure to the reversal instruction was therefore much longer in both groups than in 
Experiment 1, because the instruction was presented continuously at the bottom of the 
screen throughout the transfer test. If the failure to demonstrate a reversed PIT effect in 
Experiment 1 was due to insufficient exposure to the instruction (as was suggested), 
then a reversed PIT effect should now be observed in the Reversal No Load group. The 
demonstration of a reversed PIT effect would be consistent with the results of 
Seabrooke et al. (2016), and would suggest that PIT is, at least sometimes, mediated by 
higher-order propositional processes. A failure to demonstrate a reversed PIT effect, on 
the other hand, would suggest that the failure to reverse in Experiment 1 was not due to 
reduced exposure to the reversal instruction. Rather, it would complement the results of 
Experiment 1 in suggesting that propositional processes do not play a causal role in PIT. 
 The propositional and dual-process accounts make very similar predictions to 
Experiment 1. The crucial predictions are with respect to the Reversal Load group, so 
this group will be focused on. If the concurrent load successfully consumes participants’ 
finite reasoning processes, the propositional approach predicts that response choice will 
be at chance in the Reversal Load group. The dual-process account, by contrast, predicts 
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that automaticity will be revealed in the Reversal Load group. Under these 
circumstances, the dual-process account predicts that response choice will be mediated 
by an automatic S-O-R link mechanism, which should be immune to the reversal 
instruction. 
2.3.1 Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 1, except in the following respects. 
Participants. Sixty-one participants (31 males, aged 18-27; M = 20.23, SEM = 
0.25 years), took part in the experiment for course credit or on a voluntary basis.  
Procedure 
Practice concurrent load task. In place of the practice speed task, all groups 
began the experiment by completing ten practice trials of the concurrent load task. Each 
trial began with a blank screen that was presented for 500ms. Six unique, randomly 
chosen, single-digit numbers were then presented through participants’ headphones. 
Participants were instructed that they should remember those numbers in order. The 
numbers were presented at 330ms intervals and were voice-synthesized. A fixation 
cross was then presented centrally for 500ms, followed by a blank screen for a further 
500ms. The letter C or M was then presented for half of the trials each, and participants 
were required to select the corresponding key on the computer keyboard (responding 
was not time-limited). The letters, which were presented at the top centre and bottom 
centre of the screen, were presented to increase the interval (in place of the pictures 
presented during the transfer test) between the number sequence and the test that 
occurred at the end of each sequence (see below). Finally, a number that had been heard 
previously was presented on-screen, and participants were required to select the number 
that came next in the sequence. For example, if participants heard the sequence “3, 4, 6, 
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1, 5, 2” and the number ‘six’ was then presented on screen, the correct answer would be 
‘one’. Responses were not time-limited, feedback was not given, and the trials were 
separated by 750-1250ms intervals.  
Instrumental training. At the end of the practice load task, participants 
completed the instrumental training phase and instrumental knowledge test of 
Experiment 1. 
Transfer test. The transfer test began with the instructions of Experiment 1; 
participants were told that that they could continue to earn beer and chocolate points as 
before, that they would now sometimes see pictures before they selected a response, and 
that they would only be informed of their winnings at the end of the experiment.  
The Load group were additionally informed that numbers would be presented 
over their headphones, and that they should respond to this memory task in the same 
way they did in the practice phase. The No Load group were told to simply select the 
number that appeared on-screen at the end of each trial. Both groups were informed that 
their performance would determine the amount of beer and chocolate they would win 
(the instruction did not explicitly refer to the PIT task or the concurrent load task). 
Finally, the Reversal instruction group were told that “The pictures indicate which 
arrow key will NOT be rewarded!” This reversal instruction was presented with the 
initial instructions and continuously at the bottom of the screen throughout the transfer 
test.  
In the Load condition, the transfer test followed the same format as the practice 
load task. Each trial began with a blank screen for 500ms, before six unique, single-digit 
numbers were chosen and presented randomly through the participants’ headphones (in 
330ms intervals). The No Load group, by contrast, simply saw a blank screen for the 
equivalent time (2480ms). A centrally-presented fixation cross (500ms) was then 
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presented for both groups, followed by a blank screen (500ms). A beer, chocolate or 
neutral stimulus was then presented, above the choice symbol used during instrumental 
training (“← or →”), and participants were required to select the left or right arrow key. 
Responses were not time-limited, and no feedback was given. Finally, a probe number 
was presented on screen. The No Load group was required to press the key 
corresponding to the number on the screen, while the Load group was required to select 
the number that followed the on-screen number in the sequence presented at the start of 
the trial. There were 48 trials that were divided into eight cycles of six trials. Each cycle 
contained two presentations of each stimulus (beer, chocolate and neutral), and trial 
order was random within each cycle. The trials were separated by 750-1250ms intervals. 
At the end of the transfer test, participants completed the expectancy ratings and the 
OSPAN task of Experiment 1, and were finally fully debriefed.  
2.3.2 Results 
Exclusions. One participant was excluded for failing the instrumental 
knowledge test.  
Transfer test 
Response choice. Figure ‎2.5 shows the results of the transfer test. The graph 
indicates that a non-reversal PIT effect was present in the Non-Reversal No Load and 
Load groups. A reversed PIT effect was also apparent in the Reversal No Load group, 
but not in the Reversal Load group.  
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Figure ‎2.5. Instrumental response choice during the transfer test of Experiment 2. Response 
choice was tested in the presence of a beer, chocolate or neutral stimulus. The 50% mid-point 
represents no bias in response choice. Scores greater and lower than 50% represent a bias 
towards the beer and chocolate key, respectively. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
The data were analysed using the approach of Experiment 1. Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected values are reported where necessary to correct for violations of 
sphericity. There was a main effect of stimulus, F (1.48, 82.59) = 7.18, p < .01, 2
p  
= .11, but not instruction, F < 1, or load group, F (1, 56) = 2.03, p > .05, 2p  = .04. 
There was a significant interaction between stimulus and instruction group, F (1.48, 
82.59) = 58.98, p < .001, 2p = .51, but not between instruction and load, F < 1, or 
stimulus and load, F (1.48, 82.59) = 2.75, p = .09, 2p  = .05. Finally, there was a three-
way interaction between the stimulus, load and instruction group variables, F (1.48, 
82.59) = 6.96, p < .01, 2p  = .11.  
The significant three-way interaction prompted separate analyses exploring the 
effect of stimulus and load in each instruction group. In the Non-Reversal group, there 
was an effect of stimulus, F (2, 52) = 105.48, p < .001, 2p  = .80, but not of load, F < 1. 
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The stimulus × load interaction did not reach significance, F (2, 52) = 1.89, p > .05, 2
p
= .07. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the beer stimulus 
increased the beer response compared to the neutral stimulus, t (27) = 6.08, p < .001, 95% 
CI = [22.76, 55.81], and the chocolate stimulus, t (27) = 15.44, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[67.60, 94.45]. Conversely, the chocolate stimulus increased the chocolate response 
compared to the neutral stimulus, t (27) = 8.49, p < .001, 95% CI = [29.17, 54.32]. Thus, 
a non-reversal PIT effect was observed in the Non-Reversal group, irrespective of the 
concurrent load manipulation. 
Comparable analyses in the Reversal instruction group revealed an effect of 
stimulus, F (1.21, 36.34) = 9.21, p < .01, 2p  = .24, but not of load, F (1, 30) = 1.93, 
p > .05, 2p  = .06. There was a significant interaction between the stimulus and load 
variables, F (1.21, 36.34) = 6.45, p = .01, 2
p  = .18, which prompted separate, 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons in each load group. In the Reversal No Load 
group, the beer stimulus increased choice of the chocolate response compared to the 
neutral stimulus, t (14) = 4.27, p = .001, 95% CI = [16.42, 64.42], and the chocolate 
stimulus, t (14) = 4.00, p = .001, 95% CI = [26.03, 116.47]. Conversely, the chocolate 
stimulus increased choice of the beer response compared to the neutral stimulus, t (14) = 
2.79, p < .05, 95% CI = [2.77, 58.90]. There were no significant effects of stimulus in 
the Reversal Load group, ts < 1. Thus, a reversed PIT effect was observed in the No 
Load group, but not in the Load group.  
The null effect of stimulus in the Reversal Load group was further explored with 
a Bayes Factor calculation. For the purposes of calculating the priors, the dual-process 
model was assumed to predict a non-reversal PIT effect of a similar size to the non-
reversal PIT effect observed in the Non-Reversal Fast group of Experiment 1. The mean 
difference in the percent choice of the beer key between the beer and chocolate stimulus 
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(Sbeer – Schocolate) was used to calculate the size of the PIT effect for the Bayes analysis. 
The mean difference score in the Non-Reversal Fast group of Experiment 1 was 50. The 
equivalent mean difference score in the Reversal Load group of the current experiment 
was -6.99 (SEM = 19.60). A half-normal distribution with the standard deviation set as 
the plausible mean difference score (50) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.28. This Bayes 
Factor is below the critical lower threshold of one third, and so provides evidence for 
the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011). Hence, the data support the conclusion that there 
was no significant difference in response choice in the presence of the beer and 
chocolate stimuli in the Reversal Load group. 
Finally, the relationship between accuracy on the concurrent load task (i.e. 
whether participants responded correctly to the number probe) and the size of the 
overall transfer effect (which was calculated in the same way as Experiment 1) was 
examined. There was a marginal but non-significant negative correlation between 
accuracy on the concurrent load task and the size of the transfer effect in the Non-
Reversal Load group, r = -.51, p = .06. Thus, participants who did well on the 
concurrent load task tended to show a reduced PIT effect. Comparable correlations did 
not approach significance in any of the other groups, ps > .53.  
Reaction times. The transfer test reaction time data are shown in Figure ‎2.6. The 
graph suggests that the Non-Reversal group responded more quickly than the Reversal 
group. Mean reaction times were analysed in a comparable way to Experiment 1. There 
was a main effect of instruction, with longer reaction times in the Reversal group than 
the Non-Reversal group, F (1, 56) = 8.05, p < .01, 2p  = .13. There was no significant 
effect of stimulus, F < 1, or load, F (1, 56) = 2.42, p > .05, 2p  = .04. None of the two- 
or three-way interactions reached significance, Fs < 2.88, ps > .05.  
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Figure ‎2.6. Mean reaction times during the transfer test of Experiment 2. Error bars represent 
SEM.  
 
Expectancy ratings 
Mean ratings. Figure ‎2.7 shows the mean expectancy ratings for each outcome 
in the instruction and concurrent load groups. The graph indicates that expectancy 
ratings were reduced in the Reversal instruction group, particularly in the No Load 
group. The data were analysed in a comparable way to Experiment 1. There was a main 
effect of instruction, with lower expectancy ratings in the Reversal group than the Non-
Reversal group, F (1, 56) = 22.95, p < .001, 2p  = .29. There was also a main effect of 
outcome, with participants reporting greater expectancy for the chocolate than the beer, 
F (1, 56) = 4.76, p < .05, 2p  = .08. There was no significant effect of load, F (1, 56) = 
2.62, p > .05, 2p  = .05, but there was an interaction between the instruction and load 
groups, F (1, 56) = 7.67, p < .01, 2p  = .12. No other two-way interactions were 
observed, Fs < 1.39, ps > .05. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that 
the load manipulation did not significantly alter expectancy ratings in the Non-Reversal 
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condition, t < 1 , but increased expectancy ratings in the Reversal condition, t (30) = 
3.21, p < .01, 95% CI = [0.67, 2.88]. 
 
Figure ‎2.7. Mean expectancy ratings reported in Experiment 2. Participants were shown the 
beer and chocolate stimuli in turn and rated the extent to which they thought that the consonant 
key was more likely to be rewarded (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much). Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Correlations. Figure ‎2.8 shows the relationship between transfer effect scores 
(calculated in the same was as in Experiment 1) and self-reported expectancy of the 
cued outcome. Collapsed across outcomes, there was a positive correlation between 
expectancy ratings and the size of the transfer effect, r = .75, p < .001. This correlation 
was present in both the Non-Reversal, r = .61, p = .001, and the Reversal instruction 
group, r = .68, p < .001.   
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Figure ‎2.8. The relationship between self-reported expectancy ratings and transfer effect scores 
in Experiment 2. 
 
OSPAN task. OSPAN scores were calculated in the same way as Experiment 1. 
The data from one participant are missing because of a computer failure. The mean 
OSPAN score for the remaining participants was 2.81 (SEM = 0.24). OSPAN scores did 
not significantly correlate with the size of the overall transfer effect, r = -.15, p > .05. 
These correlations did not reach significance in either the Non-Reversal, r = -. 008, 
p > .05, or the Reversal instruction group, r = -.29, p > .05. 
2.3.3 Discussion 
Participants in Experiment 2 first learnt to perform one instrumental response to 
earn beer points and another instrumental response to produce chocolate points. 
Instrumental response choice was then assessed (in extinction) in the presence of a beer, 
chocolate, or neutral stimulus. Half of the participants were instructed that the pictures 
signalled which response would not be rewarded. Within this instructional manipulation, 
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half of the participants also completed a demanding concurrent load task throughout the 
transfer test.  
The first noteworthy result is that an outcome-selective PIT effect was observed 
in the Non-Reversal group. That is, the beer and chocolate stimuli selectively increased 
choice of the signalled outcome. The opposite pattern was observed in the Reversal No 
Load group. Here, the beer and chocolate stimuli increased not the response that was 
paired with the cued outcome during instrumental training, but the response that was 
more likely to be reinforced according to the instruction. This instructional sensitivity is 
consistent with the results reported by Seabrooke et al. (2016), and suggests that high-
level propositional processes can play an important role in PIT.  
Interestingly, a non-reversal PIT effect was observed even in the Non-Reversal 
Load group. This result is consistent with the non-reversal PIT effect that was observed 
in the Non-Reversal Fast condition of Experiment 1. Together, these data provide 
preliminary evidence for an ‘automatic’ PIT effect, at least in the sense that the PIT 
effects reported here do not depend on a great deal of time (Experiment 1) or controlled 
processing (Experiment 2). 
The reversed PIT effect, by contrast to its non-reversed counterpart, was 
abolished by the load manipulation. Clearly, the concurrent load task was sufficiently 
demanding to consume the cognitive processes necessary to produce the instructed, 
reversed PIT effect. Under these circumstances, the propositional account predicts that 
response choice should be at chance in the presence of all three stimuli. The non-
significant effect of stimulus in the Reversal Load group (and the associated Bayes 
Factor) therefore supports this propositional prediction.  
The dual-process account, by contrast, predicted a non-reversal PIT effect in the 
Reversal Load group. The data are less readily reconciled with this prediction. One 
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possibility is that the concurrent load task reduced but did not eliminate participants’ 
ability to use propositional reasoning processes. The remaining propositional processes 
may have then summed together with the automatic link mechanism to produce the null 
result observed. Clearly, this is one way in which the dual-process account could be 
reconciled with the data observed in the Reversal Load group. A natural prediction of 
this account is that more demanding versions of either the load or the PIT task would be 
more likely to produce evidence of a non-reversal PIT effect in the Reversal Load group. 
This issue will be discussed further in section 2.4 (General Discussion).  
Other interesting results came from the expectancy ratings and reaction time 
data. The Non-Reversal group firstly reported stronger expectations that the cued 
response was more likely to be rewarded than the Reversal instruction group. This effect 
is consistent with the results of Experiment 1, and suggests that verbalizable 
expectancies may play an important role in PIT (Hogarth et al., 2007; Seabrooke et al., 
2016). Further support for the role of expectancies in PIT comes from the positive 
correlation between the strength of the expectancy ratings and the size of the transfer 
effect (a correlation that was also apparent in Experiment 1). Although causal 
conclusions cannot be drawn from correlational data, the consistency of the relationship 
does suggest a clear association between self-reported expectancy ratings and the 
magnitude of the PIT effect. Interestingly, the Reversal Load group reported 
significantly higher expectancy ratings than the Reversal No Load group. One 
possibility is that the Load group paid less attention to the reversal instruction 
(presented at the bottom of the screen throughout) because they were engaged with the 
concurrent load task. This explanation, which would be consistent with both the dual-
process and propositional account, may explain (at least in part) why the Reversal Load 
group did not show any evidence of a reversed PIT effect. 
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Finally, the Non-Reversal group responded significantly more quickly in the 
presence of the beer and chocolate stimuli than the Reversal instruction group. This 
result replicates the reaction time effect observed in Experiment 1, and is consistent 
with the reaction time effects that have been reported in the ideomotor literature (Elsner 
& Hommel, 2001; Flach et al., 2006; Watson et al., 2015). This discussion will be 
resumed below. 
2.4 General Discussion 
In two experiments, participants learnt to perform one response to earn beer 
points and another response to earn chocolate points. Response choice was then tested 
in the presence of a beer, chocolate, or neutral stimulus. Half of the participants were 
instructed during the transfer test that the stimuli signalled which response would not be 
rewarded. Half of the participants in each instruction group also completed the transfer 
test under speeded conditions (Experiment 1), or whilst completing a demanding 
concurrent load task (Experiment 2). 
A typical PIT effect was observed in the Non-Reversal condition of both 
experiments. That is, the beer and chocolate pictures selectively biased response choice 
towards the instrumental response that had previously produced those outcomes, 
relative to the neutral stimulus. Notably, non-reversal PIT effects were observed even 
under considerable time pressure in Experiment 1, and whilst participants completed a 
demanding concurrent load task in Experiment 2. The propositional model makes the 
key prediction that PIT effects should only be observed when participants are able to 
use controlled reasoning processes, which require time and working memory resources. 
The observation of a non-reversal PIT effect under speed and concurrent load is 
therefore problematic for the propositional account of PIT. Rather, the data suggest that 
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PIT effects can have an automatic quality, at least in the sense that they do not require a 
great deal of time or controlled processes to execute. 
The reversal instruction data, in contrast, speak against the idea that PIT is 
automatic. In Experiment 2, a complete reversal of the PIT effect was observed in 
participants who were instructed that the stimuli presented during the transfer test 
signalled which response would not be rewarded. It is important to recognise that this 
effect was not observed in Experiment 1, and so it may seem premature to conclude that 
PIT is sensitive to instructional manipulations. However, the conclusion that PIT (and 
related phenomena) is sensitive to verbal instructions is consistent with previous reports 
(Hogarth et al., 2014; Seabrooke et al., 2016), as well as other unpublished data from 
our laboratory. Thus, it seems sensible to conclude that PIT is, at least sometimes, 
sensitive to instructional manipulations, which suggests that PIT effects can be 
mediated by propositional processes. 
Two aspects of Experiment 2 allow stronger conclusions to be made about the 
effect of the concurrent load manipulation in the Reversal group. First, a reversed PIT 
effect was observed in the Reversal No Load group. Second, the load manipulation 
completely abolished the reversed PIT effect. The latter result suggests that the 
concurrent load task was successful in consuming the cognitive resources necessary to 
produce the reversed PIT effect. Under these circumstances, the propositional and dual-
process accounts make different predictions with respect to the Reversal Load group. 
The dual-process model predicts that automaticity should be revealed when participants 
are unable to use controlled reasoning processes. Thus, the dual-process model predicts 
that an automatic, non-reversal PIT effect should be observed in the Reversal Load 
group. The propositional model, by contrast, predicts that the standard, non-reversal PIT 
effect is a non-automatic effect that depends entirely on controlled cognitive processes. 
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It does not, therefore, predict that an automatic non-reversal PIT effect should be 
observed when the implementation of reversal instructions is eliminated through 
cognitive load (in the Reversal Load group). Rather, the propositional model predicts 
that response choice should be at chance throughout the transfer test (irrespective of the 
stimulus present) – as was observed. Crucially, there was no evidence of an automatic 
non-reversal PIT effect, and this null result was supported by the Bayes Factor analysis. 
This aspect of the data therefore seems to be most naturally accounted for by the 
propositional account. 
The question remains as to why participants failed to demonstrate a reversed PIT 
effect in Experiment 1. In the absence of Experiment 2, this result is clearly problematic 
for the propositional account. It was speculated that participants may not have had 
sufficient exposure to the reversal instruction in Experiment 1. Indeed, the Reversal 
group of Experiment 1 had less exposure to the instruction than in any other experiment 
in which sensitivity to verbal instructions has been observed (Hogarth et al., 2014; 
Seabrooke et al., 2016). The reduced exposure to the instruction in Experiment 1 may 
have led participants to pay less attention to it. Some support for this ‘reduced attention’ 
interpretation comes from participants’ self-report expectancy ratings (of the extent to 
which the pictorial beer and chocolate stimuli signalled that the associated response was 
more likely to be rewarded). In Experiment 1, 65% of participants in the Reversal Slow 
condition reported mean expectancy ratings of 3.5 (the midpoint on the expectancy 
scale) or higher. These ratings suggest that many of the participants in the Reversal 
Slow condition continued to believe that the picture signalled that the associated 
response was more likely to be rewarded (despite the reversal instruction). In 
Experiment 2, by comparison, only 33.33% reported mean expectancy ratings of 3.5 of 
higher in the (equivalent) Reversal No Load condition. It seems that (for whatever 
reason), participants had greater confidence in the reversal instruction in Experiment 2 
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than in Experiment 1. It therefore seems prudent to conclude that the failure to observe a 
reversed PIT effect in Experiment 1 was most likely due to reduced confidence in the 
reversal instruction (although this conclusion remains to be tested directly). 
The immunity of the non-reversal PIT effect to the speed (Experiment 1) and 
concurrent load (Experiment 2) manipulations supports an ‘automatic’ account of PIT. 
Yet the reversed PIT effect observed in Experiment 2 supports the propositional account. 
These results are therefore paradoxical. One way to reconcile the results would be to 
speculate that both the non-reversal and the reversal PIT effects are mediated by 
propositional processes, but that the reversal PIT effect was relatively more demanding 
than the non-reversal PIT effect. This is an intuitive assumption from a propositional 
perspective, because the reversed PIT effect requires participants to remember and 
integrate knowledge about both the trained instrumental contingencies and the reversal 
instruction. The non-reversal PIT effect, in contrast, only requires a recollection of the 
trained instrumental contingencies. Hence, it is possible that the concurrent load task 
was strong enough to abolish the reversed PIT effect, but not strong enough to abolish 
the less demanding non-reversal PIT effect. The non-reversal PIT effect may depend on 
only very limited propositional processes, which may explain why participants were 
able to generate a non-reversal PIT effect even whilst completing the load task. In sum, 
it is possible that the PIT effect persisted in the Non-Reversal Load condition because 
the load task reduced but did not eliminate participants’ ability to utilise controlled 
reasoning processes.   
The analysis above implies that more demanding versions of the non-reversal 
PIT task would be more sensitive to the speed and load manipulations. Some support 
comes from the positive correlation observed between reaction times and the size of the 
transfer effect in Experiment 1. There was also a trend towards a comparable result in 
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the Non-Reversal Load group in Experiment 2. Here, a marginal negative correlation 
was observed between accuracy on the load task and the size of the transfer effect. 
These correlations suggest that participants who responded either very quickly 
(Experiment 1) or very accurately on the load task (Experiment 2) were more likely to 
show an attenuated PIT effect. Hence, PIT effects were reduced when the speed and 
load manipulations were more effective. This lends credence to the idea that more 
demanding versions of the PIT task (perhaps using a procedure similar to de Wit et al., 
2013) might be more effective in producing an effect of speed and load on the Non-
Reversal PIT task. One way to test this idea empirically would be to increase the 
number of trained instrumental contingencies. The current experiments only required 
participants to learn two concurrent instrumental contingencies, which may not have 
been particularly demanding. Future experiments could, for instance, establish four 
instrumental contingencies, and then test whether PIT effects are more sensitive to 
concurrent load than when only two contingencies are trained. The propositional 
account predicts that the greater the number of contingencies, the more influence the 
concurrent load task should have. If the immunity of the non-reversal PIT effect to the 
concurrent load manipulation in Experiment 2 was due to the formation of automatic 
associative links, then the same result should be observed with a greater number of 
instrumental contingencies (assuming participants learn the contingencies).  
Before concluding this discussion, it is also worth noting some interesting 
patterns in the reaction time data. In each experiment, the Non-Reversal group 
responded more quickly than the Reversal group to the beer and chocolate stimuli. This 
is akin to classic ideomotor effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). From an ideomotor 
perspective, the beer and chocolate stimuli may have primed the instrumental response 
that was paired with the common outcome during training. This priming effect may then 
have made it more challenging and time-consuming to perform the alternative response 
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in line with the reversal instruction. Ideomotor effects are often assumed to operate 
automatically (Ridderinkhof, 2014), and without any intention to learn the action-effect 
relationships (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). However, this is still a matter of debate 
(Watson et al., 2016), and the reaction time effects observed here are also entirely 
consistent with the propositional account. The propositional account predicts that the 
reversed PIT effect would be more time-consuming than the non-reversed PIT effect 
because successful reversal requires participants to retain knowledge of both the 
original contingencies and the instructed relations. Hence, while the observation that the 
Non-Reversal group responded more quickly than the Reversal instruction group is 
interesting, it is consistent with both the ideomotor and the propositional accounts.   
Finally, OSPAN scores (measuring working memory capacity) did not correlate 
with the transfer effect in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2. OSPAN scores were, in 
general, rather low in both experiments. It is possible that floor effects reduced the 
potential to observe significant correlations between OSPAN scores and the PIT effect. 
In future, it would be useful to employ a less demanding test of working memory, to 
further explore the relationship between working memory capacity and PIT. 
The speed and concurrent load procedures employed in Experiments 1 and 2 are 
useful for testing the dual-process model of PIT against the propositional model of PIT. 
The experiments had the potential to produce a non-reversal PIT effect in the Reversal 
Fast (Experiment 1) and Reversal Load (Experiment 2) groups. Such a result would 
have been extremely revealing, and would have provided unique evidence for a dual-
process account of PIT. Unfortunately, the data did not support this conclusion. Future 
work could assess whether other concurrent load tasks are more successful in producing 
evidence for the dual-process account. The experiments in Chapter 3, however, move 
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away from the speed and concurrent load manipulations, in the hope of establishing a 
more definitive test of the propositional and S-O-R accounts of PIT.  
The other reason for moving away from the speed and concurrent load tasks 
employed in the present chapter is that they do not provide insight into one of the most 
counterintuitive aspects of PIT: its insensitivity to outcome devaluation (Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1990a; Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 
2004; Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 2014). In particular, Hogarth and Chase (2011) 
and Hogarth (2012) have both demonstrated insensitivity of PIT to outcome devaluation 
using procedures that are very similar to the control conditions of the current 
experiments (without time restrictions or cognitive load). Hence, insensitivity to 
devaluation was demonstrated when participants should have been able to utilise higher 
order propositional processes. Insensitivity to devaluation is usually regarded as the 
definitive test for automatic or habitual control (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 
1985). The standard PIT effect is therefore usually considered to be automatic (even 
though propositional processes should be able to readily operate), because it is 
insensitive to devaluation. In light of this counterintuitive result, several experiments 
that explored the effect of a very strong outcome devaluation manipulation on PIT were 
conducted. These experiments generated more immediately promising results than the 
speed and concurrent load experiments, so this line of research was prioritised. The 
experiments in Chapter 3 therefore change direction to further examine the effect of 
outcome devaluation on PIT.  
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Chapter 3: Outcome devaluation 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters demonstrated an apparent paradox in the PIT literature. 
On the one hand, PIT is attenuated (Hogarth et al., 2014) and can be reversed 
(Experiment 2 of the current thesis) by verbal instructions. Sensitivity to verbal 
instructions is usually regarded as evidence for the role of controlled, propositional 
processes (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2005; Lovibond, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2009; Mitchell, 
Griffiths, Seetoo, & Lovibond, 2012). On the other hand, PIT is often insensitive to 
outcome devaluation manipulations (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990a; Corbit et al., 2007; 
Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 
2014, but see Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b for exceptions). 
Insensitivity to devaluation is usually interpreted as evidence for automatic or habitual 
control (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 1985). These results are considered 
paradoxical because the instructional sensitivity implicates a controlled, propositional 
process, while the insensitivity to outcome devaluation points to an automatic process.  
Before accepting that PIT is both sensitive to verbal instructions and insensitive 
to devaluation, it is important to confirm that both effects are robust. Experiment 2 
provided evidence, in addition to that in the existing literature, to suggest that PIT is 
sensitive to instructional manipulations. The instructional sensitivity reported by 
Hogarth et al. (2014) and Seabrooke et al. (2016) therefore appears to be secure. 
However, there is still ambiguity with respect to the insensitivity to devaluation that is 
usually observed in PIT experiments (Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 
2016b). In particular, Eder and Dignath (2016b) have argued that PIT may only be 
insensitive to devaluation when weak devaluation procedures are used. Their 
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explanation would resolve the apparent paradox very simply, by suggesting that PIT is 
in fact sensitive to strong devaluation manipulations – a conclusion that would be 
entirely consistent with the observed sensitivity to verbal instructions.  
Eder and Dignath's (2016b) argument was based on two experiments in which 
participants learnt to perform two instrumental responses to earn different lemonade 
drinks. Pavlovian stimuli were also trained to predict each lemonade outcome, before 
participants sampled each outcome
4
. Importantly, one outcome was devalued by mixing 
it with a substance (Tween 20) to make it taste unpleasant. The post-devaluation transfer 
test was divided into two blocks. In Experiment 1, participants were required to drink 
their (valued and devalued) lemonade winnings immediately after each block. Crucially, 
the PIT effect was sensitive to the devaluation manipulation; the Pavlovian cues 
increased instrumental responding for the common outcome when that outcome was 
valued, but not when the outcome had been devalued. As Eder and Dignath (2016b) 
noted, however, their procedure was somewhat atypical. Usually, participants are either 
not given the rewards “earned” during the transfer test (Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & 
Chase, 2011), or they are given the rewards at the very end of the transfer test (Watson 
et al., 2014). Eder and Dignath (2016b) therefore ran another experiment that was 
identical to the first, except that the transfer test winnings were simply bottled for 
participants to take away. Under these circumstances, PIT effects were observed for 
both the valued and devalued outcome. Hence, PIT was only insensitive to devaluation 
when participants were not required to consume the devalued outcomes immediately 
after each block of the transfer test. Eder and Dignath (2016b) therefore made a strong 
argument that PIT is only insensitive to weak devaluation procedures.  
Eder and Dignath's (2016b) data suggest that PIT can be sensitive to outcome 
devaluation. Their results are also consistent with some other recent observations in the 
                                                 
4
 A typical PIT effect was also observed in a pre-devaluation transfer test.  
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human literature (Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a). There are, however, 
many procedural differences between these experimental tasks and those that 
demonstrated insensitivity to outcome devaluation. For example, Eder and Dignath 
(2016a, 2016b) explicitly instructed their participants that the Pavlovian stimuli were 
not important during the transfer test. This is arguably an instructed Pavlovian 
extinction procedure, which may have made the PIT effect more susceptible to the 
devaluation manipulation. 
Eder and Dignath's (2016a, 2016b) instruction is particularly noteworthy for the 
propositional EU account of PIT. Here, PIT effects are assumed to reflect explicit 
judgements about the expected probability (Op) and value (Ov) of each outcome. The 
Pavlovian stimuli presented during the transfer test are suggested to increase the 
perceived probability Op of the associated outcome. This increase in perceived 
probability Op is assumed to underlie both the standard PIT effect and its insensitivity 
to outcome devaluation; participants respond for the devalued outcome when it is cued 
because it is considered to be much more available than the alternative (non-cued) 
outcome. Notably, the EU account assumes that the probability judgements are 
propositional. One might expect, therefore, that Eder and Dignath's (2016a, 2016b) 
instruction – that the pictures were not relevant to which response would be rewarded – 
would influence (and perhaps discredit) these propositional judgements about cue-
elicited outcome probability. Hence, it is possible that a typical PIT task would produce 
insensitivity to devaluation with even a very strong devaluation procedure. 
 In light of the above discussion, Experiment 3 tested whether PIT would be 
sensitive to a very strong devaluation manipulation (described below), using a 
procedure that is otherwise very similar to those that have demonstrated insensitivity to 
outcome devaluation (Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011). Participants were not 
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told that the pictures were irrelevant during the transfer test. Sensitivity to devaluation 
would be revealed if the PIT effect for the still-valued outcome was significantly larger 
than the PIT effect for the devalued outcome. Such a result, using the current very 
strong devaluation procedure, would support the suggestion that the previous 
demonstrations of insensitivity to outcome devaluation were simply due to the use of 
weak devaluation procedures (Eder & Dignath, 2016b). Insensitivity to devaluation, by 
contrast, would be demonstrated if both the valued and devalued Pavlovian stimuli 
biased response choice towards the associated outcome (relative to the neutral stimulus) 
to a similar extent. Such insensitivity to devaluation would be more consistent with the 
majority of the literature, and would support the claim that outcome value plays no role 
in outcome-selective PIT (e.g. Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Martinovic 
et al., 2014). 
3.2 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3, which is summarised in Table ‎3.1, tested whether PIT would be 
sensitive to a novel, very strong outcome devaluation procedure. Participants were first 
shown a bag of crisps and popcorn (outcomes O1 and O2, counterbalanced) and were 
told that they could win points corresponding to each type of food during the 
experiment. Savoury food outcomes (as opposed to the beer and chocolate props used in 
Experiments 1 and 2) were used because pilot testing had revealed that they worked 
particularly well with the devaluation manipulation. As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants then learned to perform two instrumental responses to obtain each outcome. 
Each response was selectively paired with one outcome (R1-O1, R2-O2). The outcome 
devaluation procedure took place between the instrumental training and transfer test 
phases. Here, participants sampled each outcome, but importantly, the devalued was 
covered with ground cloves and olive oil. This procedure made the devalued outcome 
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taste very unpleasant. In the final transfer test, instrumental response choice (R1 versus 
R2) was tested in the presence of pictorial stimuli that were associated with each 
outcome (stimulus S1, S2, or a neutral stimulus S0).  
Table ‎3.1 
 
Design of Experiment 3. 
Instrumental training Outcome devaluation Transfer test 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
O1 or O2 devalued S0: R1/R2? 
S1: R1/R2? 
S2: R1/R2? 
Note: R1 and R2 represent instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses). O1 and O2 
are outcomes (crisps and popcorn). S0 is a neutral stimulus, and S1 and S2 are pictures of O1 
and O2. 
 
Overall response choice was expected to be biased towards the still-valued 
outcome during the transfer test. This bias would be consistent with previous reports in 
demonstrating that overall responding is goal-directed (e.g., Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 
2016b; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Watson et al., 2014). The bias towards 
the valued outcome was also expected to be enhanced by the stimulus that was 
associated with that valued outcome. The question was whether the stimulus that 
signalled the devalued outcome would increase responding for that outcome, relative to 
the neutral stimulus. Insensitivity to outcome devaluation would be revealed if the 
stimulus signalling the devalued outcome elevated instrumental responding for that 
outcome, compared to the neutral stimulus. Moreover, the PIT effect for the devalued 
outcome should be of a comparable magnitude to the PIT effect for the still-valued 
outcome. Sensitivity to outcome devaluation, by contrast, would be revealed if the PIT 
effect for the valued outcome was significantly larger than the PIT effect for the 
devalued outcome.  
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3.2.1 Method 
Participants. Sixty participants (49 females, aged between 18 and 30; M =21.41 
years, SEM = 0.39 years) were recruited from Plymouth University and received either 
£4 or course credit for participation. Participants were screened for food allergies and 
intolerances at the start of the experiment. All other aspects were identical to 
Experiment 1. 
Apparatus and materials. A bag of Walkers extra crunchy ready salted crisps 
(150g) and Tyrrell’s sea salted “Poshcorn” (70g) served as visual props. These brands 
were also used for the devaluation manipulation. Here, the outcomes were decanted into 
separate transparent, plastic containers before the experiment. The name of the food was 
written clearly on the lid of each container. For the devalued outcomes, ground cloves 
were combined with olive oil (11 grams oil per 5 grams cloves) to form a paste that was 
brushed heavily onto the devalued food (Appendix 1 details the precise amounts used 
for each food). The non-devalued outcome was simply transferred from the original 
packaging to its container. 
A picture of crisps or popcorn (depicting the outcomes in their valued state) 
served as Pavlovian stimuli during the transfer test. Hence, as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
pictorial stimuli whose Pavlovian relationships were established outside of the 
laboratory were used (Hogarth & Chase, 2011). This procedure has the advantage of 
producing robust and replicable effects, at the expense of full experimental control of 
the Pavlovian contingencies. To minimise potential problems regarding the picture 
stimuli, a Pavlovian knowledge test was administered at the end of the experiment to 
ensure that all participants knew which outcome the stimuli represented. All other 
aspects of the apparatus and materials were identical to Experiment 1.  
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Procedure. Participants were warned before the experiment that they would be 
required to sample foods during the experiment, that the foods might not match the 
participants’ expectations, and that they might taste unpleasant. Participants provided 
informed consent and signed a form stating that they had no allergies or intolerances. 
The crisps and popcorn food props were presented, and participants were told they 
could win points towards the foods during the experiment.  
Liking ratings. Participants initially rated their desire to eat each food (based on 
the food props) by pressing a key between one (“Not at all”) and seven (“Very much”). 
The foods were rated in a random order and were separated by an interval that varied 
randomly between 750 and 1250ms.  
Instrumental training. The instrumental training phase followed a very similar 
procedure to the training used in Experiments 1 and 2. The props were removed and the 
experimenter read aloud the following instructions: “In this task, you can earn the two 
outcomes shown before by pressing the left or right arrow keys. Your task is to learn 
which keys earn each outcome.” There were 48 trials. Each trial began with a centrally 
presented choice symbol (“← or →”), which remained until participants pressed either 
the left or right arrow key. Each key was selectively paired with either crisps or popcorn, 
and this was counterbalanced between-subjects. The keys were also counterbalanced 
with respect to whether they earned the subsequently valued or devalued outcome. One 
outcome was scheduled to be available on each trial (availability of O1 or O2 on any 
given trial was random), and so each key had a 50% chance of yielding the associated 
reward. Instrumental responses were followed by the statement, “You earn one 
[CRISPS/POPCORN] point”, or “You earn NOTHING” if the available outcome was 
not selected. The outcome (crisps/popcorn/nothing) was presented in bold text and the 
rewards (crisps/popcorn) were presented in green or red (counterbalanced) to help 
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participants discriminate between them. All other text was presented in black. Feedback 
was presented for 3000ms and the trials were separated by 750-1250ms intervals. 
Instrumental knowledge test. After instrumental training, participants 
completed an instrumental knowledge test that was identical to Experiment 1, except 
that the questions related to the crisps and popcorn outcomes. Confidence ratings were 
also recorded (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “Very much”). 
Outcome devaluation. At the start of the devaluation procedure, participants 
were informed that they would have the opportunity to try the foods that were available 
for the rest of the experiment. The still-valued outcome was always sampled first, 
before the devalued outcome was revealed. After sampling both outcomes, the 
containers were placed on the table together, and participants were informed that the 
devalued outcome was past its expiry date. Liking ratings were then taken in the same 
way as at the start of the experiment.  
Transfer test. At the start of the transfer test, the experimenter read aloud the 
following instructions: “In this part of the task, you can earn the two outcomes by 
pressing the left or right arrow key in the same way as before. You will only be told 
how many of each reward you have earned at the end of the experiment. Also, 
sometimes pictures of the foods will be presented before you choose the left or right 
arrow key. NOTE: You will be required to eat all of the food you have earned at the end 
of the experiment, so please choose carefully. Press any key to begin a practice round.” 
A crisps, popcorn or neutral stimulus was presented at the start of each trial for 3000ms.  
The choice symbol (“← or →”) then appeared beneath the stimulus and remained until 
participants selected the left or right arrow key. The test phase was conducted in 
nominal extinction, and so no feedback was given. The trials were separated by 750-
1250ms intervals. There were eight cycles of six trials (48 trials in total). In each cycle, 
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the three stimuli were presented twice in a random order. Before the transfer test, 
participants completed one practice cycle to provide time to adjust to the task. The 
practice cycle was identical to the test cycles but the data were not analysed. After the 
practice cycle, the following instructions were presented: “That is the end of the practice 
phase. Please ask the experimenter now if you have any questions. REMEMBER: You 
will be required to eat all of the food you have earned at the end of the experiment, so 
please choose carefully. Press any key to begin.” The experimenter read aloud the 
instructions, answered any questions and removed the food containers before 
participants finished the transfer test.  
Knowledge tests. Participants completed a second instrumental knowledge test 
(identical to the first) to check their knowledge of the instrumental relationships. A 
Pavlovian knowledge test was also administered. Here, the crisps and popcorn stimuli 
were presented in a random order and participants selected the outcome that the 
stimulus represented. A post-experimental questionnaire was also used to collect 
demographic information and feedback about the outcomes. Finally, participants were 
fully debriefed and were asked not discuss the experiment outside the laboratory.  
3.2.2 Results 
Exclusions. Ten participants were excluded for failing either the instrumental (N 
= 8) or Pavlovian (N = 2) knowledge tests. Given the relatively high proportion of 
excluded participants, the mean transfer test results for these participants are provided in 
Appendix 2. The data from the remaining 50 participants were entered into the analyses.  
Liking ratings. Figure ‎3.1 shows the mean liking ratings for each outcome, in 
the pre- and post-devaluation liking tests. There was a main effect of liking test, with 
higher liking ratings given in the pre-devaluation test than the post-devaluation test, F 
(1, 49) = 48.97, p < .001, 2p = .50. There was also a main effect of outcome, with the 
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valued outcome receiving higher ratings than the devalued outcome when collapsed 
across the liking tests, F (1, 49) = 237.95, p < .001, 2
p = .83. Most importantly, there 
was a significant interaction between the liking test and outcome variables, F (1, 49) = 
313.47, p < .001, 2
p = .87. Planned pairwise comparisons demonstrated that the 
outcomes were rated similarly before devaluation, t < 1, but the valued outcome 
received much higher liking ratings than the devalued outcome after devaluation, t (49) 
= 29.01, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.62, 5.30].  
 
Figure ‎3.1. Mean liking ratings in Experiment 3. Ratings were taken for each outcome (valued, 
devalued) at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation), and immediately after the 
devaluation procedure (post-devaluation). Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to eat 
the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively.  Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Transfer test. Figure ‎3.2 shows the transfer test results. There was an overall 
effect of stimulus, F (2, 98) = 18.42, p < .001, 2p = .27. Bonferroni corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed an outcome-selective PIT effect. The stimulus signalling the 
valued outcome biased responding towards that outcome compared to the neutral 
stimulus, t (49) = 4.21, p < .001, 95% CI = [7.80, 30.20], and the stimulus that signalled 
the devalued outcome, t (49) = 5.33, p < .001, 95% CI = [17.13, 46.87]. Importantly, the 
stimulus that signalled the devalued outcome decreased responding for the valued 
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outcome, relative to the neutral stimulus, t (49) = 2.46, p = .05, 95% CI = [-0.11, 26.11]. 
Finally, a one-sample t-test demonstrated that overall response choice (averaged across 
the three stimuli) was biased towards the still-valued outcome, t (49) = 8.68, p < .001, 
95% CI = [20.18, 32.32]. 
To compare the magnitude of the PIT effects, PIT scores were calculated in a 
similar way to Experiments 1 and 2. For each outcome, the dependent variable was the 
percent choice of the instrumental response that was paired with the still-valued 
outcome. The PIT score for the valued outcome was calculated by subtracting choice on 
the neutral stimulus trials from choice on trials where the stimulus signalling the valued 
outcome was present (Svalued – Sneutral). This calculation was reversed for the devalued 
outcome (Sneutral – Sdevalued). Most importantly, the PIT effect scores for the valued and 
devalued outcome did not significantly differ, t < 1.  
 
Figure ‎3.2. Transfer test results of Experiment 3. Response choice was tested in the presence of 
pictorial stimuli depicting each outcome, or a neutral stimulus. Scores above and below the 50% 
mid-point represent a bias towards the valued and devalued outcome, respectively. Error bars 
represent SEM.  
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3.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested whether PIT would be insensitive to a strong outcome 
devaluation procedure. Overall, response choice was biased towards the still-valued 
outcome during the transfer test. This indicates that overall response choice was goal-
directed, because it clearly reflected an integration of knowledge about the instrumental 
contingencies, and the current outcome values (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 
1985). A PIT effect was also observed; the Pavlovian stimuli increased responding for 
their associated outcomes relative to the neutral stimulus. Importantly, this effect was 
not diminished by the devaluation manipulation. Thus, the PIT effect was “insensitive” 
to devaluation, because the stimuli exerted a similar effect on instrumental response 
choice, irrespective of whether the associated outcome had been devalued or not. This 
insensitivity to devaluation is consistent with much of the literature (Colwill & Rescorla, 
1990a; Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; 
Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 2014), and suggests that Pavlovian stimuli can, at least 
under these circumstances, motivate instrumental responding for undesirable or aversive 
outcomes.  
As noted earlier, there are three recent human PIT studies that have reported 
sensitivity to devaluation (Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b). The 
current results are clearly inconsistent with these studies. Eder and Dignath (2016b) 
recently proposed that PIT may only be insensitive to weak devaluation procedures. 
Their conclusion was based on the observation that PIT was sensitive to outcome 
devaluation when participants consumed the devalued outcome periodically throughout 
the transfer test, but not when the outcomes were given away after the experiment. 
When consumption of the devalued outcome was delayed (and potentially avoided 
entirely), the Pavlovian stimulus that signalled the devalued outcome increased 
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instrumental responding for that devalued outcome compared to a neutral stimulus. Our 
participants did not consume the outcomes after the experiment for ethical reasons, 
which may explain the observed insensitivity to devaluation. However, the instructions 
did emphasise that participants would be required to eat all of the food earned after the 
experiment, and participants had no way of knowing that this was a deception
5
. 
Furthermore, the liking rating data suggested that the devaluation manipulation 
produced a very strong reduction in liking for the devalued outcome. This aversion was 
also apparent in the transfer test, where participants demonstrated a strong overall bias 
towards the still-valued outcome. The insensitivity to outcome devaluation observed in 
the current experiment does not, therefore, appear to be for lack of a strong devaluation 
procedure. Clearly, there is a tendency for Pavlovian stimuli to facilitate instrumental 
responses for associated outcomes, even when those outcomes are of very low value. It 
seems likely, therefore, that the recent demonstrations of sensitivity to devaluation arose 
from other procedural differences. Possible procedural differences are explored more 
thoroughly in section 3.6 (General Discussion).  
Insensitivity to outcome devaluation in PIT experiments is usually taken as 
evidence of automaticity, because PIT is not seemingly flexible to changes in outcome 
value. It accords particularly well with S-O-R theory, which suggests that PIT effects 
occur automatically and without retrieving a representation of the outcome’s value (e.g., 
Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004). However, S-O-R theory 
has difficulty explaining the sensitivity to verbal instructions observed previously 
(Hogarth et al., 2014; Seabrooke et al., 2016). Thus, the issue of why PIT is sensitive to 
instructional manipulations yet insensitive to outcome devaluation remains. The 
                                                 
5
 Participants were also explicitly asked not to discuss the experiment (and the devaluation procedure 
specifically) with other potential participants during the debriefing session. It is very difficult to check 
compliance with respect to this request, but steps were nevertheless taken to minimise the possibility of 
participants discussing the experiment with others outside of the laboratory.  
91 
 
following experiments therefore aim to further examine the conditions that foster 
insensitivity to outcome devaluation in PIT.  
3.3 Experiment 4 
An overarching theme of this thesis is to reconcile PIT’s insensitivity to 
devaluation with its sensitivity to verbal instructions. Experiment 2 provided additional 
evidence demonstrating PIT’s sensitivity to instructional manipulations. Experiment 3 
demonstrated that the devaluation effect is also robust. Experiment 4 therefore aimed to 
show both effects within a single experiment. To this end, the experiment first sought 
evidence of an ‘instructed’ PIT effect. That is, the instrumental contingencies were 
simply instructed rather than trained. An instructed PIT effect would demonstrate that 
PIT effects can be produced by instructions alone, and would therefore support the 
propositional approach. Experiment 4 also tested whether an instructed, propositional 
PIT effect would be sensitive to outcome devaluation. If, like the standard PIT effect, 
the instructed effect is insensitive to outcome devaluation, then insensitivity to outcome 
devaluation can no longer only be interpreted as evidence for an automatic S-O-R 
process. Rather, it would suggest that insensitivity to devaluation can (at least 
sometimes) be produced by propositional processes.  
The search for an instructed PIT effect fits with a broader theme in associative 
learning, where evidence for propositional processes is sought by exploring whether 
effects that are traditionally developed through experience (conditioning) can be 
obtained through verbal instructions alone (e.g., Cook & Harris, 1937; De Houwer, 
2006; Lovibond, 2003; Mertens, Raes, & De Houwer, 2016). Verbal instructions are 
unlikely to produce associative links, because they do not involve the repeated, 
contiguous activation of two mental representations. In contrast to the associative link-
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based account, the propositional account predicts that effects derived from experience or 
instructions should be comparable. 
Experiment 4 tested whether a PIT effect would be observed when the 
instrumental contingencies were simply instructed rather than established through trial-
by-trial conditioning. Table ‎3.2 shows the design. Two instrumental responses were 
initially paired with crisps and popcorn points, but the contingencies were instructed 
rather than trained (R1-O1, R2-O2). Participants then completed a transfer test, where 
response choice was tested in the presence of a crisps, popcorn or neutral stimulus. The 
demonstration of a PIT effect would suggest that PIT effects can be generated by the 
propositional system alone. One outcome was then devalued, to test whether the 
instructed PIT effect would be insensitive to devaluation. Response choice was finally 
tested in a second, post-devaluation transfer test that was identical to the first. Both 
transfer tests were conducted in nominal extinction so that instrumental associative links 
could not form during either transfer test (because the instrumental contingencies were 
never experienced). If an instructed PIT effect is observed and is insensitive to outcome 
devaluation, it would suggest that insensitivity to outcome devaluation can, at least 
sometimes, reflect a propositional process.  
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Table ‎3.2 
 
Design of Experiment 4 
Instructed 
instrumental 
Pre-devaluation 
transfer test 
Outcome 
devaluation 
Post-devaluation 
transfer test 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
S0: R1/R2? 
S1: R1/R2? 
S2: R1/R2? 
O1 or O2 devalued S0: R1/R2? 
S1: R1/R2? 
S2: R1/R2? 
Note: R1 and R2 represent instrumental responses (left and right arrow keys) that were verbally 
instructed at the start of the experiment. O1 and O2 refer to outcomes (crisps and popcorn). S0 
represents a neutral stimulus, and S1 and S2 refer to pictures of O1 and O2, respectively.  
 
3.3.1 Method 
The method was identical to Experiment 3, except in the following respects.  
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduate psychology students (18 females, 
aged 18-28; M = 20.00 years, SEM = 0.51 years) completed the experiment for course 
credit.  
Procedure 
Pre-devaluation transfer test. After completing initial liking ratings for each 
outcome, participants were instructed to press the left and right arrow keys to win crisps 
and popcorn points. In place of the instrumental training given in Experiment 1, the 
instrumental contingencies were simply presented on-screen and verbally confirmed. 
These instructed contingencies were counterbalanced with respect to the outcome 
(crisps, popcorn) that the response produced, and whether the outcome was 
subsequently devalued or not. The instructions were framed as a response-outcome 
contingency (e.g. LEFT ARROW = CRISPS) or an outcome-response contingency (e.g. 
CRISPS = LEFT ARROW) for half of the participants each. The presentation of the 
instruction was not intended to be an experimental manipulation. By counterbalancing 
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the instructions in this way, we simply hoped to control for any underlying bias 
generated by the presentation of the instructions. 
The transfer test was identical to Experiment 3, except that the instructed 
instrumental contingencies were presented at the bottom of the screen throughout. Each 
instruction was presented in either red or green (counterbalanced) to help discriminate 
them. After the pre-devaluation transfer test, instrumental knowledge was tested as in 
Experiment 3.  
Outcome devaluation. The outcome devaluation procedure was identical to 
Experiment 3, except that the devalued outcome was not described as past its expiry 
date. Many of the participants in Experiment 3 reported that they did not believe this 
instruction, so it was omitted from the procedure.  
Post-devaluation transfer test and knowledge tests. The second, post-
devaluation transfer test was identical to the first. Participants subsequently completed 
the instrumental and Pavlovian knowledge tests, and the post-experimental 
questionnaire from Experiment 3.  
3.3.2 Results 
Exclusions. One participant was excluded for failing both the instrumental and 
Pavlovian contingency knowledge tests.  
Liking ratings. Figure ‎3.3 shows the mean liking ratings for each outcome at 
the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation) and after the devaluation procedure (post-
devaluation). The pattern was very similar to that of Experiment 3. There was a main 
effect of liking test, with higher ratings given in the pre-devaluation test than in the 
post-devaluation test, F (1, 22) = 26.79, p < .001, 2p = .55. A main effect of outcome 
was also observed, with the valued outcome receiving higher ratings than the devalued 
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outcome, F (1, 22) = 109.39, p < .001, 2
p = .83. Most importantly, there was an 
interaction between the liking test and outcome variables, F (1, 22) = 81.13, p < .001, 
2
p = .79. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that the valued outcome was rated 
more highly than the devalued outcome in both the pre-devaluation, t (22) = 2.91, p 
< .01, 95% CI = [0.20, 1.19]
6
, and post-devaluation liking test, t (22) = 11.39, p < .001, 
95% CI = [3.70, 5.35].  
 
Figure ‎3.3. Mean liking ratings in Experiment 4. Ratings were taken for each outcome (valued, 
devalued) at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation), and immediately after the 
devaluation procedure (post-devaluation). Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to eat 
the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Transfer tests. Figure ‎3.4 shows the pre- and post-devaluation transfer test 
results. The graph indicates that a PIT effect was apparent in the pre-devaluation 
transfer test, where the stimuli increased choice of the instrumental responses that had 
been instructed to produce the cued outcomes. Overall response choice was biased 
towards the valued outcome in the post-devaluation transfer effect, but a PIT effect for 
the devalued outcome was still apparent.  
                                                 
6
 The preference towards the valued outcome in the pre-devaluation liking test was unexpected, and is 
therefore discussed more thoroughly below. 
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Figure ‎3.4. Pre- and post-devaluation transfer test results of Experiment 4. Response choice 
was tested in the presence of pictorial stimuli depicting each outcome, or a neutral stimulus. 
Scores above and below the 50% mid-point represent a bias towards the valued and devalued 
outcome, respectively. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
The results were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA on the transfer 
test (pre-devaluation, post-devaluation), stimulus (valued, neutral, and devalued) and 
instruction (O-R, R-O) variables. The instruction variable was not expected to influence 
the pattern of results, but it was nevertheless included in the analysis. To confirm, there 
was no main effect of instruction or any significant interactions with the transfer test 
and stimulus variables (Fs < 1.37, ps > .26). The instruction groups were therefore 
collapsed for presentation. However, the means and standard deviations for each 
instruction group are provided in  Appendix 3: for transparency. Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied where appropriate to correct for sphericity. 
There was a main effect of transfer test, with participants responding more for 
the valued outcome after devaluation than before, F (1, 21) = 54.89, p < .001, 2p  = .72. 
There was also a main effect of stimulus, F (1.16, 24.27) = 42.64, p < .001, 2p  = .67, 
and a significant stimulus × transfer test interaction, F (1.33, 27.91) = 11.46, p = .001, 
2
p  = .35.  
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Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the pre-devaluation 
transfer test, the stimulus signalling the subsequently still-valued outcome increased 
responding for that outcome compared to the neutral stimulus, t (22) = 4.66, p < .001, 
95% CI = [11.76, 41.46] , and the stimulus that signalled the subsequently devalued 
outcome, t (22) = 8.47, p < .001, 95% CI = [5.01, 94.31].  The stimulus that signalled 
the subsequently devalued outcome also increased responding for that outcome 
compared to the neutral stimulus, t (22) = 6.13, p < .001, 95% CI = [26.22, 64.88]. Thus, 
a PIT effect was observed in the pre-devaluation transfer test. The magnitude of the two 
PIT effects was not significantly different, t (22) = 1.92, p = .07, 95% CI = [-1.58, 
40.16]. 
Comparable analyses in the post-devaluation transfer test revealed that the 
stimulus that signalled the valued outcome increased responding for that outcome 
compared to the neutral stimulus, t (22) = 2.69, p < .05, 95% CI = [0.19, 11.75], and the 
stimulus that signalled the devalued outcome, t (22) = 3.25, p < .05, 95% CI = [5.90, 
53.24]. Importantly, the stimulus that signalled the devalued outcome also increased 
responding for that devalued outcome compared to the neutral stimulus, t (22) = 3.03, p 
< .05, 95% CI = [3.36, 43.85]. Thus, a PIT effect was observed for both the valued and 
the devalued outcome. Interestingly, the PIT effect for the devalued outcome was 
significantly larger than the PIT effect for the valued outcome, t (22) = 2.53, p = .02, 95% 
CI = [3.11, 31.67].  
The use of a pre-devaluation transfer test in the current experiment also allows a 
comparison of the size of the transfer effects before and after the devaluation procedure. 
The transfer effect scores for the valued and devalued outcomes were calculated in the 
same way as in Experiment 3. For the valued outcome, the size of the pre-devaluation 
transfer effect (M = 26.36, SEM = 5.71) was significantly larger than the post-
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devaluation transfer effect (M = 5.98, SEM = 2.17), t (22) = 3.74, p = .001, 95% CI = 
[9.08, 31.78]. For the devalued outcome, the size of the pre-devaluation (M = 45.65, 
SEM = 7.27) and post-devaluation (M = 23.37, SEM = 7.68) transfer effect did not 
significantly differ, t (22) = 2.01, p = .06, 95% CI = [-0.76, 45.33].  
Finally, one-sample t-tests revealed that, in the pre-devaluation transfer test, 
overall response choice was biased towards the outcome that subsequently served as the 
valued outcome, t (22) = 2.94, p < .01, 95% CI = [3.39, 19.62]. This is consistent with 
the higher liking ratings given to this outcome at the start of the experiment (despite 
counterbalancing the outcomes). Overall responding was also biased towards the valued 
outcome in the post-devaluation transfer test, t (22) = 10.49, p < .001, 95% CI = [29.58, 
44.16]. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4 explored whether trial-by-trial experience of instrumental 
contingencies is necessary to observe a PIT effect, by investigating whether PIT could 
be produced by instruction in the absence of experience. The experiment also tested 
whether an instructed PIT effect would be insensitive to an outcome devaluation 
manipulation. In the pre-devaluation transfer test, participants demonstrated a clear 
instructed PIT effect; the pictorial crisps and popcorn stimuli selectively biased 
response choice towards the response that had been instructed to produce the outcome 
that was signalled by the stimulus. This result suggests that PIT effects can be produced 
by the propositional system alone. It is also consistent with the suggestion that explicit 
contingency knowledge plays an important role in generating PIT effects (Bezzina et al., 
2016; Hogarth et al., 2007; Lovibond et al., 2015; Talmi et al., 2008). 
In the post-devaluation transfer test, overall response choice was strongly biased 
towards the response that was instructed to produce the still-valued outcome. A PIT 
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effect was still observed for the devalued outcome though: responding for the devalued 
outcome was enhanced by the stimulus depicting that outcome, relative to the neutral 
stimulus. A PIT effect in the case of an instructed response for a devalued outcome is 
interesting, because insensitivity to outcome devaluation is usually regarded as evidence 
for automatic or habitual control (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 1985). 
Instructed contingencies, on the other hand, are most naturally explained by the 
operation of controlled, propositional processes (Mitchell et al., 2009). Hence, the result 
is paradoxical; although response choice was most likely governed by propositional 
beliefs – the instrumental contingencies were only ever instructed – a PIT effect was 
still observed for the devalued outcome. It seems that insensitivity to devaluation may 
not always reflect automaticity, but may instead (at least sometimes) reflect a controlled 
reasoning process. This possibility is further explored in section 3.6 (General 
Discussion).  
 In contrast to Experiment 3 (and the other published PIT experiments that have 
demonstrated insensitivity to devaluation), the current experiment included a pre-
devaluation transfer test. This allows a direct comparison of the size of the PIT effect 
for each outcome before and after devaluation. The size of the PIT effect for the valued 
outcome was smaller after devaluation than before devaluation. There was also a non-
significant trend in the same direction for the devalued outcome. Hence, it seems 
possible that, even though the sizes of valued and devalued PIT effects were not 
significantly different in the post-devaluation transfer test, the PIT effects were in fact 
influenced by the devaluation manipulation (see Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b for 
similar results). It also seems likely that the size of the PIT effect for the valued 
outcome in the post-devaluation transfer test was reduced because response choice 
approached ceiling (complete responding for the valued outcome). This possibility will 
be expanded on in Section  3.6 (General Discussion). 
100 
 
 
Finally, the valued outcome was preferred to the devalued outcome in even the 
pre-devaluation liking test. This result was unexpected, because the pre-devaluation 
liking ratings pertained to the non-devalued outcomes that were presented in their 
original packaging. In all of the devaluation experiments reported in this thesis, great 
care was taken to ensure that the devalued and non-devalued foods were not revealed 
prior to the devaluation procedure. The devaluation foods were kept out of sight and in 
a separate room. Furthermore, the outcomes served as valued and devalued outcomes in 
an alternate, between-subjects fashion, precisely to prevent a systematic bias towards 
either outcome. In the unlikely event that participants saw the outcomes prematurely, 
they would have consequently seen both the valued and devalued forms of each 
outcome. Another possibility is that the outcome values became known through word of 
mouth outside of the laboratory (despite explicit requests to prevent this during the 
debriefing). Again, the alternate counterbalancing of the outcomes should have 
prevented this from inducing an overall pre-devaluation bias towards either outcome. In 
sum, there is no obvious answer to explain the pre-devaluation preference towards the 
valued outcome. However, it does not affect the critical result – that an instructed PIT 
effect was observed for a devalued outcome –so it will not be discussed here further.  
3.4 Experiment 5 
Experiment 4 demonstrated a PIT effect for a devalued outcome, when the 
instrumental response was merely instructed to produce that outcome. The first 
objective of Experiment 5 was to replicate the results of Experiment 4. The second 
objective was to test whether the insensitivity to outcome value in the new instructed 
PIT effect is comparable to that seen in the standard PIT effect. If both the trained and 
instructed PIT effects are mediated by a common (propositional) mechanism, then 
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outcome devaluation should have a similar impact on each effect. If the PIT effect 
following trial-by-trial instrumental training is partly due to an automatic S-O-R 
mechanism, however, then less sensitivity (greater insensitivity) to outcome devaluation 
might be seen in this condition. Table ‎3.3 shows the design.  
Table ‎3.3  
Design of Experiment 5 
Trained 
instrumental 
Instructed 
instrumental 
Outcome 
devaluation 
Trained 
transfer 
Instructed 
transfer 
R1 – O1 
R2 – O2 
R3 – O1 
R4 – O2 
O1 or O2 devalued S0: R1/R2? 
S1: R1/R2? 
S2: R1/R2? 
S0: R3/R4? 
S1: R3/R4? 
S2: R3/R4? 
Note: Both the instructed and trained contingencies, and trained and instructed transfer tests, 
were counterbalanced with respect to the order in which they were presented. R1-R4 represent 
instrumental responses (left, right, up and down arrow keys), and O1 and O2 refer to outcomes 
(crisps and popcorn). S0 represents a neutral stimulus, and S1 and S2 refer to pictures of O1 and 
O2, respectively.  
 
Participants learnt to perform two instrumental responses (R1 and R2) to earn 
crisps and popcorn points (outcomes O1 and O2, counterbalanced) in an instrumental 
training phase (R1-O1, R2-O2). Two additional responses (R3 and R4) were instructed 
to produce the same two outcomes (R3-O1, R4-O2). One outcome was then devalued 
using the devaluation procedure used previously. Finally, participants completed two 
transfer tests, where response choice was tested in the presence of crisps, popcorn, and 
neutral stimuli. The trained instrumental responses (R1/R2) were used in one transfer 
test, and the instructed responses (R3/R4) in the other. The order of the transfer tests 
was counterbalanced between-subjects. If insensitivity to devaluation arises entirely 
from a propositional process, then the trained and instructed PIT effects should be 
equally insensitive to outcome devaluation. If the insensitivity to outcome devaluation 
seen in the standard, trained PIT effect (Experiment 3) is partly due to an automatic S-
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O-R triggering mechanism, however, then the trained PIT effect should be more 
insensitive to devaluation than the instructed PIT effect. 
3.4.1 Method 
The method was identical to Experiment 4, except in the following respects. 
Participants. Thirty-one undergraduate psychology students (28 females, aged 
18-24; M = 18.86 years, SEM = 0.23 years), completed the experiment. 
Procedure 
Instrumental training and instructions. At the start of the experiment, the two 
arrow key combinations (left and right, up and down) were randomly allocated to the 
trained (R1/R2) and instructed (R3/R4) instrumental contingencies. Half of the 
participants experienced the trained instrumental contingencies first, followed by the 
instructed contingencies. The order was reversed for the remaining participants. After 
initial liking ratings were taken, the following on-screen instructions were presented: 
“In this task, you can earn the two outcomes shown before by pressing the four arrow 
keys. We will tell you which outcome some of the keys earn, but you will have to work 
the others out for yourself.” Half of the participants then received the instructed 
contingencies (presented in the same way as in Experiment 4). All participants were 
then told, “You can now earn crisps and popcorn by pressing the (R1 and R2) arrow 
keys. Your task is to learn which key earns each outcome.” Instrumental training 
commenced using the procedure of Experiment 3. At the end of the instrumental 
training phase, the instructed contingencies were presented to the participants who had 
not received them before. 
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Outcome devaluation and liking ratings. The outcome devaluation procedure 
from Experiment 3 was received after instrumental training. Participants also completed 
a second liking test.  
Transfer tests. Half of the participants received the trained transfer test first, 
followed by the instructed transfer test. The test order was reversed for the remaining 
participants. The instructed instrumental contingencies were shown at the bottom of the 
screen throughout the instructed transfer test. The trained contingencies were never 
visually presented or verbally confirmed. After each transfer test, participants’ 
knowledge of the relevant instrumental contingencies was tested, as in Experiment 4. 
Finally, participants completed the Pavlovian knowledge test and post-experimental 
questionnaire of Experiment 3.  
3.4.2 Results 
Exclusions. Six participants were excluded for failing the trained (N = 3) or 
instructed (N = 3) instrumental knowledge tests. For completeness, the transfer test 
results for these participants are provided in Appendix 2. 
Liking ratings. Figure ‎3.5 shows the mean liking ratings given for each 
outcome in the pre- and post-devaluation liking ratings. The results were very similar to 
the previous experiments. There was a main effect of liking test, with higher ratings 
given in the pre-devaluation test than the post-devaluation test, F (1, 24) = 37.23, p 
< .001, 2p = .61. There was also a main effect of outcome, with the higher ratings given 
to the valued outcome than the devalued outcome, F (1, 24) = 283.95, p < .001, 2p  
= .92. Most importantly, there was a significant interaction between the liking test and 
outcome variables, F (1, 24) = 143.72, p < .001, 2p  = .86. Bonferroni corrected 
pairwise comparisons demonstrated that the valued outcome received higher liking 
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ratings than the devalued outcome in both the pre-devaluation, t (24) = 2.73, p = .01, 95% 
CI = [0.25, 1.83] and post-devaluation liking test, t (24) = 52.96, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[5.50, 5.94].  
 
Figure ‎3.5. Mean liking ratings in Experiment 5. Ratings were taken for each outcome (valued, 
devalued) at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation), and immediately after the 
devaluation procedure (post-devaluation). Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to eat 
the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Transfer tests. Figure ‎3.6 shows the results of the trained and instructed transfer 
tests in each instruction (O-R, R-O) group. The instruction variable was not expected to 
influence the results. However, the graph revealed likely differences between the O-R 
and R-O instruction groups, so it was included in the analysis.  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pre-devaluation Post-devaluation
L
ik
in
g
 r
a
ti
n
g
 
Liking Test 
Valued
Devalued
105 
 
 
Figure ‎3.6. Trained and instructed transfer test results in each instruction group of Experiment 
5. Response choice was tested in the presence of pictorial stimuli depicting each outcome, or a 
neutral stimulus. Scores above and below the 50% mid-point represent a bias towards the 
valued and devalued outcome, respectively. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
 A mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of transfer test, indicating that there 
was a greater preference for the valued outcome in the instructed transfer test than the 
trained transfer test , F (1, 23) = 6.86, p = .02, 2
p  = .23. There was also a main effect of 
stimulus, F (1.39, 31.90) = 21.19, p < .001, 2p  = .48, but not of instruction (O-R versus 
R-O), F (1, 23) = 1.81, p > .05, 2p  = .07. There was a significant stimulus × instruction 
interaction, suggesting that the effect of stimulus was larger in the O-R instruction 
group than the R-O instruction group, F (1.30, 31.90) = 4.14, p = .04, 2p  = .15. There 
were no significant interactions between transfer test and instruction, F (1, 23) = 2.53, 
p > .05, 2p  = .10, or transfer test and stimulus, F (1.42, 32.57) = 1.39, p > .05, 
2
p  = .06. 
Finally, the three-way interaction between transfer test, stimulus and instruction was not 
significant, F (1.42, 32.57) = 2.42, p > .05, 2p  = .10.  
The significant stimulus × instruction group (R-O versus O-R) interaction 
prompted separate, Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons exploring the effect of 
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stimulus in each instruction group (collapsed across the transfer tests). In the O-R 
instruction group, the stimulus that signalled the valued outcome increased responding 
for that outcome compared to the stimulus that signalled the devalued outcome, t (11) = 
4.83, p < .001, 95% CI = [23.03, 75.93], but not compared to the neutral stimulus, t (11) 
= 2.11, p > .05, 95% CI = [-2.87, 28.39]. The stimulus that signalled the devalued 
outcome increased choice of that devalued outcome compared to the neutral stimulus, t 
(11) = 5.27, p < .001, 95% CI = [18.74, 54.70]. Comparable analyses in the R-O 
instruction group revealed no significant effects of stimulus (possibly due to low power), 
ts < 2.15, ps > .13. Thus, there was a significant PIT effect for the devalued outcome in 
the O-R instruction group, but no evidence of a PIT effect for either outcome in the R-O 
instruction group.  
The non-significant interaction between the stimulus and transfer test (trained 
versus instructed) variables suggests that the pattern of response choice across the three 
stimuli did not significantly differ between the instructed and trained transfer tests. The 
crucial hypothesis, however, concerns whether the trained PIT effect was equally 
insensitive to the outcome devaluation manipulation as the instructed PIT effect. In fact, 
the PIT effect for the devalued outcome was numerically larger in the instructed transfer 
test (M = 27.50, SEM = 6.30) than in the trained transfer test (M = 18.25, SEM = 5.58), 
but this difference did not reach significance t (24) = 1.93, p = .07, 95% CI = [-0.63, 
19.13]. Bayes Factors were therefore calculated to determine whether this null result 
represents true evidence against the alternative hypothesis (that the instructed PIT effect 
for the devalued outcome was larger than the comparable trained PIT effect), or whether 
the null result simply reflects a lack of data sensitivity. The trained and instructed PIT 
effects were expected to be of a similar magnitude to those obtained in Experiments 3 
and 4, respectively. In Experiment 3, the (trained) PIT effect score for the devalued 
outcome was 13 (calculated using the Sneutral – Sdevalued calculation). In Experiment 4, the 
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size of the equivalent (instructed) PIT effect score in the post-devaluation transfer test 
was 23.37. Thus, a plausible mean difference score in the current experiment would be 
23.37-13 = 10.37. A half-normal distribution was used, with the standard deviation set 
as the plausible mean difference score (10.37). This produced a Bayes Factor of 3.75. 
The Bayes Factor is greater than three, and therefore supports the alternative hypothesis 
(Dienes, 2011). That is, the data support the hypothesis that the instructed PIT effect 
was more insensitive to devaluation than the trained PIT effect.  
Finally, planned one-sample t-tests revealed that overall response choice was 
biased towards the valued outcome in both the trained, t (24) = 5.22, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[13.50, 31.17], and the instructed transfer test, t (24) = 7.59, p < .001, 95% CI = [21.54, 
37.62]. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Experiment 5 tested whether training and instructions produce comparable PIT 
effects after devaluation. Collapsed across the instructed and trained transfer tests, an 
outcome-selective PIT effect was observed, where the Pavlovian stimuli (outcome 
pictures) selectively increased the response that had either been trained or instructed to 
produce the cued outcome. The non-significant interaction between the stimulus and 
transfer test variables indicated that the size of the trained and instructed PIT effects 
were comparable. Regarding the devalued outcome specifically, the Bayes Factor 
suggested that the instructed PIT effect was more insensitive to devaluation than the 
trained PIT effect. The latter result, that instructed instrumental contingencies produced 
a greater degree of insensitivity to devaluation than the trained contingencies, seems 
more in line with the propositional account of PIT than the link-based S-O-R account. 
Link-based accounts suggest that training should be more likely to foster automaticity 
than instructions alone, because training allows the mental representations of the 
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response R and the outcome O to be repeatedly activated in a contiguous manner (see 
Cartoni et al., 2015 for a similar argument). This is precisely why, from the perspective 
of associative links between mental representations, it makes sense that overtraining 
renders instrumental responding insensitive to devaluation (Adams, 1982; Tricomi et al., 
2009). Thus, the results appear to be more consistent with the propositional model of 
PIT, where insensitivity to devaluation arises from a controlled reasoning process. 
Although this process remains to be identified, the results suggest that it can be initiated 
from either training or instructions. 
One unexpected finding was that, in contrast to Experiment 4, the O-R 
instruction produced a PIT effect but the R-O instruction did not. It is not obvious why 
this instruction affected response choice in the current experiment but not in Experiment 
4. Nevertheless, it was a very clear result and it is therefore necessary to explore 
possible reasons for it. One possibility is that the O-R instruction (e.g., “crisps = left 
arrow”) was interpreted as a stimulus-response (S-R) instruction. That is, participants 
may have believed that the instruction referred to which response participants should 
perform in the presence of each outcome picture. It should be noted that the 
experimenter made no reference to the stimuli when verbally explaining the instruction 
at the start of the transfer test. Nevertheless, participants may have interpreted the O-R 
instruction as an S-R instruction (particularly considering the instruction was also 
present throughout the transfer test). Although this line of reasoning was not anticipated, 
it is a rational inference. In future, more specific instructions regarding the instrumental 
(outcome-response) function of the responses may be more effective in clarifying the 
intended meaning of the instructions. 
 The other noteworthy aspect of the instruction variable (R-O versus O-R) was 
that it appeared to influence both the instructed and trained PIT effects indiscriminately 
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(as indicated by the non-significant three-way interaction between the stimulus, transfer 
test, and instruction variables). At first sight, it makes little sense for the instruction 
variable to influence the trained PIT effect (which involved different, non-instructed 
instrumental responses). However, the instructed contingencies were presented at the 
start of the experiment (prior to either transfer test). This was a deliberate decision that 
was made to ensure that the instructed and trained instrumental responses would be, as 
far as possible, comparable. However, by presenting the instructed contingencies at the 
start of the experiment, it is possible for the instructions to influence the trained transfer 
test. Again, in future, it may be advisable to only present the instructions immediately 
before the instructed transfer test. Considering the order of the trained and instructed 
transfer test should be counterbalanced, however, a similar pattern of results might still 
be expected when the instructed transfer test precedes the trained transfer test. A 
between-subjects design, in which half the participants receive the training and the other 
half receives instructions, could circumvent this issue.  
Overall, the results suggest that PIT may be insensitive to outcome devaluation 
even when an associative link mechanism is unlikely to dominate behaviour. It seems 
possible, therefore, that insensitivity to outcome devaluation may not provide 
unequivocal evidence for S-O-R theory. Experiment 6 aimed to provide further 
evidence for this suggestion using a biconditional PIT procedure (described below). The 
design aimed to control for the formation of instrumental relations during training, so 
that a PIT effect could not be readily governed by an S-O-R mechanism.  
3.5 Experiment 6 
The results of Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that the insensitivity of PIT to 
outcome devaluation may not provide unequivocal evidence for S-O-R theory. When 
the instrumental contingencies were only instructed (and therefore most likely encoded 
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propositionally), the PIT effect was still insensitive to devaluation. This was interpreted 
as evidence to suggest that insensitivity to outcome devaluation may (at least sometimes) 
reflect a controlled decision-making process. 
Another PIT effect that is not readily explained by S-O-R theory has also 
recently been observed (Hardy et al., in revision). This design, which is shown in 
Table ‎3.4, was inspired by Rescorla's (1990) biconditional experiment in rats. 
Participants first learnt to perform two responses (R1 and R2) to earn beer and chocolate 
points (O1 and O2) in a discriminative training phase. Each trial began with the 
presentation of a pair of blue or black arrow symbols (“← →”), which served as 
discriminative stimuli (Sd1 and Sd2). Sd1 signalled that R1 and R2 would produce 
O1and O2, respectively (Sd1: R1-O1, R2-O2). Sd2 signalled the opposite contingencies 
(Sd2: R1-O2, R2-O1). Instrumental response choice (R1 versus R2) was then tested in 
the presence of each discriminative stimulus in compound with a beer, chocolate or 
neutral stimulus (S1, S2 or S0). 
Table ‎3.4 
 
Design and results of Hardy et al. (in revision).  
Discriminative training  Transfer test 
Sequential Intermixed   
Stage 1:  
Sd1: R1-O1, R2-O2 
Stage 2: 
Sd2: R1-O2, R2-O1 
 Sd1: R1-O1, R2-O2 
Sd2: R1-O2, R2-O1 
 Sd1+S1: R1 > R2 
Sd1+S2: R1 < R2 
Sd2+S1: R1 < R2 
Sd2+S2: R1 > R2 
Note: Sd1 and Sd2 refer to discriminative stimuli (blue and black arrow symbols), R1 and R2 
denote instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses), and O1 and O2 refer to 
outcomes (beer and chocolate points). S1 and S2 refer to pictures of O1 and O2, respectively. 
During the transfer test, response choice in the presence of the pictorial stimuli (S1 and S2) was 
assessed in relation to a neutral stimulus that was also presented in compound with each 
discriminative stimulus (Sd1 and Sd2). 
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The first important aspect of Hardy et al.'s (in revision) design is that the 
discriminative stimuli (Sd1 and Sd2) were trained to predict both responses and 
outcomes equally. S-O-R theory therefore predicts that the Sds should not bias response 
choice either way, because they should activate both outcomes, which should then 
prime both responses equally. The second noteworthy feature concerns the pictorial beer 
and chocolate stimuli (S1 and S2). Although these stimuli should have entered into 
Pavlovian associations with their outcomes prior to the experiment, they were not paired 
with either instrumental response during discriminative training. S-O-R theory therefore 
predicts that these Pavlovian stimuli should activate their associated outcome 
representations, which should then activate both responses equally (because each 
outcome was paired with both responses during discriminative training). Thus, S-O-R 
theory predicts no bias in response choice during the critical transfer test. However, a 
clear PIT effect was observed during the transfer test. In compound with Sd1, S1 and S2 
increased choice of R1 and R2, respectively. The pattern was reversed in the presence of 
Sd2; S1 and S2 now increased R2 and R1, respectively. Thus, response choice reflected 
a summation of the discriminative and Pavlovian stimuli that were present on each 
transfer test trial.  
Hardy et al.'s (in revision) biconditional PIT effect is most consistent with the 
hierarchical theory of PIT, where the Pavlovian and discriminative stimuli collectively 
signal which instrumental response is most likely to be rewarded. One possibility is that 
the hierarchical relationships were encoded propositionally. That is, response choice 
may have been mediated by explicit beliefs that the stimuli signalled which response 
was more likely to be reinforced. Hardy et al.'s  data do not provide conclusive evidence 
regarding the role of propositional processes. Their results do, however, provide 
evidence of a PIT effect that cannot be readily explained by S-O-R theory. It resembles 
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Experiments 4 and 5 in this respect, where PIT effects were observed that could not be 
readily accounted for by S-O-R theory.  
Experiment 6 tested whether Hardy et al.'s (in revision) biconditional PIT effect 
would be sensitive to the outcome devaluation manipulation used in Experiments 3-5. 
Insensitivity to outcome devaluation is arguably the single strongest line of support for 
S-O-R theory. Thus, if the biconditional PIT effect is also insensitive to outcome 
devaluation, it would complement the results of Experiments 4 and 5 in suggesting that 
insensitivity to outcome devaluation may not provide unequivocal evidence for S-O-R 
theory.  
3.5.1 Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 3, except in following respects.  
Participants, apparatus and materials. Fifty-nine Plymouth University 
psychology undergraduates (44 females, aged between 18 and 27; M = 20.10 years, 
SEM = 0.29 years) completed the experiment for course credit.  
Procedure  
Discriminative training. After providing initial liking ratings, the experimenter 
read aloud the following instructions: “You can now earn crisps and popcorn by 
pressing the left or right arrow keys. Different arrow shapes indicate which key earns 
which reward. Your task is to learn this. Press any key to begin.” Discriminative 
training consisted of a sequential phase followed by an intermixed phase. Each trial 
began with the central presentation of a black or blue arrow symbol (“← →”). These 
symbols served as discriminative stimuli (Sd1 and Sd2), and signalled that participants 
should press either the left or right arrow key.  Responses were followed by the text 
“You win one [CRISPS/POPCORN] point”, depending on the reward earned and the 
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discriminative stimulus that was present. The instrumental responses (left and right 
arrow keys, R1 and R2) and outcomes (crisps and popcorn, O1 and O2) were fully 
counterbalanced with respect to the discriminative stimuli (blue and black arrow shapes, 
Sd1 and Sd2). In the presence of Sd1, R1 and R2 produced outcome O1 and O2, 
respectively (Sd1: R1-O1, R2-O2). The responses produced the opposite outcomes in 
the presence of Sd2 (Sd2: R1-O2, R2-O1). During the sequential stage of training, each 
discriminative stimulus was presented for eight sequential trials, followed by eight 
sequential trials with the other discriminative stimulus. The order of discriminative 
stimulus presentation was counterbalanced between-subjects. The trials were separated 
by 750-1250ms intervals. 
Discriminative contingency knowledge was tested after participants completed 
one cycle of the sequential stage of discriminative training (16 trials). Participants 
answered four questions to assess explicit knowledge of the discriminative 
contingencies. The discriminative stimuli were presented in turn, above the question, 
“When this arrow was present, which key earned [crisps/popcorn] the LEFT or RIGHT 
key?” Correct answers were followed by the statement “Correct”, beneath the 
discriminative stimulus. Incorrect answers were followed by a buzzer noise and the 
statement, “Incorrect. The correct answer was [LEFT/RIGHT]”. Feedback was 
presented for 1500ms, the four questions were presented in a random order, and they 
were separated by 750-1250ms intervals. If participants answered any of the questions 
incorrectly, the sequential phase and knowledge test were repeated until participants 
answered every question correctly. This extended version of training was used to first 
be consistent with Hardy et al.'s (in revision) procedure, and secondly because the 
contingencies were considerably more difficult to learn than in the previous experiments.  
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The sequential training phase was followed by an intermixed training phase. 
Intermixed training followed the same procedure as the sequential training phase, except 
that the 16 trials were randomly intermixed. Participants subsequently completed a 
discriminative contingency knowledge test that was identical to the first knowledge test. 
The intermixed training phase and contingency knowledge test was also repeated until 
participants reported accurate contingency knowledge. 
Outcome devaluation. Following successful acquisition of the discriminative 
contingencies, either the crisps or popcorn was devalued using the cloves procedure of 
Experiments 3-5. Participants also completed post-devaluation liking ratings after the 
devaluation procedure.  
Transfer test. The instructions for the transfer test were very similar to those 
given in Experiment 3; participants were told that they could continue to earn crisps and 
popcorn by pressing the arrow keys, that they would only be told how many they had 
earned at the end, and that pictures would sometimes be presented before they 
responded. They were also informed that they would be required to eat all of the food 
they earned afterwards.  
Each transfer test trial began with the presentation of a crisps, popcorn or neutral 
stimulus for 3000ms. A discriminative stimulus (arrow symbols) then appeared beneath 
the picture stimulus, which remained until participants selected the left or right arrow 
key. Response time was not limited, and feedback was not provided. There were four 
cycles of 12 trials (48 trials in total). In each cycle, each discriminative stimulus (Sd1or 
Sd2) was presented with each Pavlovian stimulus (crisps, popcorn, or neutral) twice in a 
random order. Participants completed one cycle of practice trials before continuing on 
to the main transfer test. After the practice phase, the outcomes were removed and 
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participants were reminded that they would be required to eat all of the food they earned 
at the end of the experiment.  
After completing the transfer test, participants completed a final instrumental 
knowledge test (without feedback) to assess memory of the instrumental contingencies. 
The Pavlovian knowledge test of Experiments 3-5 was also administered; participants 
were shown the crisps and popcorn pictures and selected the outcome that they 
represented.    
3.5.2 Results 
Exclusions. Eighteen participants were excluded for failing either the final 
instrumental (N = 10) or Pavlovian (N = 7) knowledge test, or both (N = 1). Given the 
high proportion of participants who failed the contingency knowledge tests, the mean 
transfer test scores in these participants are provided in Appendix 2. One further 
participant was excluded because s(he) required 23 blocks of discriminative training to 
pass the instrumental knowledge test, and s(he) did not complete the rest of the 
experiment (due to time restraints). The data from the remaining 40 participants were 
entered into the analyses.  
Liking ratings. Figure ‎3.7 shows the mean liking ratings given for each 
outcome in the pre- and post-devaluation liking rating tests. The results were very 
similar to the previous experiments. There was a main effect of liking test, with higher 
ratings given in the pre-devaluation test than the post-devaluation test, F (1, 39) = 50.82, 
p < .001, 2p  = .57. There was also a main effect of outcome, with the higher ratings 
given to the valued outcome than the devalued outcome, F (1, 39) = 111.20, p < .001, 
2
p  = .74. Most importantly, there was a significant interaction between the liking test 
and outcome variables, F (1, 39) =414.09, p < .001, 2p  = .91. Planned pairwise 
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comparisons revealed that in the pre-devaluation liking test, the subsequently devalued 
outcome received higher liking ratings than the valued outcome (despite 
counterbalancing the food outcomes), t (39) = 2.10, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.28]. 
Most importantly, the still-valued outcome received higher ratings than the devalued 
outcome in the post-devaluation transfer test, t (39) = 28.82, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.70, 
5.40].  
 
Figure ‎3.7. Liking ratings in Experiment 6. Ratings were taken for each food outcome (crisps, 
popcorn) taken at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation) and immediately after the 
devaluation procedure (post-devaluation). Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to eat 
the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Transfer test. Figure ‎3.8 shows the transfer test results of Experiment 6. The 
graph shows the percent choice of the key that predicts the still-valued outcome 
(collapsed across discriminative stimuli) in the presence of the Pavlovian stimulus 
signalling the valued and devalued outcome, and the neutral stimulus. A repeated 
measures ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied for sphericity) revealed 
an effect of stimulus, F (1.20, 46.82) = 3.98, p < .05, 2p  = .09. Bonferroni corrected 
pairwise comparisons revealed no significant differences between the three stimuli, ts < 
2.10, ps > .13. A one-sampled t-test confirmed that overall response choice was biased 
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towards the still-valued outcome (relative to the 50% midpoint), t (39) = 11.90, p < .001, 
95% CI = [31.86, 44.91]. 
 
Figure ‎3.8. Transfer test results of Experiment 6. Response choice was tested in the presence of 
pictorial stimuli depicting each outcome, or a neutral stimulus. The data are collapsed across 
the discriminative stimulus (Sd1, Sd2) trials. The dependent variable is the percent choice of the 
instrumental response that produced the still-valued outcome in the presence of each 
discriminative stimulus. Scores above and below the 50% mid-point represent a bias towards 
the valued and devalued outcome, respectively. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
The analysis above suggests that a PIT effect was not observed for either 
outcome. Given that the crucial hypothesis concerned the devalued outcome, a Bayes 
Factor was calculated to substantiate the claim that a PIT effect was not observed for the 
devalued outcome. It is reasonable to expect that the PIT effect for the devalued 
outcome in the current experiment would be of a similar magnitude to that observed in 
Experiment 3 (where insensitivity to devaluation was observed in a typical PIT 
procedure). The mean difference score between the neutral stimulus and the stimulus 
that signalled the devalued outcome was 13. The comparable mean difference score in 
the current experiment was 8.28 (SEM = 3.95). A half-normal distribution with the 
standard deviation set as the plausible mean difference score (13) produced a Bayes 
Factor of 4.25. The Bayes Factor is above the critical threshold of three, and therefore 
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supports the alternative hypothesis (Dienes, 2011). That is, the Bayes Factor suggests 
that there is substantial support for the suggestion that a PIT effect was observed for the 
devalued outcome. Finally, the PIT effect for the devalued outcome (M = 8.28, SEM = 
3.95) was numerically larger than the PIT effect for the valued outcome (M = 1.56, SEM 
= 1.86), but this difference did not reach significance, t (39) = 1.74, p = .09, 95% CI = [-
1.10, 14.54].  
3.5.3 Discussion 
Experiment 6 tested whether a biconditional PIT effect would be sensitive to an 
outcome devaluation manipulation. S-O-R theory cannot readily explain biconditional 
PIT effects, because the discriminative stimuli and instrumental responses are equally 
paired with each outcome. Collapsed across the stimuli, there was a strong overall bias 
towards the still-valued outcome. Indeed, instrumental response choice approached 
ceiling (complete responding for the valued outcome) in all three stimulus conditions. 
Ceiling effects are a critical issue in PIT devaluation experiments, and particularly in the 
current experiments. They are therefore discussed more thoroughly in section 3.6 
(General Discussion). Despite the clear preference for the valued outcome, the Bayes 
Factor indicated that a PIT effect was apparent for the devalued outcome. That is, the 
stimulus that signalled the devalued outcome increased instrumental responding for that 
outcome compared to the neutral stimulus. Notably, a PIT effect for the devalued 
outcome was observed even when an S-O-R associative chain could not readily control 
behaviour. The data therefore accord with the results of Experiments 4 and 5, in that 
they demonstrate PIT effects that are not readily explained by S-O-R theory.  
3.6 General Discussion 
The current experiments explored the effect of a novel, very strong outcome 
devaluation procedure on PIT. In Experiment 3, overall response choice was biased 
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towards the still-valued outcome during the transfer test. This bias is indicative of goal-
directed control, because it shows that overall response choice was sensitive to both the 
instrumental contingencies and the current value of the outcomes (de Wit & Dickinson, 
2009; Dickinson, 1985, 2016). Paradoxically, PIT effects were still observed for each 
outcome; the crisps and popcorn stimuli selectively increased choice of the instrumental 
response that was paired with cued outcome, relative to the neutral stimulus. Crucially, 
there was no significant difference in the size of the PIT effect for the valued and 
devalued outcomes. The latter result replicates previous work in demonstrating an 
insensitivity of PIT to outcome devaluation (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990a; Corbit et al., 
2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 1994b; Watson 
et al., 2014). The novel contribution of Experiment 3 was in the use of an original and 
very strong devaluation procedure. The result therefore extends previous knowledge by 
demonstrating that PIT effects can be insensitive to even the very strong outcome 
devaluation manipulation employed here.  
In light of the current results, it is important to now examine the three studies in 
the human PIT literature that have recently reported sensitivity to outcome devaluation 
more closely (Allman et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b). Clearly, these 
experiments are inconsistent with both the current results and the wider literature. The 
first demonstration of sensitivity to outcome devaluation came from Allman et al. 
(2010), who used a stock market procedure where participants acted as investment 
bankers. Eder and Dignath (2016a) also used a very similar procedure, so the 
experiments are discussed collectively. In both cases, instrumental responses were 
trained to produce monetary outcomes in different currencies, and Pavlovian stimuli 
represented companies that traded in those currencies. Clear PIT effects were observed 
in the initial pre-devaluation transfer tests. That is, the Pavlovian stimuli selectively 
increased the instrumental response that was associated with the same currency 
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(compared to neutral stimuli). One of the outcomes was subsequently devalued by 
reducing its exchange rate, so that the currency was rendered worthless
7
. Instrumental 
responding was then assessed in a post-devaluation transfer test. PIT effects were 
observed in both experiments for the still-valued outcome, but were markedly reduced 
for the devalued outcome. The authors therefore argued that their PIT effects were 
sensitive to devaluation, because they were influenced by the instructed devaluation 
manipulation. These results are important because they speak against strong claims that 
PIT effects are not mediated by outcome value (e.g., Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; 
Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Rescorla, 1994b). Moreover, Allman et al. 
(2010) suggested that this sensitivity to devaluation (and human PIT effects in general) 
may be mediated by a higher order propositional process. 
Eder and Dignath (2016b, Experiment 1), whose experiment was outlined at the 
start of this chapter, provided further evidence of sensitivity to devaluation. Briefly, 
they established two instrumental responses and two Pavlovian stimuli as predictors of 
two distinct lemonade rewards. One of the lemonade drinks was then devalued by 
making it taste unpleasant. The final transfer test was divided into two blocks, and 
participants were required to drink their winnings after each block. Under these 
circumstances, a PIT effect was observed for the still-valued outcome, but not for the 
devalued outcome.  Again, Eder and Dignath (2016b) suggested that PIT is sensitive to 
strong outcome devaluation manipulations. 
It is clear that Allman et al. (2010) and Eder and Dignath's (2016a, 2016b) 
experiments have produced some very interesting results with respect to the effect of 
outcome devaluation on PIT. Their results certainly suggest that PIT effects can be goal-
directed, since the effects were either attenuated or abolished by devaluation. Although 
                                                 
7
Eder and Dignath (2016a) also tested the effect of an upvaluation manipulation, where the value of one 
outcome was increased. This manipulation had little impact and is therefore not discussed further. 
121 
 
there are many procedural differences between these experiments and those that have 
reported insensitivity to devaluation, there is one aspect in each that seems potentially 
important. Allman et al. (2010) and Eder and Dignath (2016a) instructed their 
participants that one currency outcome was “worthless”. It is possible that this was 
construed as instructed extinction of the instrumental relationship, leading participants 
to believe that the response would no longer produce the devalued currency (Hogarth, 
2012). A related explanation applies to Eder and Dignath (2016b). They explicitly told 
their participants that the Pavlovian cues were not meaningful during the transfer test. 
This is an instructed Pavlovian extinction procedure, and is not typical to PIT tasks. 
Although these may seem like subtle procedural differences, they may impact heavily 
on decision-making, particularly if response choice is governed by explicit strategies. 
As noted in the introduction of the current chapter, these instructions are particularly 
important with respect to the propositional EU account of PIT.  
Recall that the propositional EU theory suggests that PIT effects reflect a 
judgement about the expected probability (Op) and value (Ov) of each outcome. 
Pavlovian stimuli that are presented during the transfer test are suggested to increase the 
perceived probability of the associated outcome Op, providing the associated 
instrumental response is performed. These judgements are assumed to be propositional 
in nature, and hence should be highly susceptible to verbal instructions. If Eder and 
Dignath's (2016b) instruction was interpreted as instructed extinction of the Pavlovian 
contingencies, then participants may have inferred that the Pavlovian stimuli did not 
signal which response was more likely to be rewarded. A similar argument can be made 
for both Allman et al.'s (2010) and Eder and Dignath's (2016a) studies. If their 
devaluation manipulation was construed as instructed extinction of the instrumental 
relationship, then participants may have abandoned their belief that the Pavlovian 
stimulus signalled the availability of a currency; a worthless currency is not really a 
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currency at all. Hence, it is possible that Allman et al.’s (2010) and Eder and Dignath's 
(2016a, 2016b)  procedures simultaneously degraded both cue-elicited outcome 
probability (Op) and outcome value (Ov). The fact that the PIT effect was either 
reduced or abolished under these circumstances supports the suggestion that the 
standard PIT effect may be mediated by a controlled inference that is based on both 
perceived outcome probability (Op) and outcome value (Ov). The experiments in 
Chapter 4 aim to test this prediction of the propositional EU model more systematically.   
The discussion above suggests that the propositional EU account may be able to 
reconcile the previous demonstrations of insensitivity to outcome devaluation (Allman 
et al., 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b) with the current demonstration of 
insensitivity to outcome devaluation (Experiment 3). The remainder of the discussion 
therefore focuses on Experiments 4-6. Experiment 4 firstly demonstrated a PIT effect 
that was acquired by instruction in the absence of experience. Participants were first 
instructed that two responses would produce different outcomes. Crucially, they did not 
receive any training on these contingencies. During the transfer test, the instruction 
alone was sufficient to generate a PIT effect; presenting a stimulus that was associated 
with one of the outcomes was sufficient to bias response choice towards the response 
that has been instructed to produce the cued outcome. The demonstration of an 
instructed PIT effect suggests that PIT effects can (at least sometimes) be propositional 
in nature. It might be argued that this is a premature conclusion. Perhaps the instructions 
alone, for instance, were able to generate instrumental links. The demonstration of an 
‘instructed PIT effect’ would not be surprising under these circumstances, because the 
stimulus would activate the associated instructed response using an S-O-R mechanism 
(in much the same way as in the case of a ‘trained’ instrumental response).   
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It is not immediately obvious how an instructed response could produce an 
instrumental associative link. Associative links are usually assumed to require the 
repeated and contiguous presentation of the two events (e.g., Elsner & Hommel, 2004; 
Shanks & Dickinson, 1988, 1991). It should, therefore, be very difficult for an 
instructed contingency to generate an associative link (Mitchell et al., 2009). Perhaps 
the instruction – that the response would produce the outcome – concurrently activated 
the mental representation of the response and the outcome, which allowed a link to form 
between them. Of course, a straightforward test of this account would be to instruct 
participants that the response would not produce the outcome, and then test whether that 
instruction would elicit a PIT effect (Mitchell et al., 2009). More generally, one of the 
core assumptions of link-based models is that associative links form passively from 
contiguous pairings of events (in this case, the response R and the outcome O). Verbal 
instructions are recognised as one of the best ways to tease link-based and propositional 
accounts of learning apart, because the two theories usually make different predictions 
in this regard (De Houwer, 2009, 2014; De Houwer et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2009). 
If instrumental links were suggested to form as a result of a mere verbal instruction, it 
would be one step closer to allowing the link-based and propositional accounts of 
learning to become indistinguishable (Lovibond, 2003). 
Another interesting aspect of Experiment 4 was that the instructed PIT effect 
appeared to be insensitive to the devaluation manipulation. That is, the stimulus that 
signalled the devalued outcome increased choice of the response that had been 
instructed to produce the devalued outcome, relative to the neutral stimulus. This 
instructed insensitivity to devaluation was also replicated in the O-R instruction group 
of Experiment 5. Moreover, the Bayes Factor indicated that the instructed PIT effect 
was more insensitive to devaluation than the trained PIT effect. As noted above, the 
demonstration that PIT is often insensitive to outcome devaluation is usually regarded 
124 
 
as evidence of an automatic associative link mechanism, where the stimulus has a 
signalling rather than motivational role (Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; 
Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 2014). Instructional effects, on the other hand, are less 
readily attributed to a link-formation mechanism (Mitchell et al., 2009). The data 
therefore confirm the paradox that was outlined at the start of this chapter; an instructed 
PIT effect was observed, but was insensitive to outcome devaluation. One way to 
reconcile this paradox would be to propose that insensitivity to devaluation may, at least 
sometimes, reflect the operation of controlled, propositional processes. The experiments 
in Chapter 4 seek evidence for this possibility, by exploring the nature of processes that 
produce insensitivity to devaluation. 
Another possibility is that the insensitivity of the instructed PIT effect to 
outcome devaluation in Experiment 5 was due to the use of a within-subjects design. As 
a consequence of being associated with the same outcomes, instructed and trained 
instrumental responses may have become associated with one another through a process 
of acquired equivalence (Hall, 1996; Hall, Mitchell, Graham, & Lavis, 2003). That is, 
R1 and R3 might have been treated as equivalent by virtue of being followed by the 
same outcome O1 (the same applies to R2 and R4 – both associated with O2). In the 
instructed transfer test, stimulus S1 may have activated O1, which activated the trained 
R1 via an S-O-R link mechanism. The instructed R3 might then have been executed 
because it was perceived as equivalent to R1. Of course, this analysis relies on the 
assumption that acquired equivalence can be generated for instructed relations alone, 
and so also seems to reflect an inferential process of generalisation (Smyth, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). The instructional effects of Experiments 4 and 5, 
therefore, appear to be best interpreted within a propositional model of PIT. The section 
below examines the final experiment in this chapter: Experiment 6. 
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Experiment 6 explored the effect of outcome devaluation on a biconditional PIT 
task. Here, each discriminative stimulus and instrumental response was paired with both 
outcomes equally. Instrumental response choice was then tested in the presence of each 
discriminative stimulus, alongside a picture of one of the outcomes. S-O-R theory 
predicts that response choice under these circumstances should be at chance, because 
each discriminative stimulus and instrumental response was associated with both 
outcomes equally. The pictorial stimuli were not paired with either response, so they 
would not be expected to bias response choice either. Following outcome devaluation, 
overall response choice was heavily biased towards the still-valued outcome. Indeed, a 
PIT effect was not observed for the valued outcome, probably because response choice 
was close to ceiling. The Bayes Factor, however, indicated that a PIT effect was still 
observed for the devalued outcome. Thus, a PIT effect was observed for a devalued 
outcome in a biconditional PIT procedure, which cannot be readily explained by S-O-R 
theory. The data therefore complement the interpretations of Experiments 4 and 5 in 
demonstrating that the insensitivity of PIT to devaluation may not provide unique 
evidence for S-O-R theory.  
It should be noted that the results of Experiment 6 do not provide direct 
evidence for the propositional approach. Instead, the data support a hierarchical model 
of PIT, where the stimuli presented during the transfer test increase the perceived 
strength of the associated instrumental contingency (Hogarth et al., 2014; Hogarth & 
Troisi, 2015; Rescorla, 1991, 1992b). In light of the results of Experiments 4 and 5 
(where instructed responses produced PIT effects that were insensitive to outcome 
devaluation), however, it seems likely that PIT effects may be mediated by a 
hierarchical mechanism that is (at least in humans) propositional in nature. That is, 
participants may infer that the stimuli that are presented during the transfer test signal 
which instrumental response is more likely to be reinforced. They may even infer that 
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the alternative, non-cued outcome is completely unavailable (has zero probability). This 
difference in perceived outcome probability (Op) may outweigh the difference in 
outcome value (Ov), and may therefore explain why PIT is so often insensitive to 
outcome devaluation manipulations. 
The overall pattern of results in this chapter add to a growing body of literature 
demonstrating that Pavlovian stimuli can facilitate instrumental responding for a 
common outcome, even if that outcome has been devalued. Consistent with the 
literature, this effect has been interpreted as evidence to suggest that PIT is often 
insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations. However, there is a very important 
limitation of this interpretation. PIT effects are usually assessed by measuring the extent 
to which a Pavlovian stimulus increases instrumental responding for the same outcome, 
compared to a neutral stimulus. After outcome devaluation, response choice in the 
presence of the neutral stimulus is generally biased towards the still-valued outcome; 
participants respond for the outcome they like best. This bias was particularly apparent 
in the current experiments because the devaluation manipulation was so strong. 
However, it is usually present to some degree in PIT procedures that use other 
devaluation manipulations, such as selective satiation (Hogarth, 2012; Watson et al., 
2014) and health warnings (Hogarth & Chase, 2011). Indeed, the non-cued bias towards 
the still-valued outcome is regarded as an important component of the overall result, 
because it shows that non-cued instrumental responding is goal-directed. Thus, 
following outcome devaluation, the PIT effect is assessed using a baseline that is biased 
towards the still-valued outcome. What is not usually discussed is that, as responding 
for the still-valued outcome approaches ceiling, there is less opportunity to detect a PIT 
effect for the valued outcome. Conversely, there is relatively greater scope to observe a 
PIT effect for the devalued outcome. This means that the size of the PIT effect for the 
valued outcome may be underestimated in the standard task, and the effect for the 
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devalued outcome exaggerated. Hence, when PIT effects are of a comparable magnitude 
for the valued and devalued outcomes, it may simply reflect an artefact of the 
measurement technique.  
The ceiling effects issue outlined above has important implications for the 
theories of PIT. Insensitivity to devaluation is a key line of support for S-O-R theory, 
because it suggests that PIT is mediated by an automatic mechanism that is not flexible 
to motivational changes. The propositional EU model, on the other hand, is less readily 
supported by insensitivity to devaluation. Recall that the EU model proposes that PIT 
effects are driven by propositional judgements about both the perceived outcome value 
(Ov) and probability (Op). The finding that PIT is insensitive to devaluation speaks 
against this prediction, because it suggests that a judgement about outcome value Ov 
does not influence response choice during the transfer test. The ceiling effects issue 
outlined above, however, may reconcile the insensitivity of PIT to devaluation with the 
propositional EU account. When only one outcome is cued, there is a small tendency to 
respond for that outcome, even when it has been devalued. The standard PIT task (such 
as that used in Experiment 3) may overestimate this tendency due to the ceiling effect 
on response choice in the neutral stimulus condition. The experiments in Chapter 4 aim 
to test this EU model of PIT, by examining whether sensitivity to outcome devaluation 
is observed when the possible influence of ceiling effects is eliminated.  
In summary, the current set of experiments demonstrated that PIT effects can 
persist even after a very strong outcome devaluation manipulation (Experiment 3). This 
insensitivity to devaluation was also apparent in Experiment 4 when the instrumental 
contingencies were instructed rather than established through trial-by-trial conditioning. 
Moreover, the instructed PIT effect for the devalued outcome was numerically larger 
than the comparable trained PIT effect in Experiment 5. These data provide unique 
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evidence for the role of propositional processes in PIT. Finally, a PIT effect for a 
devalued outcome was observed in a biconditional procedure in Experiment 6. The 
latter result cannot be readily attributed to an S-O-R associative chain. The data suggest, 
therefore, that insensitivity to devaluation may not always reflect an S-O-R link 
mechanism, but may instead (at least sometimes) reflect a controlled reasoning process 
that is possibly based on judgements of EU. These EU estimates were suggested to 
reflect propositional inferences about the perceived probability (Op) and value (Ov) of 
each outcome. The presentation of a Pavlovian stimulus during the transfer test may 
increase the perceived probability of that outcome, providing the associated response is 
performed. When only the devalued outcome is cued, there is a tendency for 
participants to choose that devalued outcome, perhaps because it is perceived to be the 
only available outcome (i.e. the Op for the valued outcome is zero). This cue-elicited 
increase in perceived probability Op gives rise to an apparent insensitivity to 
devaluation, which is particularly pronounced when baseline response choice is biased 
towards the still-valued outcome. This is because there is less room to observe a PIT 
effect for the still-valued outcome, and relatively greater scope to detect a PIT effect for 
the devalued outcome. The experiments in Chapter 4 aim to test the propositional EU 
account more thoroughly, by exploring whether PIT is sensitive to outcome devaluation 
when PIT effects are not assessed relative to a biased baseline.  
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Chapter 4: Expected utility 
4.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 3 demonstrated that PIT effects can be insensitive to even a very strong 
devaluation procedure. In Experiment 3, for example, participants reported a clear 
aversion to the devalued outcome in the post-devaluation liking test. They also 
demonstrated an overall preference towards the valued outcome in the transfer test. Yet, 
a PIT effect was still observed for the devalued outcome. Most importantly, the PIT 
effect was of a comparable magnitude to that observed for the valued outcome. The PIT 
effect was therefore said to be insensitive to devaluation. This insensitivity to outcome 
devaluation is consistent with the majority of the literature (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990a; 
Corbit et al., 2007; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 
1994b; Watson et al., 2014). It is also entirely consistent with the predictions of S-O-R 
theory. However, as noted earlier, S-O-R theory has difficulty explaining the 
instructional sensitivity that has been observed in previous PIT experiments (see 
Hogarth et al., 2014 and Experiment 2 of the current thesis). A propositional EU 
account, in which response choice is mediated by judgements about perceived outcome 
probability (Op) and outcome value (Ov), was therefore proposed to explain the data. 
The experiments in this chapter aim to test some predictions of this propositional EU 
account of PIT.  
 The propositional EU account suggests the Pavlovian stimulus that is presented 
during the PIT transfer test increases the perceived probability of the associated 
outcome, providing the associated instrumental response is performed (Cartoni et al., 
2015; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth et al., 2014; Seabrooke et al., 2016). When a stimulus 
that signals a devalued outcome is presented, it is suggested to signal an outcome that 
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has a high probability (Op), but a low value (Ov). It also signals that the alternative, 
non-cued outcome currently has a low probability Op, even though it retains a high 
value Ov. Indeed, the non-cued outcome may even be interpreted to be completely 
unavailable (zero probability). The propositional EU account proposes that these cue-
elicited changes in outcome probability Op give rise to a stronger utility estimate for the 
cued, devalued outcome than the non-cued, valued outcome. Simply put, the difference 
in perceived outcome probability is suggested to outweigh the difference in outcome 
value. This difference is then suggested to increase responding for the devalued 
outcome when it is cued.  
 The current chapter reports five experiments that systematically manipulate cue-
elicited outcome probability (Op) and outcome value (Ov) to test the propositional EU 
account of PIT. Furthermore, the experiments utilise novel PIT procedures that do not 
measure PIT effects against baseline response choice in the presence of a neutral 
stimulus. As noted in Chapter 3, baseline response choice is usually biased towards the 
valued outcome in PIT devaluation experiments. When PIT effects are assessed relative 
to this baseline, the PIT effect for the valued and devalued outcomes often appear to be 
of a similar magnitude. However, the biased baseline leaves less room to detect a PIT 
effect for the valued outcome (because of the ceiling effect on response choice), and 
relatively greater scope to detect a PIT effect for the devalued outcome. The current 
experiments therefore eliminate this shift in baseline responding to establish a better 
estimate of the role of outcome value in PIT.  
4.2 Experiment 7  
Experiment 7 was very similar to an experiment in rats by Rescorla (1994b). 
Table ‎4.1 shows the design. Participants first learnt to perform two instrumental 
responses (R1 and R2) to earn points towards four outcomes: crisps, popcorn, cashew 
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nuts and nachos (outcomes O1-O4, counterbalanced). Response R1 was scheduled to 
produce O1 and O3 on a random half of the trials each, while R2 was scheduled to 
produce O2 and O4 on half of the trials each. Outcomes O3 and O4 were then devalued 
using the cloves procedure of Experiments 3-6. Response choice was finally tested in 
the presence of two stimulus compounds: S1 and S4, or S2 and S3. These stimulus 
compounds each signal both one valued and one devalued outcome. They also signal 
one outcome associated with R1 and a second outcome associated with R2. The S1+S4 
compound, for example, is associated with outcomes O1 and O4, which were paired 
with R1 and R2, respectively. Hence, both responses were associated with a cued 
outcome on every trial. Crucially, only stimulus S1 signals a valued outcome (O1), 
because O4 (signalled by S4) was devalued. If PIT is sensitive to outcome devaluation 
when cue-elicited probability Op is controlled, then a selective bias will be observed 
towards the cued, valued outcome. Hence, the S1+S4 compound will increase R1 
responses, because R1 produced the valued O1 (and R2 produced the devalued O4). By 
the same logic, the S2+S3 compound will increase R2 responses. 
Table ‎4.1 
 
Design of Experiment 7 
Instrumental training Outcome devaluation Transfer test 
R1 – O1, O3 
R2 – O2, O4 
O3 and O4 devalued S1+S4: R1/R2? 
S2+S3: R1/R2? 
Note: R1 and R2 represent instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses), and O1-O4 
are outcomes (crisps, popcorn, cashew nuts and nachos). S1-S4 are pictorial stimuli that are 
associated with outcomes O1-O4, respectively. 
 
S-O-R theory makes a very different prediction: the stimulus compounds should 
activate outcome representations that prime both responses equally. Furthermore, only 
the identity of the outcomes (not their values) will be activated - this is the assumption 
that allows S-O-R theory to explain the usual insensitivity to devaluation (such as that 
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observed in Experiment 3). Thus, S-O-R theory predicts that the stimuli will induce 
conflict, and no bias will be observed. That is, participants should be equally likely to 
choose R1 and R2 in the presence of S1+S4 or S2+S3 (as Rescorla, 1994b found in rats). 
4.2.1 Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 3, except in the following respects. 
Participants. Thirty-three UNSW Australia undergraduates (20 female, aged 
17-24; M = 19.00, SEM = 0.26 years) participated for course credit. The experiment was 
approved by the UNSW Australia School of Psychology Human Research Ethics 
Advisory Panel. 
Apparatus and materials. Cobs natural sea salt popcorn (80g), Doritos original 
salted nachos (170g), Smith’s original crisps (170g) and Nobby’s salted cashew nuts 
(300g) were used as props and for the outcome devaluation procedure. 
Procedure 
Instrumental training. After completing initial liking ratings, participants were 
instructed that they could earn the four outcomes (crisps, popcorn, cashew nuts and 
nachos) by pressing the left and right arrow keys. One outcome associated with each 
response was scheduled to be available on each trial (outcome availability on any given 
trial was random). R1 was followed by either O1 or O3, depending on which outcome 
was available. R2 similarly produced either O2 or O4 on each trial. The outcomes 
associated with each response were presented in red or green (counterbalanced) to help 
discriminate them. All other aspects of instrumental training and the subsequent 
instrumental knowledge test were identical to Experiment 1. 
Outcome devaluation. Outcomes O3 and O4 were then devalued using the 
cloves procedure of Experiment 3. The non-devalued outcomes (O1 and O2) were 
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sampled first, followed by the devalued outcomes (O3 and O4). The outcomes were 
randomly sampled within this constraint. 
Transfer test. Each transfer test trial presented compound cues containing S1 
and S4 (pictures of outcomes O1 and O4), or S2 and S3 (pictures of O2 and O3). The 
cues were presented at the top centre and bottom centre of the screen, with cue location 
counterbalanced across trials. Participants were instructed that the cue location was not 
important. After 3000ms, the choice symbol (“← or →”) was centrally presented, 
between the two cues, until participants performed a left or right arrow key response. 
There were four trial types (S1+S4 and S2+S3, with counterbalanced cue location). 
Each trial was presented once per cycle, and there were eight cycles (32 trials in total). 
Trial order was random within each cycle. Participants completed one practice cycle 
before continuing on to the main transfer test. 
4.2.2 Results 
Exclusions. Seven participants were excluded for failing the instrumental 
knowledge tests. The mean transfer test scores for these participants are provided in 
Appendix 2. Another participant was excluded for giving high liking ratings (M = 4) to 
the devalued outcomes in the post-devaluation liking test. This participant also showed 
no evidence of devaluation in the post-experimental questionnaire.  
Liking ratings. Figure ‎4.1 shows the mean liking ratings for the valued (O1, O2) 
and devalued (O3, O4) outcomes, at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation) and 
immediately after the devaluation procedure (post-devaluation). The results are very 
similar to those reported in Chapter 3. There was a main effect of liking test, with 
participants giving higher liking ratings in the pre-devaluation liking test than the post-
devaluation liking test, F (1, 24) = 5.48, p < .03, 
2
p  = .19. There was also a main effect 
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of outcome, with the valued outcome receiving higher ratings than the devalued 
outcomes when collapsed across liking tests, F (1, 24) = 94.32, p < .001, 
2
p  = .80. 
Most importantly, there was an interaction between the liking test and outcome 
variables, F (1, 24) = 148.39, p < .001, 
2
p  = .86. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the outcomes were rated equally before devaluation, t < 1, 
and that the still-valued outcomes received higher ratings than the devalued outcomes 
after devaluation, t (24) = 18.11, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.29, 5.39]. 
 
Figure ‎4.1 Mean liking ratings in Experiment 7. Ratings were taken for each outcome (O1-O4) 
at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation), and immediately after the devaluation 
procedure (post-devaluation). Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to eat the outcome 
“Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Transfer test. Figure ‎4.2 shows the transfer test results.  The S1+S4 compound 
elicited more R1 responses than the S2+S3 compound, t (24) = 10.85, p < .001, 95% CI 
= [62.75, 92.25].  
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Figure ‎4.2. Transfer test results of Experiment 7. Response choice was tested in the presence of 
compound stimuli depicting outcomes O1 and O4 (S1+S4), and O2 and O3 (S2+S3). The 50% 
mid-point represents no bias in response choice. Scores above 50% demonstrate a bias towards 
R1, which was paired with O1 (valued) and O3 (devalued) during instrumental training. Scores 
below 50% represent a bias towards R2, which was paired with O2 (valued) and O4 (devalued) 
during instrumental training. Error bars represent SEM.  
4.2.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 7, response choice during the transfer test was highly influenced 
by outcome value. When a stimulus compound signalled two outcomes that varied in 
their value, participants selectively responded for the high-value signalled outcome. 
These data speak against the dominant S-O-R model of PIT, in which outcome value is 
not activated in the S-O-R chain (Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Rescorla, 
1994b). Instead, the results support a goal-directed model in which PIT is highly 
sensitive to outcome devaluation, at least when both responses are associated with a 
cued outcome. 
Notably, the results are quite different from those of a related study by Rescorla 
(1994b), where rats showed insensitivity to devaluation in the presence of compound 
stimuli. One possibility is that this discrepancy reflects a fundamental difference in the 
processes that underlie PIT in animals (where an S-O-R process dominates) versus 
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humans (where a propositional process dominates). Alternatively, the discrepancy may 
reflect procedural differences between the two experiments. Perhaps the current 
devaluation manipulation was especially strong and thus better able to influence 
responding. Another possibility is that the complex design rendered the task simply too 
difficult for Rescorla’s rats. However, we remain cautious in accepting either of these 
accounts. For one thing, many experiments have shown strong devaluation effects using 
the lithium chloride-induced aversion procedure that Rescorla used. For another, rats 
have been shown to successfully solve other tasks that are of a similar complexity 
(Rescorla, 1991). More research is needed in both humans and rats to progress this 
discussion beyond speculation.  
4.3 Experiment 8 
The results of Experiment 7 suggest that PIT is sensitive to outcome value when 
outcomes associated with both responses are cued on every transfer test trial. The data 
appear to provide unique support for the propositional EU account of PIT, because they 
suggest that PIT is highly sensitive to outcome value when outcome probability Op is 
controlled. That is, participants selectively respond for the cued, high-value outcome 
when both instrumental responses are signalled on every transfer test trial. However, S-
O-R theory predicted only the null result in Experiment 7; an S-O-R mechanism had no 
opportunity to influence response choice during the transfer test. Experiment 8 therefore 
sought positive evidence for the S-O-R account. To this end, a novel PIT procedure was 
designed to ensure that the propositional and S-O-R accounts made opposite predictions. 
Hence, the theories were directly set against one another. Table ‎4.2 shows the design. 
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Table ‎4.2 
 
Design of Experiment 8 
Instrumental training Transfer test 
R1 – O1-/O3+ 
R2 – O2-/O3+ 
S1+S3: R1/R2 
S2+S3: R1/R2 
Note: R1 and R2 represent instrumental responses (left and right arrow key presses), and O1-O3 
are outcomes (crisps, popcorn and cashew nuts). ‘+’ and ‘-’ denote rewarding and aversive 
outcomes, respectively. S1-S3 are pictorial stimuli that are associated with outcomes O1-O3, 
respectively. 
 
During instrumental training, participants learnt to perform two instrumental 
responses (R1 and R2) to earn three different food outcomes: crisps, popcorn and 
cashew nuts. Two outcomes, O1- and O2-, were rendered aversive prior to training by 
coating them in ground cloves and olive oil. Outcome O3+ remained positive. R1 
responses were followed by outcome O1- on some trials, and O3+ on others (R1-O1-
/O3+), while R2 produced O2- or O3+ (R2-O2-/O3+). Response choice (R1 versus R2) 
was finally assessed in the presence of pictorial stimulus S3 (depicting O3+) in 
compound with either S1 or S2 (representing O1- and O2-). 
A unique aspect of the procedure described above is in the use of a pre-training 
devaluation procedure. Outcome value was established before instrumental training to 
test whether pre-training devaluation would foster an automatic S-O-R mechanism in 
the current design. The S-O-R mechanism is often assumed to operate via an ideomotor 
mechanism, where anticipating an outcome automatically primes associated 
instrumental responses, regardless of the current valence of the outcome (e.g., de Wit & 
Dickinson, 2009, 2015; Hogarth et al., 2013; Watson et al., 2015). As noted above, this 
is precisely why the ideomotor mechanism is favoured as a mechanism to explain the 
insensitivity to devaluation that is usually seen in PIT experiments. Much of the 
empirical support for ideomotor theory comes from studies that used motivationally 
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neutral outcomes (see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010 for a review). There is also some 
evidence to suggest that ideomotor priming effects occur for even undesirable or 
aversive outcomes (Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002; Eder et al., 2014). These 
results provide support for the ideomotor account because, as Dickinson (2016) points 
out, even aversive outcomes should automatically prime associated motor responses 
according to ideomotor theory. A straightforward prediction of this interpretation of S-
O-R theory, then, is that PIT effects should be observed for undesirable outcomes, even 
when outcome value is established before instrumental training. Experiment 8 tested 
this prediction. Evidence of automaticity following a pre-training devaluation procedure 
would provide especially strong evidence for S-O-R theory.  
S-O-R theory (as interpreted by Dickinson, 2016) predicts that the stimulus 
compounds will prime and trigger the instrumental responses that produced the cued 
outcomes, irrespective of outcome value. Thus, an S1+S3 compound will trigger R1, 
because R1 is associated with both signalled outcomes O1- and O3+, whereas R2 is 
only associated with one of the cued outcomes – O3+. By the same logic, an S2+S3 
compound will increase R2 responses. The propositional EU account proposes that 
response choice reflects a controlled inference, and therefore that participants may seek 
to avoid the aversive outcomes. Hence, the S1+S3 compound should decrease R1 
responses, because participants will try to avoid the cued, aversive O1-. Conversely, 
participants should preferentially choose R2 to earn the positive O3+. By the same logic, 
the S2+S3 compound should similarly decrease R2 responses (and increase R1 
responses). The critical novel feature of this design is that both responses share the 
positive O3+ with the stimulus compounds S1+S3 and S2+S3. Outcome probability will 
therefore be high for both responses on all test trials, allowing the opportunity to detect 
a role of outcome value. Baseline response choice should not be biased in either 
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direction, because the instrumental responses are equally associated with a valued and 
devalued outcome. 
4.3.1 Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 7, except in the following respects. 
Participants. Twenty-four Plymouth University psychology undergraduates (22 
females, aged 18-25; M = 19.21, SEM = 0.35 years) completed the experiment for 
course credit. The experiment was approved by the Plymouth University Ethics 
Committee. 
Apparatus and materials. Walker’s extra crunchy ready salted crisps (150g), 
Tyrrell’s sea salted “Poshcorn” (70g), and Sainsbury’s salted jumbo cashew nuts (400g) 
were used for the taste test.  
Procedure 
Taste and liking test. Participants initially sampled the crisps, popcorn and 
cashew nuts that were available to win. The foods were counterbalanced with respect to 
the outcome for which they served (O1-, O2- or O3+). Participants always sampled O3+ 
first, before the other outcomes were revealed. The aversive outcomes O1- and O2-, 
coated in cloves and olive oil, were then sampled randomly. After the taste test, 
participants rated their desire to eat each food (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “Very much”), with 
the questions presented in a random order. The outcomes were removed after these 
ratings had been provided. 
Instrumental training. Instrumental training began with the following 
instructions: “In this part of the task, you can earn the three outcomes shown before by 
pressing the left or right arrow keys. Your task is to learn which keys earn each 
outcome.” There were 48 trials. Each trial began with a centrally presented choice 
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symbol (“← or →”), which remained until participants pressed either the left or right 
arrow key. Responses were followed by the statement “You earn one 
[crisps/popcorn/cashews] point”, depending on the reward earned. The rewarding 
outcome O3+ was scheduled to be available on half of the trials, and the aversive 
outcomes O1- and O2- on the remaining trials. The trials were randomly distributed 
throughout training. When outcome O3+ was available, either response produced this 
outcome. When the aversive outcomes were available, left arrow key responses (R1) 
produced O1-, and right arrow key responses (R2) produced O2-. All other aspects of 
instrumental training were the same as Experiment 7. 
Instrumental knowledge test. Following instrumental training, participants were 
asked which key produced each outcome. They chose between the options “Left arrow”, 
“Both” and “Right arrow”, using the mouse. Their answer was outlined in red for 
1000ms, and participants then rated their confidence between one (“not at all”) and 
seven (“very confident”). The questions were randomly ordered. 
Transfer test. The transfer test began with instructions that were very similar to 
the instructions given in Experiment 7; participants were told that they could continue to 
earn the three outcomes by pressing the left or right arrow key, but that they would now 
only be told how many they had earned at the end of the experiment. They were also 
informed that pictures would be presented, and that would be required to eat all of the 
food they earned at the end of the experiment.  
Each trial began with the presentation of pictorial stimuli representing outcome 
O3+ (S3), and either O1- (S1) or O2- (S2).The stimuli were presented at the top centre 
and bottom centre of the screen. After 3000ms, the choice symbol (“← or →”) was 
presented centrally, between the two stimuli, and participants were required to choose 
the left or right arrow key. There were eight cycles of four trials (32 trials). In each 
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cycle, S3 was presented with S1 twice and with S2 twice, with counterbalanced cue 
location. All other aspects of the transfer test were identical to Experiment 7. After 
completing the transfer test, participants completed another instrumental knowledge test, 
a Pavlovian knowledge test for the three stimuli, and the post-experimental knowledge 
test of the previous experiments.  
4.3.2 Results 
Knowledge tests. Twelve participants failed the first or second instrumental 
knowledge test and were labelled “unaware”. The remaining 12 participants were 
considered “aware”. Considering there was an equal number of participants in each 
group, rather than rejecting the unaware participants, awareness was included as a 
variable in the analysis.  
Liking ratings. Figure ‎4.3 shows the liking ratings for the aversive (O1-, O2-) 
and rewarding (O3+) outcomes for participants who were aware and unaware of the 
instrumental contingencies. Most importantly, O3+ received higher ratings than O1-
/O2-, F (1, 22) = 490.62, p < .001, 
2
p  = .96. There was no effect of group or interaction 
between the outcome and group variables, Fs < 1.  
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Figure ‎4.3 Mean liking ratings in Experiment 8. Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to 
eat the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. The data are divided according to 
whether participants demonstrated awareness of the instrumental contingencies. Error bars 
represent SEM.  
 
Transfer test. Figure ‎4.4 shows the transfer test results. There was a main effect 
of stimulus compound, with participants performing more R1 responses in the presence 
of the S2+S3 compound than the S1+S3 compound, F (1, 22) = 15.99, p < .001, 
2
p  
= .42. There was no main effect of awareness, F < 1, but there was an interaction 
between awareness and stimulus compound, F (1, 22) = 21.60, p < .001, 
2
p  = .50. 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the S2+S3 compound elicited 
more R1 responses than the S1+S3 compound in the aware group, t (22) = 6.11, p 
< .001, 95% CI = [41.30, 83.70]. No effect of stimulus compound was observed in the 
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unaware group, t < 1. 
 
Figure ‎4.4. Transfer test results of Experiment 8. Response choice was tested in the presence of 
stimulus compounds depicting either O1- or O2- with O3+ (S1+S3, S2+S3). The 50% mid-point 
represents no bias in response choice. The data are subdivided according to whether 
participants reported accurate knowledge of the instrumental contingencies. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 8 used a novel PIT procedure that directly set the propositional and 
S-O-R theories against one another. Each transfer test trial signalled a rewarding 
outcome that was common to both instrumental responses, and an aversive outcome that 
was unique to one response. The stimuli primed not the response that was most strongly 
associated with the signalled outcomes, but the response that did not produce the cued, 
aversive outcome. These data provide compelling evidence to suggest that, at least 
under these circumstances, PIT is highly sensitive to outcome value.  
Interestingly, sensitivity to outcome value was only apparent in participants who 
demonstrated explicit awareness of instrumental contingencies. That is, the stimulus 
compounds failed to bias response choice (in either direction) in participants who failed 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Aware Unaware
P
er
ce
n
t 
ch
o
ic
e 
o
f 
R
1
 
Group 
S1+S3
S2+S3
144 
 
the instrumental contingency knowledge tests; these participants responded at chance. 
The finding that explicit contingency knowledge is necessary to observe an effect of 
stimulus compound in the current design accords with observations in typical PIT 
procedures (Hogarth et al., 2007; Lovibond et al., 2015; Talmi et al., 2008; Trick et al., 
2011). Moreover, it supports the suggestion that propositional knowledge plays an 
important role in PIT.  
4.4 Experiment 9  
In Experiment 8, each transfer test trial signalled two outcomes that varied in 
their value. Under these circumstances, PIT was highly sensitive to outcome value. This 
procedure can be contrasted to typical PIT experiments (such as Experiment 3), in 
which only one high or low value outcome is cued on each trial. These conditions 
typically promote insensitivity to outcome devaluation (e.g., Hogarth & Chase, 2011; 
Hogarth, 2012; Watson et al., 2014). Experiment 9 sought to test whether this difference 
in experimental design is crucial to whether PIT is sensitive to devaluation or not.  
The current design specifically tested whether cueing the positive outcome O3+ 
on every trial is necessary to observe the effect seen in Experiment 8. The experiment 
followed a similar procedure to Experiment 8; two instrumental responses were initially 
trained to predict unique aversive food outcomes (O1- and O2-), as well as a common 
rewarding outcome O3+ (R1-O1-, O3+, R2-O2-, O3+). For one group (Compound-cue), 
response choice was then tested in the presence of the compound stimuli used in 
Experiment 8: S1+S3 and S2+S3. For the other group (Single-cue), the aversive 
outcomes were simply presented twice on each test trial: S1+S1 and S2+S2. The 
Compound-cue group were expected to replicate the effect observed in Experiment 8. 
That is, the S1+S3 compound was expected to increase choice of R2, and the S2+S3 
compound was expected to increase choice of R1. If the sensitivity to outcome value 
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observed in Experiment 8 was because the positive O3+ was cued on every test trial, 
then the effect should not be observed in the Single-cue group. The Single-cue 
condition is more similar to the standard PIT procedure in which only one outcome and 
response is cued on every test trial, and so might be more likely to produce insensitivity 
to devaluation. Insensitivity to devaluation would be observed if the S1+S1 compound 
increased choice of R1 compared to the S2+S2 compound. Similarly, the S2+S2 
compound should increase choice of R2 compare to the S1+S1 compound.  
4.5.1 Method 
 The method was the same as Experiment 8, except in the following respects. 
Participants. Forty-one participants from Plymouth University (23 females, 
aged 18-28; M = 20.54, SEM = 0.34 years) completed the experiment for £4.  
Procedure.  A large proportion of participants failed the contingency knowledge 
tests in Experiment 8. Several steps were therefore taken to make the instrumental 
contingencies more memorable in the current experiment. First, the instrumental 
responses were changed to the “A” and “L” keys instead of the left and right arrow keys. 
The rationale here was that the responses required the use of different hands, which 
should make them more distinguishable. The instructions for the instrumental training 
phase were also more explicit: “In this part of the task, you can earn the three outcomes 
shown before by pressing the A or L key. Both keys will produce [O3+]. Your task is to 
learn which keys produce [O1-] and [O2-]. Press any key to begin.” The terms in 
brackets were replaced by their respective outcomes. Instrumental training was identical 
to Experiment 8, except that the choice symbol was replaced with “Choose a key: A or 
L?”, and participants selected either the A or L key instead of the arrow keys. These 
changes were also made to the transfer test. The instrumental knowledge tests were also 
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identical to Experiment 1, except that participants chose between the three new options - 
A key, L key, or both.  
The transfer test for the compound-cue group was identical to the transfer test 
used in Experiment 8. The transfer test for the single-cue group was also the same, 
except that stimulus S1 or S2 was presented twice on every trial, in place of S3. After 
the transfer test, participants completed the instrumental and Pavlovian knowledge tests 
of Experiment 8, except that the Single-cue group were not shown S3 during the 
Pavlovian knowledge test (since it was not presented during the experiment at all for 
this group).  
4.5.2 Results 
Exclusions. Fourteen participants were excluded for failing the instrumental (N 
= 10) or Pavlovian (N = 3) knowledge tests, or both (N = 1). Given the high proportion 
of excluded participants, the transfer test results for these participants are provided in 
Appendix 2. One additional participant was excluded for giving a higher liking rating (6) 
to one of the aversive outcomes than to the positive outcome (5). This left a total of 26 
participants (Single-cue = 13, Compound-cue = 13), whose data were entered into the 
remaining analyses.  
Liking ratings. Figure ‎4.5 shows the liking rating data for the aversive (O1-, 
O2-) and rewarding (O3+) outcomes in each group. Most importantly, O3+ received 
higher liking ratings than O1- and O2- when collapsed across groups, F (1, 24) = 382.61, 
p < .001, 
2
p  = .94. There was no effect of group, F < 1, nor was there an interaction 
between the outcome and group variables, F (1, 24) = 2.05, p > .05, 
2
p  = .08.  
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Figure ‎4.5. Mean liking ratings in Experiment 9. Ratings of one and seven represent to wanting 
to eat the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Transfer test. Figure ‎4.6 shows the transfer test results. No main effects were 
observed for stimulus compound, F (1, 24) = 2.03, p > .05, 
2
p  = .08, or group, F (1, 24) 
= 1.52, p > .05, 
2
p  = .06. There was a marginal but non-significant interaction between 
the stimulus compound and group variables, F (1, 24) = 3.33, p = .08, 
2
p  = .12.  
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Figure ‎4.6. Transfer test results of Experiment 9. Response choice was tested in the presence of 
stimulus compounds S1+S1/S2+S2 (Single-cue), or S1+S3/S2+S3 (Compound-cue). The 50% 
mid-point represents no bias in response choice. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
The non-significant stimulus compound × group interaction suggests that the 
effect of the stimulus compounds on response choice did not significantly differ across 
the two groups. However, Figure ‎4.6 indicates that an effect of stimulus was observed in 
the Compound-cue group. It is important to assess this effect statistically to confirm 
whether the effect observed in Experiment 8 was replicated in the comparable 
Compound-cue condition of the current experiment. Pairwise comparisons were 
therefore computed for each group, followed by Bayes Factors for confirmation. In the 
Compound-cue group, the S2+S3 compound increased the R1 response more than the 
S1+S3 compound, t (24) = 2.30, p < .05, 95% CI = [3.55, 66.64]. There was no 
significant effect of stimulus in the Single-cue group, t < 1.  
Given the non-significant stimulus compound × group interaction, Bayes Factors 
were calculated to confirm the analyses reported above. It was assumed that the effect 
of stimulus compound in the Compound-cue group would be of a similar magnitude to 
that obtained in ‘aware’ group of Experiment 8. The mean difference (S2+S3 – S1+S3) 
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for the ‘aware’ group of Experiment 8 was 62.50. The comparable score for the 
Compound-cue group of the current experiment was 35.10 (SEM = 13.82). A half-
normal distribution with the standard deviation set as the plausible mean difference 
score (62.50) produced a Bayes Factor of 9.28. Thus, there was strong evidence to 
suggest that the S2+S3 compound produced more R1 responses than the S1+S3 
compound in the Compound-cue group. 
Comparable Bayes Factors were also calculated for the Single-cue group. The 
mean difference (S2+S2 – S1+S1) for the Single-cue group was -4.43 (SEM = 16.62). A 
half-normal distribution with the standard deviation set as the plausible mean difference 
score (62.50) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.21. This Bayes Factor is below the critical 
threshold of one third, and so provides evidence for the null hypothesis. That is, the data 
support the conclusion that the S2+S2 stimuli did not increase R1 responses compared 
to the S1+S1 stimuli.  
Finally, a Bayes Factor was also calculated to explore whether the Single-cue 
group showed any evidence of automaticity, which would be revealed if the S1+S1 
stimuli increased choice of the R1 response compared to the S2+S2 stimuli. For the 
purpose of calculating the priors, the maximum plausible effect was assumed to be of an 
opposite but comparable magnitude to the effect seen in the ‘aware’ group of 
Experiment 8 (62.50). The mean difference score for the Single-cue group of the current 
experiment was entered as +4.43 (SEM = 16.62), because the means went in the same 
direction as the experimental hypothesis (i.e. S1+S1 > S2+S2 with the percent choice of 
R1 as the dependent variable). A uniform distribution (with the upper and lower bound 
set as 62.50 and 0, respectively) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.42. This value is between 
the critical thresholds of one third and three, and is therefore inconclusive. That is, there 
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was insufficient evidence for the either the null hypothesis or the experimental 
hypothesis.   
4.5.3 Discussion 
Experiment 9 first replicated the effect observed in Experiment 8 in the 
Compound-cue group. When compound stimuli signalled both a rewarding and an 
aversive outcome on every test trial, participants demonstrated a selective bias away 
from the cued, aversive outcome. A comparable effect was not observed in the Single-
cue group, where the aversive outcomes were cued in the absence of the stimulus that 
signalled the rewarding outcome. Participants responded at chance under these 
circumstances; the stimuli failed to bias response choice in either direction.  
The non-significant interaction between the stimulus compound and group 
variables is a weakness of the experiment. One possibility is that the experiment was 
underpowered. Across the two groups, a relatively high proportion of participants were 
excluded for failing the contingency knowledge tests, and this would have reduced the 
experimental power. However, given the clear results observed in each group, it seems 
unlikely that a replication with greater power would change the overall pattern of results.  
Overall, the results suggest that signalling the positive O3+ during the transfer 
effect may be important to the effect observed in Experiment 8. This supports the 
suggestion that participants infer that the Pavlovian stimuli that are presented during the 
transfer test signal which outcomes are available, and which outcomes are not. The 
experiment was also useful in that the Compound-cue group served to replicate the 
effect observed in Experiment 8. 
It was anticipated that the Single-cue group might have demonstrated the usual 
insensitivity to devaluation that is seen in typical PIT tasks; only one low-value 
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outcome was cued on every test trial, which resembles the conditions of the transfer test 
in the standard PIT procedure. Insensitivity to devaluation would have been 
demonstrated by the opposite pattern to that observed in the Compound-cue group; the 
S1+S1 and S2+S2 stimuli should have increased R1 and R2 responses, respectively. 
However, this effect was not observed; participants performed at chance during the 
transfer test, rather than showing any evidence of a standard PIT effect that was 
insensitive to devaluation. In typical PIT tasks, each response is trained to predict 
unique outcomes. Each response was also trained to predict different (aversive) 
outcomes in the current design, but they also predicted the common positive O3+. It is 
possible that this difference in training is responsible for the null result observed in the 
Single-cue group (as opposed to a standard PIT effect). Although this is an intriguing 
possibility, it was not pursued further for two reasons. Firstly, a null result in the Single-
cue group would not be particularly informative, even if the interaction reached 
significance. Secondly, there was a more important issue that needed to be addressed. In 
particular, a post-training devaluation procedure needed to be employed to further test 
the effect of outcome devaluation on PIT. This issue was therefore prioritised in 
Experiment 10. 
4.5 Experiment 10  
Experiments 8 and 9 demonstrated that when stimulus compounds signalled 
both an aversive and a rewarding outcome, participants show a clear bias away from the 
cued, aversive outcome. These data appear to provide unique support for the 
propositional EU model of PIT. However, there is reason to warrant caution. An 
important feature of those experiments is that outcome value was established at the start 
of the experiment, before instrumental training commenced. This can be contrasted to 
the previous PIT studies that demonstrated insensitivity to devaluation, where the 
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outcomes were devalued after training but before the critical transfer test (Hogarth, 
2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Watson et al., 2014).  
S-O-R theory often assumes that the Pavlovian stimulus presented during the 
transfer test activates an ideomotor mechanism, where anticipation of the cued outcome 
triggers the associated instrumental response. As noted above, S-O-R (ideomotor) 
theory has been previously interpreted as an automatic mechanism that should operate 
for even aversive outcomes (Dickinson, 2016). Other researchers have, however, argued 
that such a system would be highly dysfunctional from an evolutionary perspective 
(Eder & Hommel, 2013; Eder et al., 2014; Marien, Aarts, & Custers, 2015). 
Anticipating an aversive outcome might intuitively be expected to suppress responses 
that produce them, perhaps via the formation of an inhibitory link between the mental 
representations of the response R and the aversive outcome O (Dickinson, 1994). One 
possibility, then, is that sensitivity to outcome value was observed in Experiments 8 and 
9 because inhibitory links formed between the instrumental responses and aversive 
outcomes during the instrumental training phase. According to this account, the 
stimulus compounds presented during the transfer test would have activated the 
associated outcome representations. The inhibitory links would have then supressed the 
instrumental response that was trained to produce the cued, aversive outcome. Clearly, 
this account would explain the results of Experiments 8 and 9 very well.  
Experiment 10 followed the design of Experiment 8 but with a more standard 
post-training devaluation procedure. This means that all outcomes were positive during 
training, and so no inhibitory associations should have formed. If the effect observed in 
Experiment 8 was due to the formation of inhibitory instrumental links with the aversive 
outcomes, then the opposite result should now be observed. Hence, the S-O-R account 
predicts that the S1+S3 compound will increase R1 on test, and the S2+S3 compound 
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will increase R2. If participants made a deliberate choice to avoid the aversive outcomes 
in Experiment 8, however, then response choice should follow the same pattern as in 
Experiment 8.   
4.5.1 Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 9, except in the following respects.  
Participants. Thirty participants from Plymouth University (21 females, aged 
18-23; M = 20.50, SEM = 0.25 years) completed the experiment in exchange for £4. 
Procedure. Participants were initially shown the food outcomes (crisps, popcorn 
and cashew nuts) in their original packaging and were told that they could win points 
towards them. The props were placed in front of the computer, in a consonant location 
to the keys that produced them (i.e., O3+ was placed centrally, and O1- and O2- were 
placed to the left and right of O3+, respectively). Participants completed liking ratings 
for each outcome, before the props were removed. All text was presented in black 
during instrumental training. The devaluation taste test took place after the first 
instrumental knowledge test (which followed instrumental training). Participants then 
completed a post-devaluation liking test prior to the transfer test. All participants 
completed the transfer test that was employed in Experiment 8. 
4.5.2 Results 
Exclusions. Four participants were excluded for failing the instrumental 
knowledge tests. Two additional participants were excluded for giving higher liking 
ratings of O2- or O3- after devaluation than before. The data from the remaining 24 
participants were entered into the analyses. 
Liking ratings. Figure ‎4.7 shows the mean liking ratings for the valued (O3+) 
and devalued (O1-/O2-) outcomes in the first (pre-devaluation) and second (post-
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devaluation) liking rating test. There was a main effect of liking test, with participants 
giving higher liking ratings in the pre-devaluation test than the post-devaluation test, F 
(1, 23) = 41.12, p < .001, 
2
p  = .64. There was also a main effect of outcome, with the 
valued O3+ receiving higher liking ratings than the devalued O1-/O2- when collapsed 
across liking tests, F (1, 23) = 103.72, p < .001, 
2
p  = .82. Most importantly, there was 
an interaction between the liking test and outcome variables, F (1, 23) = 161.51, p 
< .001, 
2
p  = .88. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
outcomes were rated equally before devaluation, t < 1, and that O1-/O2- received lower 
ratings than O3+ after devaluation, t (23) = 23.91, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.74, 5.64].  
 
Figure ‎4.7. Mean liking rating in Experiment 10. Ratings were taken for each outcome (O1-, 
O2- and O3+) at the start of the experiment (pre-devaluation), and immediately after the 
devaluation procedure (post-devaluation). Ratings of one and seven represent wanting to eat 
the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars represent SEM.  
 
Transfer test. Figure ‎4.8 shows the transfer test results. Most importantly, the 
S2+S3 compound increased R1 responses compared to the S1+S3 compound, t (23) = 
6.58, p < .001, 95% CI = [39.28, 75.30]. 
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Figure ‎4.8. Transfer test results of Experiment 10. Response choice was tested in the presence 
of stimulus compounds depicting either O1- or O2- with O3+ (S1+S3, S2+S3). The 50% mid-
point represents no bias in response choice. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
4.5.3 Discussion 
When compound stimuli signalled two outcomes, participants demonstrated a 
strong tendency to selectively avoid the cued, devalued outcome. This is consistent with 
the results of Experiments 8 and 9. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the effect can be 
replicated even when the outcomes are devalued after the instrumental training phase. 
Together, these results are at odds with the claim that PIT effects are mediated by a 
representation of the outcome’s identity, but not its value (Hogarth et al., 2013; Hogarth 
& Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004). The data suggest that not only does the stimulus 
retrieve the outcome’s value, but that PIT is highly sensitive to changes in outcome 
value, at least when multiple outcomes are cued.  
4.6 Experiment 11  
Experiments 8-10 set the propositional and S-O-R accounts of PIT against one 
another using a novel experimental design. When stimulus compounds signalled both an 
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aversive and a rewarding outcome on every test trial, response choice was highly 
sensitive to outcome value. Under these circumstances, participants sought to avoid the 
cued, aversive outcome. This effect was observed regardless of whether the outcomes 
were devalued before or after the instrumental contingencies were established. These 
data provide strong support for the propositional EU account of PIT, in which 
participants selectively respond for the signalled outcome that has the highest value. 
That is, response choice appears to reflect an integration of knowledge about the 
perceived probability (Op) and value (Ov) of each outcome.  
The data support a goal-directed account of PIT, where cue-elicited response 
choice is sensitive to changes in outcome value, at least when multiple outcomes are 
signalled. It should be noted, however, that this does not demonstrate that an automatic 
S-O-R process plays no role in PIT. It is certainly still possible that both goal-directed, 
propositional and automatic S-O-R processes contribute to PIT effects, but that 
Experiments 8-10 were not optimised to detect the latter process. Experiment 11 tested 
this possibility by incorporating the concurrent load task used in Experiment 2 into the 
design of Experiment 10. The aim here was to make it difficult for participants to 
engage in high-level, propositional reasoning throughout the transfer test. If response 
choice is mediated in part by an automatic S-O-R mechanism, then this mechanism 
should be revealed under concurrent load. That is, S-O-R theory predicts the opposite 
effect to that observed in Experiment 10 under concurrent load. If PIT effects are 
entirely mediated by a goal-directed process, however, then a generalised impairment in 
response choice should be observed. Crucially, no evidence of automaticity would be 
expected.  
Participants were randomly allocated to a No Load or Load condition at the start 
of the experiment. The concurrent load task manipulation was applied during the 
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transfer test (in much the same way as in Experiment 2). The No Load group were 
expected to replicate the results of Experiment 10. Based on the results of Experiment 2, 
the concurrent load task was also expected to effectively reduce participants’ ability to 
use controlled reasoning processes. The propositional account predicts that the effect 
observed in Experiment 10 will be reduced to chance performance in the Load condition. 
If response choice is partly mediated by an S-O-R mechanism, however, then 
automaticity should now be observed. That is, the S1+S3 and S2+S3 compounds should 
now bias response choice towards R1 and R2, respectively.  
4.6.1 Method 
The method was the same as Experiment 10, except in the following respects.  
Participants. Fifty-five participants from Plymouth University (35 females, 
aged 18-30; M = 21.15, SEM = 0.41 years) completed the experiment for £4. 
Participants were randomly allocated to the No Load or Load group at the start of the 
experiment.  
Procedure 
Practice concurrent load task. After providing informed consent, both groups 
completed 10 practice trials of the concurrent load task, which was very similar to the 
task used in Experiment 2. In brief, each trial began with the presentation of either the 
letter ‘M’ or ‘C’ at the top centre and bottom centre of the screen, while six unique, 
single-digit, randomly-chosen numbers were played at 330ms intervals through 
participants’ headphones. On-screen instructions to “Press the key” were then presented 
centrally (between the two letter stimuli), until participants selected either the M or C 
key. A number that was part of the sequence heard at the start of the trial was then 
presented on-screen, and participants were required to select the number that came next 
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in the sequence that they had heard. The trials were separated by 750-1250ms intervals. 
Participants wore headphones throughout the duration of the experiment. They 
subsequently completed the liking ratings, instrumental training and knowledge test, 
and the outcome devaluation procedure of Experiment 10.  
Transfer test. All participants initially received the instructions that were given 
for the transfer test of Experiment 10. The Load group were also informed that numbers 
would be presented through their headphones and that when a number was presented 
on-screen, they should select the number that came next in the sequence. The No Load 
group were told to simply select the number that appeared on the screen. Both groups 
were informed that the trials would repeat at the end of the experiment if they responded 
to the probe number incorrectly, and so they should respond accurately to complete the 
experiment on time. In truth, incorrect trials were not repeated. The instruction was 
given simply to encourage participants to fully engage with the concurrent load task.  
The transfer test followed a similar format to Experiment 10. Each trial began 
with two pictorial stimuli representing the common rewarding outcome O3 (S3), and 
either the devalued O1 (S1) or O2 (S2). Immediately following the onset of the stimuli, 
the Load group heard six numbers through their headphones. The numbers were 
presented in the same way as in the practice load task. The No Load group did not hear 
any numbers, but were required to wait for the equivalent time (1980ms). For both 
groups, the statement “Choose a key: A or L?” was then presented centrally, between 
the stimuli, until an instrumental response was selected. Finally, a number was 
presented on-screen, and the Load group were required to select the number that came 
next in the sequence that was presented at the start of the trial. The No Load group 
simply selected the number shown. All other aspects of the transfer test were identical 
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to Experiment 10. Finally, participants completed the instrumental and Pavlovian 
knowledge tests of the previous experiments, and were fully debriefed at the end.  
4.6.2 Results 
Exclusions. Sixteen participants were excluded for failing the instrumental (N = 
10) or Pavlovian (N = 3) knowledge tests, or both (N = 3). Given the high proportion of 
participants who failed the contingency knowledge tests, the transfer test results for 
these participants are provided in Appendix 2. A further two participants were excluded 
for giving higher liking ratings for a devalued outcome in the post-devaluation liking 
test than in the pre-devaluation liking test. The data from the remaining 37 participants 
(No Load = 17, Load = 20), were entered into the analyses. 
Liking ratings. Figure ‎4.9 shows the mean pre- and post-devaluation liking 
ratings for the valued (O3+) and devalued (O1-, O2-) outcomes in each group. There 
was a main effect of liking test, with higher ratings given in the pre-devaluation test 
than the post-devaluation test, F (1, 35) = 29.78, p < .001, 
2
p  = .46. There was also a 
main effect of outcome, with the higher ratings given to the valued outcome than the 
devalued outcome when collapsed across groups and the two tests, F (1, 35) = 183.19, p 
< .001, 
2
p  = .84. There was no main effect of group, F < 1. Most importantly, there 
was a significant interaction between the liking test and outcome variables, F (1, 35) = 
229.10, p < .001, 
2
p  = .87. No interactions with group were observed, Fs < 1. 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that the outcomes were rated 
equally in the pre-devaluation liking test, t < 1, and the valued O3+ received 
significantly higher liking ratings than the devalued O1-/O2- in the post-devaluation 
liking test, t (35) = 26.05, p < .001, 95% CI = [4.76, 5.56]. 
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Figure ‎4.9. Pre- and post-devaluation liking ratings in Experiment 11. Ratings of one and seven 
represent wanting to eat the outcome “Not at all” and “Very much”, respectively. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
 
 Transfer test 
Response choice. Figure ‎4.10 shows the transfer test results of Experiment 11. 
There was a main effect of stimulus compound, with the S2+S3 compound eliciting 
more R1 responses than the S1+S3 compound, F (1, 35) = 5.78, p = .02, 
2
p  = .14. A 
main effect of group was not observed, F < 1, but there was a significant interaction 
between the stimulus compound and group variables, F (1, 35) = 6.45, p = .02, 
2
p  = .16. 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed an effect of stimulus compound in 
the No Load group, t (35) = 3.36, p = .002, 95% CI = [9.04, 36.55], but not in the Load 
condition, t < 1.  
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Figure ‎4.10. Transfer test results of Experiment 11. The 50% mid-point represents no bias in 
response choice. Scores above 50% demonstrate a bias towards R1, while scores below 50% 
represent a bias towards R2. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
A Bayes Factor was calculated to determine whether the null effect of stimulus 
compound in the Load group was genuine evidence for the null result, or whether there 
was insufficient evidence to distinguish the null hypothesis from the experimental 
hypothesis (that an automatic PIT effect would be observed). It was assumed that the 
maximum plausible effect size would be of an opposite but comparable size to the effect 
observed in Experiment 10. The mean difference in R1 responses between the two 
compound stimuli (S2+S3 – S1+S3) was 57.29 in Experiment 10. The mean difference 
between the stimulus compounds in the No Load group was 0.63 (SEM = 2.48). A 
uniform distribution produced a Bayes Factor of 0.07, which provides strong evidence 
for the null hypothesis. Thus, the data suggest that when multiple responses are primed 
on every transfer test trial, an automatic PIT effect is not seen under concurrent load. 
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4.6.3 Discussion 
Experiment 11 first replicated the result observed in Experiment 10 in the No 
Load group. When stimulus compounds signalled a rewarding and a devalued outcome, 
participants demonstrated a bias away from the cued, devalued outcome. Together, 
these results confirm that PIT effects are sensitive to post-training outcome devaluation 
procedures, at least when multiple outcomes and responses are cued on each trial during 
the transfer test. 
The unique contribution of Experiment 11 was in the use of a concurrent load 
procedure during the transfer test. The sensitivity to outcome devaluation seen in the No 
Load condition was not observed in participants who completed a concurrent load task 
during the transfer test. This suggests that the manipulation was effective in reducing 
participants’ ability to employ the controlled processes necessary to produce the 
behavioural pattern observed in the No Load group. Crucially, there was no evidence of 
an automatic PIT effect in the Load group, and this was supported by the Bayes Factor 
analysis. These data therefore support the propositional EU account of PIT, but provide 
less compelling evidence for the automatic S-O-R model.   
4.7 General Discussion 
The current experiments tested the propositional EU account of PIT against the 
S-O-R account. Each experiment examined the effect of outcome devaluation when 
stimulus compounds signalled outcomes that were associated with both instrumental 
responses during the PIT transfer test. Experiment 7 first established two instrumental 
responses to predict different two rewarding outcomes each, before one outcome 
associated with each response was devalued. When response choice was tested in the 
presence of stimulus compounds that signalled one valued and one devalued outcome, 
participants demonstrated a clear bias towards the instrumental response that was 
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associated with the cued and valued outcome. Experiment 8 extended this approach but 
also sought positive evidence of an automatic S-O-R mechanism. Participants were 
trained to perform two instrumental responses to earn different aversive outcomes, as 
well as a common rewarding outcome. Response choice was then assessed in the 
presence of pictorial stimuli signalling the valued outcome in compound with one of the 
aversive outcomes. Participants who reported explicit knowledge of the instrumental 
contingencies demonstrated a strong bias away from the cued, aversive outcome.  
Experiment 9 suggested that this effect depends on the presentation of a stimulus 
signalling the common rewarding outcome. The effect was then replicated in 
Experiment 10 using a post-devaluation procedure. Finally, Experiment 11 
demonstrated that sensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 10 depends on 
controlled reasoning processes. Participants responded at chance when they completed a 
demanding concurrent load task during the transfer test. Crucially, no evidence of an 
automatic S-O-R process (where the S1+ S3 and S2+S3 compounds increased R1 and 
R2, respectively) was observed under concurrent load. Collectively, these results 
suggest that PIT is goal-directed when the stimuli presented during the transfer test 
signal that multiple outcomes are available on each trial. 
The current results are most consistent with the propositional EU account of PIT, 
where participants make a controlled choice to pursue the cued outcome because it is 
seen as much more available than the alternative outcome. There are some discrepancies 
in the results, however, particularly with respect to Experiment 3 (where insensitivity to 
devaluation was observed in Chapter 3). These issues will be elaborated on further in 
Chapter 5 (General Discussion).  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
The experiments in this thesis aimed to further current knowledge of the 
psychological mechanisms that underlie human PIT effects. Chapter 1 predominately 
focused on two psychological theories of PIT: S-O-R theory and a recently developed 
propositional EU theory (which is an extension of hierarchical S: R-O theory). The 
dominant model of PIT, S-O-R theory, advocates an automatic associative link 
mechanism. It specifically suggests that Pavlovian stimuli presented during the transfer 
test activate the sensory properties of the associated outcomes, which then trigger 
associated instrumental responses (thereby circumventing the current incentive value of 
the outcome). The finding that PIT is often insensitive to devaluation clearly accords 
with this account very well (Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; 
Rescorla, 1994b; Watson et al., 2014).  
Chapter 1 contrasted S-O-R theory to the propositional EU account, which 
proposes that PIT effects are mediated by explicit contingency knowledge that gives rise 
to effortful inferential reasoning processes. It also makes the key prediction that PIT 
effects are mediated by judgements about the probability (Op) and value (Ov) of each 
outcome. The primary empirical support in the existing literature for the propositional 
EU account came from two findings. Firstly, PIT effects are usually only observed in 
participants who can report explicit contingency knowledge (Bezzina et al., 2016; 
Hogarth et al., 2007; Lovibond et al., 2015; Talmi et al., 2008). Secondly, PIT effects 
are sensitive to post-training verbal instructions (Hogarth et al., 2014). These findings 
are both regarded as evidence for the propositional EU account, because they suggest 
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that PIT effects reflect controlled, cognitive processes. However, it was clear that there 
were several key aspects of the propositional EU account that were untested in the 
existing literature. A core aim of the current research, therefore, was to test the 
propositional EU account of PIT more thoroughly. Another important aim was to 
further test the instructional and devaluation effects, with the aim of providing a 
cohesive account of PIT that reconciled these seemingly paradoxical results.  
5.2 Summary of results 
Chapter 2 extended the work of Hogarth et al. (2014) and Seabrooke et al. 
(2016), by testing whether PIT would be sensitive to a post-training reversal instruction. 
The experiments also tested whether the PIT effects would be influenced by time 
pressure (Experiment 1) or concurrent load (Experiment 2). Standard PIT effects were 
observed in the Non-Reversal groups; the reward cues selectively increased choice of 
the instrumental response that was paired with the common outcome. Interestingly, 
these non-reversal PIT effects were observed even when participants responded very 
quickly, or when they completed the concurrent load task during the transfer test. These 
data therefore provide unique evidence of an ‘automatic’ PIT effect, at least in the sense 
that the PIT effects demonstrated in these experiments do not appear to require a great 
deal of time or controlled processing. 
Experiment 2 also demonstrated a reversed PIT effect by instruction; the stimuli 
biased response choice not towards the response that was paired with the cued outcome, 
but towards the response that was more likely to be reinforced according to the 
instruction. A reversed PIT effect was not observed in the Reversal Load group. 
Crucially, in this reversal instruction group, the concurrent load procedure did not reveal 
any evidence of an underlying automatic S-O-R mechanism; response choice was at 
chance regardless of the stimulus present. This result seems most naturally interpreted 
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within the propositional model of PIT, because automaticity was not revealed when the 
conditions favoured the discovery of an underlying S-O-R mechanism. 
Chapter 3 used a different approach, in that it tested the effect of a novel, very 
strong devaluation procedure on PIT. In Experiment 3, a typical PIT procedure 
produced a PIT effect that was insensitive to this devaluation procedure. That is, the 
Pavlovian stimuli selectively increased choice of the response that was paired with the 
cued outcome, and the size of the PIT effects for the valued and devalued outcomes did 
not significantly differ. This insensitivity to devaluation is usually regarded as evidence 
of an automatic S-O-R mechanism. However, Experiments 4-6 provided examples of 
insensitivity to devaluation even when an S-O-R mechanism should not have been able 
to readily operate. Together, the data were therefore interpreted as evidence to suggest 
that insensitivity to devaluation may, at least sometimes, reflect a controlled decision-
making process.  
The experiments in Chapter 4 developed an alternative method to examine the 
effect of outcome devaluation on PIT. In each experiment, every transfer test trial 
signalled two outcomes
8
, so that both instrumental responses were cued on every trial. 
Crucially, only one of the signalled outcomes was valued, because the other had been 
devalued. Cue-elicited response choice was highly sensitive to devaluation under these 
circumstances; participants selectively chose the response that was associated with the 
cued, high-value outcome. Interestingly, this sensitivity to devaluation was not observed 
when participants received a concurrent load throughout the transfer test (Experiment 
11). Under these circumstances, participants responded at chance. Crucially, they did 
not show any evidence of an automatic PIT effect that was insensitive to devaluation. 
Taken together, the results reported in Chapter 4 support the suggestion that PIT is 
                                                 
8
 With the exception of the Single-Cue group in Experiment 9.  
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highly sensitive to outcome devaluation when multiple outcomes and responses are 
cued on every transfer test trial.  
5.3 Theoretical implications 
The current research provides strong evidence to suggest that PIT effects are 
goal-directed, at least when multiple outcomes and responses are cued. In the past, an 
automatic S-O-R link mechanism has been favoured, in which the stimulus activates 
only the sensory properties of the outcome (Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016; Balleine & 
Ostlund, 2007; de Wit & Dickinson, 2015; Hogarth, 2012; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; 
Holland, 2004; Watson et al., 2014, 2016). This explanation has been favoured largely 
because PIT procedures usually produce insensitivity to devaluation. Experiment 3 
confirmed this result, by demonstrating a PIT effect that was insensitive to a very strong 
devaluation manipulation. This insensitivity to devaluation is seemingly inconsistent 
with the sensitivity to devaluation that was observed in Chapter 4; a stimulus that 
signalled a devalued outcome increased responding for that outcome in Experiment 3, 
but decreased responding for that same devalued outcome in Experiment 10 (and 
related experiments). The experiments used the same devaluation technique, which 
suggests that it is not simply the method of devaluation that is crucial (Eder & Dignath, 
2016). Clearly, there is a crucial difference between PIT effects in which multiple 
outcomes/responses are primed (Experiment 10), and the standard value-insensitive case 
in which only one outcome/response is primed (Experiment 3). In light of these 
discrepant results, much of the discussion below concerns the extent to which the 
dominant psychological theories of PIT are able to account for both of these results. Of 
course, the effects demonstrated in Experiments 3 and 10 were not observed within a 
single experiment, so cross-experimental comparisons must be made with caution. 
However, the effects were both significant in opposite directions, and they were also 
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both demonstrated in multiple experiments. It seems clear, therefore, that both effects 
are robust and replicable. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion in this section 
focuses predominately on Experiment 3 versus Experiment 10. It is also worth noting, 
however, that the other experiments reported in Chapter 4 are also relevant to the 
discussion because they complement the conclusions of Experiment 10 very well.  
The insensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 3 is clearly most 
consistent with S-O-R theory, where the stimulus activates the identity but not the value 
of the associated outcome, which then triggers the associated instrumental response 
(Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Martinovic et al., 2014; Rescorla, 1994b). The value-based 
response choice pattern in Experiment 10, by contrast, is less readily reconciled with 
current accounts of S-O-R theory. The results of Experiment 10 provide clear evidence 
to suggest that the stimuli retrieve both the sensory properties and the current incentive 
value of the outcomes. Current versions of S-O-R theory are therefore able to explain 
the insensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 3, at the expense of not being 
able to explain the sensitivity to devaluation that was observed in Experiment 10. There 
are, however, other ways in which an amended S-O-R model could potentially account 
for the goal-directed PIT effects that were reported in Chapter 4. These possibilities will 
be discussed after the section immediately below, which considers whether the 
propositional EU theory can reconcile the results of Experiment 3 with the results of 
Experiment 10. 
Propositional EU theory proposes that PIT effects are mediated by cue-elicited 
increases in perceived outcome probability (Op). That is, participants infer that the 
stimulus presented during the transfer test signals that the associated response is more 
likely to be reinforced. They then deliberately choose that response to obtain the cued 
outcome. From the propositional EU perspective, it is clear that typical PIT designs, in 
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which only one high- or low-value outcome is cued per trial, confound cue-elicited 
outcome probability with outcome devaluation. When a single stimulus that predicts a 
devalued outcome is presented, it signals a high probability outcome that is of low value 
(high Op, low Ov). The other outcome retains a high Ov but has a low Op (because it is 
not cued). Under these circumstances, participants demonstrate a bias towards the cued, 
devalued outcome (compared to a neutral stimulus), perhaps because it is considered to 
be much more available than the non-cued outcome. The cue-elicited increase in 
perceived outcome probability (Op) for the devalued outcome may lend itself to a 
decision-making process that is akin to a Hobson’s choice; although participants are 
free to choose either response, they believe that only the cued outcome is available and 
so they respond for it, even if that outcome has been devalued. When multiple outcomes 
and responses are cued on every transfer test trial, however, PIT effects are highly 
sensitive to outcome devaluation. Participants may infer that both responses are likely to 
be reinforced during the transfer test, and so they can choose between the cued 
outcomes on the basis of their value. This account may reconcile the sensitivity to 
devaluation observed in Experiment 10 with the insensitivity observed in Experiment 3; 
in both cases, response choice is a reflection of a ‘high-level’, decision-making process. 
This analysis does, however, highlight something of a paradox. On the one hand, 
participants seem to prefer devalued outcomes to no outcome in the standard PIT 
procedure (as seen in Experiment 3), but seek to avoid the same devalued outcomes in 
Experiment 10. The latter result suggests that the devaluation procedure rendered the 
value of the devalued outcomes negative. The EU of these outcomes should also, 
therefore, be negative in the standard PIT design (Experiment 3). The EU for the non-
cued but valued outcome should be zero, because the outcome is considered to be 
unavailable. Hence, when the devalued outcome is cued, the EU of the valued outcome 
should be zero, and the EU of the devalued outcome should be negative. The 
170 
 
instrumental response that predicts the valued outcome should therefore be 
preferentially performed, even when the devalued outcome is cued. Of course, this 
result is not usually observed - participants often show a bias towards the devalued 
outcome when it cued (relative to a neutral stimulus). 
Why then, according to propositional EU theory, did participants often choose a 
cued aversive outcome in Experiment 3? One possibility is that the insensitivity to 
devaluation observed in Experiment 3 is entirely an artefact of the measurement 
technique. As noted in Chapter 3, measuring PIT effects relative to baseline response 
choice in typical PIT procedures is a flawed approach, because baseline response choice 
is biased towards the still-valued outcome after devaluation. This issue is discussed in 
more detail below.  
Another way to reconcile the results of Experiment 3 with propositional EU 
theory would be to suggest that there is value in simply earning some kind of outcome 
on each trial. This leads participants to respond for the devalued but available outcome 
over the valued but (perceived to be) unavailable outcome. A limitation of typical PIT 
designs is that they often confound the perceived availability of the cued outcome with 
the absence of the other (non-cued) outcome. As a consequence, participants may infer 
that the signalled outcome is available on a given trial, and that all non-cued outcomes 
are not. This makes it difficult to determine whether PIT effects are driven by an 
expectancy of the cued outcome, an expected omission of the non-cued outcome, or 
both. The experiments reported in Chapter 4 offer a unique advantage in that they help 
to isolate the role of outcome value by signalling multiple outcomes that differ in their 
value. 
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5.3.1. Other theories 
Of the theories of PIT discussed so far, the experiments reported in this thesis 
appear to be most consistent with the propositional EU model of PIT. The section below 
now discusses the results with reference to three other theories of PIT, namely an 
amended S-O-R model, hierarchical S: R-O theory and a mediated S-R theory that was 
recently proposed by Cohen-Hatton et al. (2013). 
5.3.1.1. An amended S-O-R model 
One way in which an amended S-O-R model could account for the sensitivity to 
devaluation observed in Chapter 4 would be to propose that PIT effects are still 
mediated by an S-O-R associative chain, but that chain encodes both the sensory 
properties and the current incentive value of the outcome. There is no inherent reason 
for S-O-R theory to assume that the stimulus activates only the identity of the associated 
outcome rather than its value. Indeed, this was merely an auxiliary assumption that 
enabled S-O-R theory to explain the insensitivity to devaluation that is usually observed 
in PIT experiments. It is also not necessary to assume that goal-directed PIT effects are 
propositional in nature; automatic associative link processes have, in the past, been 
purported to explain other goal-directed learning phenomena (de Wit & Dickinson, 
2009, 2015). S-O-R theorists could therefore reconcile the results reported in Chapter 4 
with S-O-R theory very simply, by proposing that the stimulus activates both the 
sensory properties and the value of the outcomes. The model could, for instance, take a 
stance similar to that of the associative-cybernetic (AC) model of instrumental action 
(Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009, 2015, Dickinson, 1994, 2012, 
2016). The core idea here is that, once an outcome representation has been activated, its 
value is assessed in an incentive system. Information is then fed back to the motor 
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program. This feedback loop allows modulation (i.e. activation or inhibition) of the 
instrumental response depending on the current incentive value of the outcome. 
To make this analysis more concrete, consider the example of Experiment 10. 
Here, two instrumental responses (R1 and R2) were trained to predict different food 
outcomes (O1 and O2) as well as a common outcome O3 (R1-O1, O3; R2-O2, O3). The 
unique outcomes O1 and O2 were then devalued. Instrumental response choice was then 
tested in the presence of stimulus compounds that signalled the common, valued O3 and 
either the devalued O1 or O2 (S1+S3, S2+S3). Response choice was strongly biased 
away from the response that predicted the cued, devalued outcome. The AC model (or 
something similar) could explain this result by perhaps suggesting that the stimulus 
compounds activated the mental representations of the associated outcomes. The S1+S3 
compound, for example, would have excited the mental representations of outcomes O1 
and O3. Then, the value of the outcomes would have been assessed in the incentive 
system, where O1 would have been recognised as devalued (and O3 as valued). This 
information would then be fed back to the motor programs through the feedback loop. 
This feedback loop would result in O3 priming R1 and R2 indiscriminately (because 
both responses were equally associated with O3). O1 would also inhibit the 
performance of R1, because O1 was devalued. Hence, the priming effect of O3 on R1 
would be offset by the inhibition of R1 by O1. R2 would therefore be activated more 
strongly than R1, and so should be preferentially performed. Clearly, this is one way in 
which an amended S-O-R model could account for the goal-directed PIT effects 
observed in Chapter 4.  
It is not clear, however, that the model described above can account for the 
insensitivity to devaluation that is usually seen in typical PIT experiments (such as 
Experiment 3). If outcome value is assessed in the incentive system, then the response 
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that predicts the cued, devalued outcome should not be performed (because the 
incentive system should inhibit the response just as in Experiment10).  Thus, the 
adapted S-O-R model can account for the goal-directed effect observed in Experiment 
10 (as well as other related effects in Chapter 4), at the expense of not being able to 
explain the insensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 3 (as well as other 
previous demonstrations of insensitivity to devaluation observed in the PIT literature).  
By contrast, the propositional EU theory of PIT can account for both results. 
From this perspective, participants show a small bias towards the devalued outcome 
when it is the only outcome cued, because it is perceived to be much more available 
than the alternative, non-cued outcome. There may also be value in earning something 
rather than nothing at all. When multiple responses are cued, however, then participants 
selectively choose the response that produces a high-probability (i.e. cued), high value 
outcome.  
5.3.1.2. Hierarchical S: R-O theory 
The results reported in this thesis also have interesting implications for the 
hierarchical S: R-O theory that was first introduced in Chapter 1. Hierarchical S: R-
O theory suggests that PIT effects arise because the Pavlovian stimulus signals an 
increase in the strength of the associated instrumental relationship (Balleine & 
Ostlund, 2007; Cartoni et al., 2015; Colwill & Rescorla, 1990b; de Wit & Dickinson, 
2009; Hogarth et al., 2014; Rescorla, 1991).  The key point to note about 
hierarchical S: R-O theory is that it proposes that instrumental responses (including 
PIT effects) are mediated by forward R-O associations (in contrast to the backwards 
O-R association that is advocated by S-O-R theorists). It therefore assumes that 
instrumental responses are evaluated and performed on the basis of their 
consequences (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009). Intuitively, this account appears to be a 
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goal-directed model of PIT, and is therefore consistent with the goal-directed effects 
that were observed in Chapter 4.  
There are at least two possible ways to interpret the psychological nature of 
the hierarchical S: R-O mechanism. In the animal literature, hierarchical S: R-O 
theory is often interpreted within an associative link framework, where activation of 
the response representation transmits excitation to the associated outcome 
representation (e.g., Colwill & Rescorla, 1990b; Rescorla, 1991). From this 
perspective, the mechanism that allows hierarchical theory to generate goal-directed 
behaviour is unclear. The forward R-O link allows the response to activate the 
associated outcome representation, but it is not clear how the appraisal of the 
outcome’s value then modulates the instrumental response (Dickinson, 1994; 
Mackintosh & Dickinson, 1979). For this reason, the hierarchical S: R-O mechanism 
has been suggested to be integrated with the AC model (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
Dickinson, 1994). In this way, the evaluation of the outcome representation can be 
fed back to the motor system through the feedback loop, thereby modulating the 
extent to which the instrumental response is performed based on the current 
incentive value of the associated outcome. This approach has the advantage of 
providing an associative mechanism of goal-directed behaviour (Dickinson, 1994). 
However, it is unclear whether this mechanism can account for the finding that PIT 
effects are profoundly influenced by verbal instructions (Hogarth et al., 2014). 
Hence, the link-based view of hierarchical S: R-O theory can (when integrated with 
the AC model) provide a mechanism for goal-directed behaviour, but not necessarily 
provide a full account of the complexities of human behaviour.  
An alternative view is that the hierarchical mechanism is propositional in 
nature. Per this account, participants infer that the stimulus signals which response 
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will be reinforced during the transfer test, and they then deliberately choose that 
response. From this perspective, the propositional EU and hierarchical accounts of 
PIT are essentially the same theories that use different terminologies. This 
interpretation has the advantage of allowing hierarchical theory to explain the 
instructional sensitivity reported in the current thesis and by Hogarth et al. (2014), at 
the expense of not providing a mechanistic view of human goal-directed behaviour. 
5.3.1.3. Mediated S-R theory 
The results reported in Chapter 4 also have interesting implications for another 
link-based theory of PIT, called mediated S-R theory, that was recently put forward by 
Cohen-Hatton et al. (2013). Mediated S-R theory has not been discussed so far because 
the experiments in this thesis were designed to test the dominant S-O-R account of PIT 
against the propositional EU model. However, mediated S-R theory was proposed 
largely to explain the counterintuitive finding that PIT can be both outcome-selective 
and insensitive to devaluation. The sensitivity to devaluation observed in Chapter 4 is 
therefore clearly relevant for the mediated S-R theory of PIT. 
Similar to S-O-R theory, mediated S-R theory assumes that instrumental training 
produces bidirectional instrumental R-O/O-R links. These links allow thoughts about 
the outcome O (i.e. activation of the outcome representation) to automatically activate 
the associated instrumental response R representation. Crucially, when the stimulus S is 
subsequently paired with the outcome O during Pavlovian conditioning, the outcome 
representation will also activate the representation of the associated instrumental 
response R. This means that the representations for both the Pavlovian stimulus S and 
the instrumental response R will be concurrently activated, which is suggested to 
produce a direct stimulus-response (S-R) associative link. A similar argument can be 
made when Pavlovian conditioning precedes instrumental training. Here, Pavlovian 
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conditioning fosters a link between the mental representations of the stimulus S and the 
outcome O. When the instrumental response R is subsequently paired with the outcome 
O, the outcome will activate the associated stimulus S. It is worth mentioning here that 
activation of the response R would precede activation of the stimulus representation S 
under these circumstances (Alarcón & Bonardi, 2016). Nevertheless, the authors 
suggest that the concurrent activation of the stimulus and response would allow a direct 
S-R link to form (Cohen-Hatton et al., 2013).  
S-R associative links do not incorporate a representation of the outcome, and so 
PIT would not be expected to be sensitive to devaluation under these circumstances. 
Cohen-Hatton et al.'s (2013) mediated S-R account therefore successfully predicts the 
insensitivity to devaluation that is usually reported in PIT experiments. However, the 
goal-directed PIT effects reported in Chapter 4 seem to lie beyond the scope of 
mediated S-R theory. Consider the example of Experiment 10 again. Here, Pavlovian 
training (presumably
9
) precedes instrumental training, because life experience prior to 
the experiment would have allowed the food pictures to become associated with the 
outcomes (de Wit & Dickinson, 2015). In the transfer test, the stimulus compounds (e.g. 
S1+S3) should have therefore automatically triggered the response that was most 
strongly associated with the stimuli (R1), irrespective of the value of the mediating 
outcomes. The fact that the opposite result was observed speaks against the mediated S-
R account of PIT. 
To conclude this section, the results reported in this thesis appear to be most in 
line with the hierarchical and propositional EU theories of PIT. This is because, when 
only one low-value outcome is cued, participants show a bias towards that outcome 
relative to a neutral stimulus. This suggests that the stimulus signals which response is 
                                                 
9
 To test mediated S-R theory more thoroughly, future research should use the experimental design of 
Experiment 10 but incorporate a formal Pavlovian conditioning procedure. 
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more likely to be rewarded, and is therefore akin to the hierarchical mechanism that has 
been advocated previously (Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; Cartoni et al., 2015; Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1990b; de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Hogarth et al., 2014; Rescorla, 1991). In 
light of the instructional effects reported in this thesis and by Hogarth et al. (2014), it 
seems possible that this hierarchical mechanism is encoded propositionally. 
Furthermore, when stimuli signal multiple responses and outcomes that differ in their 
values, participants select the response that is associated with the cued outcome that is 
of the highest value. This latter result suggests that outcome value also plays an 
important role in human PIT effects. Together, these results therefore seem to be best 
accounted for by the propositional EU theory of PIT. The section below now details a 
broader implication for the interpretation of outcome devaluation effects. 
5.3.2. Other theoretical implications 
Another important theoretical implication of the current results concerns the 
interpretation of demonstrations of insensitivity to devaluation more generally. 
Insensitivity to devaluation is usually regarded as a key criterion for diagnosing habitual 
or automatic control (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; Dickinson, 1985). Experiments 4 and 
5, however, demonstrated insensitivity to devaluation even when the instrumental 
responses were merely instructed rather than established through trial-by-trial 
conditioning. These experiments suggest that insensitivity to devaluation may, at least 
sometimes, reflect the operation of a controlled reasoning process rather than an 
automatic associative link mechanism. It might be argued that the instructions alone 
could have fostered an instrumental link, which would then explain why the instructed 
PIT effect was insensitive to devaluation. As noted in Chapter 3, the mechanisms that 
would allow an instruction to produce an instrumental link is far from clear (Mitchell et 
al., 2009). At the very least, formal instrumental training would be expected to produce 
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a stronger link than an instructed contingency. This prediction was not supported by the 
results of Experiment 5; if anything, the PIT effect for the devalued outcome was 
numerically larger for the instructed responses than the trained responses in Experiment 
5. Thus, the data were consistent with the suggestion that instrumental responses can be 
insensitive to devaluation, even when an inflexible link mechanism should not readily 
operate. 
The instructed insensitivity discussed above is consistent with the suggestion 
that insensitivity to devaluation may sometimes reflect a controlled decision-making 
process. As noted above, typical PIT procedures (e.g. Experiment 3) might produce an 
apparent insensitivity to devaluation because they confound cue-elicited outcome 
probability with outcome devaluation. When only one outcome is cued per trial during 
the PIT transfer test, participants may choose that outcome not because it is an 
involuntary response, but because it is perceived to be the only available outcome. Thus, 
the apparent insensitivity to devaluation may in fact reflect a response strategy rather 
than an inflexible stimulus-elicited response (Robinson & Berridge, 2008). Future 
research will determine whether this account also stands up to scrutiny with respect to 
other instrumental learning phenomena.  
Another interesting finding comes from the concurrent load tasks used in 
Experiments 2 and 11. In Experiment 2, the standard (non-reversal) PIT effect was 
insensitive to the load manipulation. The sensitivity to devaluation observed in the No 
Load group of Experiment 11, by contrast, was completely eliminated in the Load group. 
These results suggest that the standard PIT effect observed in Experiment 2 might be 
more automatic than the sensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 11, because 
it was more resistant to manipulations that aimed to reduce participants’ ability to use 
controlled reasoning processes. From the propositional EU theory perspective, the 
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standard PIT observed in Experiment 2 relies largely on judgements of perceived 
outcome probability. The sensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 11, by 
contrast, is more complex because it depends on a recollection of the relevant 
contingencies, judgements of perceived probability, and the current incentive value of 
the outcomes. Hence, from the propositional EU theory perspective, it makes sense that 
the sensitivity to devaluation observed in Experiment 11 would be less automatic (i.e. 
more influenced by the load manipulation) than the standard PIT effect observed in 
Experiment 2. Of course, it is possible that different processes underlie the two effects. 
The standard PIT effect in Experiment 2 may be relatively automatic (and hence 
immune to the load manipulation), while the sensitivity to devaluation observed in 
Experiment 11 may be more controlled (which would explain why it was eliminated 
through concurrent load).   
5.4 Methodological implications 
The primary methodological implication of the current results comes from the 
argument made in Chapter 3 regarding the use of a moving baseline to measure 
devaluation effects in PIT experiments. It was suggested that typical PIT devaluation 
procedures, in which PIT effects are measured relative to a neutral stimulus, may 
underestimate the size of the PIT effect for the valued outcome, and overestimate the 
size of the PIT effect for the devalued outcome. This is because, after outcome 
devaluation, response choice in the neutral stimulus condition is usually biased towards 
the still-valued outcome. As a consequence, there is less room to observe a PIT effect 
for the valued outcome (due to the ceiling effect on response choice), and there is 
relatively greater opportunity to detect a PIT effect for the devalued outcome. It is 
possible (although not currently confirmed) that the insensitivity to devaluation 
observed in Chapter 3 is entirely due to this artefact. If this is the case, it would have 
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profound implications for the theories of PIT, because it would allow researchers to say 
with more certainty that PIT effects are goal-directed. Notably, the amended S-O-R 
model would no longer have a problem explaining the insensitivity to devaluation 
observed in Experiment 3, because the effect could simply be attributed to a flaw in the 
experimental design. The propositional EU model would also not need to rely on the 
suggestion that participants choose to respond for the cued, devalued outcome because 
it is better to earn something than nothing. Of course, this possibility remains 
speculative at present. It is certainly still possible that PIT can be truly insensitive to 
devaluation in other circumstances, even when the size of the effect is not assessed 
relative to baseline response choice. Some experimental designs that aim to test this 
idea are described below (Section  5.6, Future research).  
The ceiling effect issue described above was discussed in the context of outcome 
devaluation, but it also has potentially important implications for experiments exploring 
the relationship between PIT and drug dependency. Notably, several recent experiments 
have reported that baseline response choice is correlated with dependence, but PIT 
effects are not (Hogarth & Chase, 2011, 2012; Martinovic et al., 2014). However, these 
experiments all used typical PIT procedures in which one response was trained to 
predict a drug reward (either tobacco; Hogarth & Chase, 2011, 2012, or alcohol; 
Martinovic et al., 2014) and another response that was trained to predict a non-drug 
reward (chocolate). Instrumental response choice is then tested in the presence of drug 
(tobacco or alcohol), chocolate and neutral stimuli. Under these circumstances, baseline 
(non-cued) instrumental choice typically correlates with dependence. That is, highly 
dependent drug users show a preference for the drug response in the absence of any 
Pavlovian stimuli. This means that, as dependency increases, there is less room to 
observe a PIT effect for the drug reward (in much the same way as there is less 
opportunity to observe a PIT effect for the still-valued outcome in typical PIT 
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devaluation experiments). It is therefore not surprising that these experiments failed to 
find a relationship between PIT effects and dependency. Indeed, one might even expect 
a negative correlation under these circumstances, because the size of the observable PIT 
effect for the drug reward should be inversely related to dependency. In sum, to test 
whether PIT effects are truly correlated with dependence, future research needs to 
measure the PIT effect in a way that is not contingent on baseline response choice in the 
presence of a neutral stimulus. The design used in Experiments 8-11, for example, could 
be adapted to measure the relationship between tobacco dependency and PIT. In this 
design, tobacco points would serve as the common outcome (O3) that both responses 
produce. The responses would also produce two other outcomes O1 and O2 (e.g. crisps 
and popcorn). As in Experiments 8-11, instrumental response choice would then be 
assessed in the presence of stimulus compounds that signal tobacco and one of the other 
outcomes (S1+S3, S2+S3). If PIT is related to tobacco dependence, then a positive 
correlation would be expected between the size of the reversed PIT effect (such as that 
seen in Experiments 8-11) and tobacco dependency. This is because highly dependent 
tobacco smokers might attempt to avoid the cued food outcome in order to obtain the 
cued tobacco outcome. 
5.5 Applications 
The current results suggest that controlled, propositional processes can play an 
important role in generating PIT effects. This is in contrast to the usual interpretation of 
PIT, and cue reactivity more generally. Cue-elicited reward seeking may have evolved, 
at least partially, as a decision-making heuristic to maximise success when searching for 
natural rewards such as food and water. Cues may signal the availability of specific 
rewards, and therefore the viability of the responses that earn those rewards. When only 
one reward is perceived to be available because it is the only cued outcome, resources 
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may be channelled into obtaining that reward, even if it is of low value (as seen in the 
standard PIT effect). More research is needed to determine whether this is also true of 
cue-elicited reward-seeking outside of the laboratory, or whether it is simply an artefact 
of procedures that measure PIT devaluation effects against a biased baseline. If it is also 
applicable in real-world contexts, then the insensitivity to devaluation seen in 
Experiment 3 (as well as other previous demonstrations) provides a clear way in which 
reward cues may facilitate dysfunctional behaviour. The results may, therefore, have 
important implications for clinical treatments. PIT processes are thought to be involved 
in a range of problematic behaviours, including drug-seeking (Hogarth et al., 2010) and 
overeating (Colagiuri & Lovibond, 2015; Watson et al., 2014). These behaviours are 
often not moderated by outcome devaluation – for example satiety, health warnings or 
taste aversion (Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 2012; Watson et al., 2014). That is, 
people seek rewards even when those rewards lead to unpleasant, unwanted and 
potentially damaging consequences. The current research suggests that these behaviours 
can sometimes reflect strategic processes. 
The current results suggest that interventions for overeating and drug abuse 
should focus especially on controlled decision-making biases. This conclusion is 
consistent with the finding that extinction of cues through exposure therapy does little to 
reduce cue reactivity (e.g., Conklin & Tiffany, 2002). This failure is also mirrored in 
laboratory PIT experiments, which have demonstrated that Pavlovian extinction 
procedures do not eliminate PIT in either rodents (Delamater, 1996; Rescorla, 1992a) or 
human participants (Hogarth et al., 2014; Lovibond et al., 2015; Rosas et al., 2010). The 
aim of these procedures is to degrade Pavlovian S-O associations by repeatedly pairing 
a reward-predictive stimulus with non-reinforcement. Through the lens of associative 
theory, exposure therapy (extinction) should reduce cue reactivity by weakening the link 
between the stimulus S and the outcome O. The failure of these manipulations to 
183 
 
influence cue reactivity is therefore troubling from an S-O-R link perspective (Cohen-
Hatton et al., 2013). From a propositional perspective, however, it makes sense that 
extinction treatments would not dampen cue reactivity in the real world. This is because 
cue exposure therapies are often incongruent with knowledge about the real world. For 
example, individuals will continue to believe that a chocolate bar wrapper signals 
chocolate, regardless of whether that wrapper has been repeatedly presented in the 
absence of a chocolate reward in the clinic.  
Note that this analysis of appetitive extinction contrasts with phobia exposure 
treatments, where beliefs are not (typically) congruent with reality. A patient may have 
a phobia of spiders, for example, even though spiders are not (usually) harmful. 
Repeatedly presenting spider stimuli in the absence of an aversive outcome should, 
therefore, reinforce the (correct) belief that spiders are not generally harmful. Of course, 
there are also some examples of reward-predictive stimuli where extinction treatments 
would not undermine propositional beliefs. Consider the example of an individual who 
eats chocolate in front of the television every evening. Here, the television is associated 
with chocolate, but it does not actually produce chocolate. Hence, extinguishing the 
television-chocolate association should not undermine propositional beliefs about the 
“signalling” role of the television. It is possible that extinction treatments using these 
types of stimuli would be more responsive to cue exposure treatments, because such 
therapies would not undermine propositional beliefs with respect to these stimuli. 
5.6 Future research 
The results reported in this thesis have been interpreted as evidence for the role 
of controlled, propositional processes in PIT. However, the immunity of the basic PIT 
effect to speed and load in Chapter 2 suggests that PIT effects do have an automatic 
quality. These experiments also indicate potential to observe further automaticity in 
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other PIT experiments. This would be an exciting and worthwhile line of research, 
because it would provide clear evidence for a dual-process account of PIT. It would 
therefore have profound implications for the strategies that are recommended to target 
problematic PIT processes outside of the laboratory. The demonstration of a standard 
PIT effect despite a reversal instruction would provide especially strong evidence of 
automaticity, because this would be completely incongruent with the instructed 
contingencies. Hence, it could demonstrate a behavioural dissociation between 
propositional beliefs (perhaps measured via expectancies) and performance.  
One way to look for further automaticity would be to increase the demands of 
the PIT task. Increasing the task complexity should reduce participants’ ability to use 
explicit and controlled strategies, and might consequently reveal evidence of an 
underlying automatic mechanism. More Pavlovian and instrumental contingencies could 
be trained, for example, to increase the working memory demand (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 
2005). If a standard PIT effect is observed under time pressure or concurrent load, even 
when there are many contingencies to remember, it would lend credence to the 
suggestion that PIT effects can be generated automatically (and would hence support a 
dual-process account of PIT). The demonstration of a PIT effect in the absence of 
explicit contingency knowledge would provide especially compelling evidence of 
automaticity. 
Another exciting avenue for future research applies to the experiments reported 
in Chapter 4. Those experiments found clear evidence of sensitivity to devaluation, 
which suggests that PIT effects are, at least in those designs, goal-directed. It does not 
follow that all PIT effects will necessarily be goal-directed though. It is certainly still 
possible that automaticity (i.e. insensitivity to devaluation) will be revealed when 
participants are unable to use controlled reasoning processes. Experiment 11 provided 
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an initial test of this possibility, by testing whether an “automatic” PIT effect would be 
revealed when participants completed a concurrent load task during the transfer test. 
Recall that in that experiment, two responses were trained to predict a common outcome 
O3, as well as either O1 or O2 (R1 – O1, O3; R2 – O2, O3). The unique outcomes O1 
and O2 were then devalued, before response choice (R1 versus R2) was tested in the 
presence of stimulus compounds that signalled the common, valued outcome with one 
of the unique, devalued outcomes (S1+S3; S2+S3). The goal-directed effect (where 
S2+S3 increased R1 responses more than S1+S3) that was observed in the No Load 
group was not observed in the Load group who were engaged in a concurrent load task 
during the transfer test. The Load group did not demonstrate any evidence of 
automaticity either though; participants responded at chance throughout the transfer test, 
irrespective of the stimulus compound present. It is of course possible that more 
demanding concurrent load tasks would be more effective in producing evidence of 
automaticity. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from null results, but it is fair to say 
that Experiment 11 provided no clear evidence of automaticity under concurrent load. 
However, it is still possible that other manipulations (described below) will be more 
effective in producing evidence of automaticity in the procedures used in Chapter 4. 
It has been suggested that instrumental learning can be mediated by two distinct 
controllers: a goal-directed process that is sensitive to outcome devaluation, and an S-R 
“habit” process that is insensitive to devaluation (Dickinson, 2016). Various 
manipulations have been shown to produce a shift from goal-directed instrumental 
responding to habitual control. These manipulations include overtraining of the 
instrumental response (Adams, 1982; Tricomi et al., 2009), stress induction (Schwabe & 
Wolf, 2009), acute alcohol administration (Hogarth, Attwood, Bate, & Munafò, 2012), 
and negative mood induction (Hogarth, He, et al., 2015).  It would be worth testing 
whether these manipulations are also effective in producing evidence of automaticity 
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(i.e. insensitivity to devaluation) in the PIT designs employed in Chapter 4. It is possible, 
for example, that the relatively modest instrumental training in Experiment 10 favoured 
a goal-directed mechanism over an automatic mechanism. A longer training period 
might be more successful in producing an automatic PIT effect that is insensitive to 
outcome devaluation.   
It is also important for future research to examine the extent to which the results 
reported in Chapter 4 replicate in non-human subjects. Notably, Rescorla (1994b) 
observed insensitivity to devaluation in rats in a study that was conceptually very similar 
to Experiment 7 of the current thesis. In both experiments, rats/humans were trained to 
perform two instrumental responses to each earn two different outcomes. One outcome 
associated with each instrumental response was then devalued by either pairing the 
outcome with lithium-chloride to induce sickness (Rescorla, 1994b), or by coating the 
food with ground cloves and olive oil to make it taste unpleasant (Experiment 7 of the 
current work). Instrumental responding was then assessed in the presence of stimuli that 
signalled outcomes associated with both instrumental responses. Crucially, one of the 
cued outcomes was always valued, and the other was always devalued. Under these 
circumstances, Rescorla's (1994b) rats performed both responses indiscriminately 
during the transfer test; response choice was insensitive to devaluation. Experiment 7 of 
the current thesis, by contrast, produced clear evidence of sensitivity to devaluation in 
humans; participants showed a strong bias towards the instrumental response that 
predicted the cued, still-valued outcome.  
One possibility is that the differential results in rats and humans arose from 
procedural differences between the two experiments. As Rescorla (1994b) noted, it is 
very difficult to ensure that outcome devaluation is complete. Although Rescorla’s rats 
rejected at least some of the devalued outcomes during the devaluation procedure, it is 
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possible that the outcomes were still somewhat valued. This residual value may have 
produced the observed indifference between the valued and devalued outcomes; there 
may have been no difference in value in the memory of the two outcomes. It is also 
possible that PIT effects are mediated by fundamentally different processes in rats and 
humans; that human PIT effects are mediated by a goal-directed, propositional process, 
and that rodent PIT effects are mediated by an automatic S-O-R process. This analysis 
would have a profound influence on our interpretation of rodent PIT experiments, 
because it would suggest that rodent studies might translate poorly to human 
experiments. To progress this debate, it seems sensible to first replicate both Rescorla's 
(1994b) experiment in rats, and Experiment 7 of the current thesis in humans. The 
severity of the devaluation method could also be varied in each design. It would also be 
a worthwhile endeavour to translate the procedure used in Experiments 8 and 10 for use 
in non-human subjects. These latter experiments are particularly useful because the 
automatic and goal-directed accounts predict opposite results. The experiments 
therefore directly set the two theories against one another. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The experiments in this thesis explored the psychological mechanisms that 
underlie human outcome-selective PIT effects. The research confirmed that PIT effects 
are, at least sometimes, sensitive to verbal instructions. However, they appear to be 
robust against speeded reaction time tasks and concurrent load tasks (Chapter 2). The 
latter results provide preliminary evidence to suggest that PIT effects may have an 
underlying automatic quality to them. In Chapter 3, a typical PIT procedure was shown 
to produce insensitivity to devaluation using a very strong devaluation procedure. This 
insensitivity was interpreted within a propositional framework, because it was apparent 
even when the instrumental relationship was merely instructed, which should not 
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encourage the formation of an instrumental associative link. Finally, Chapter 4 
demonstrated that PIT is highly sensitive to devaluation when multiple outcomes and 
responses are cued on every transfer test trial. 
Overall, the results provide support for the propositional EU account of PIT. In 
particular, the PIT effects reported here appear to reflect a goal-directed decision-
making process that is based on perceived outcome probability and outcome value. The 
results consequently have profound implications for our theoretical and applied 
understanding of PIT, in that they suggest that controlled decision-making processes 
can play an important role in PIT. Future work will confirm whether automatic 
processes also mediate PIT effects in other circumstances.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Food devaluation measurements 
Due to the different surface area and weight of the food outcomes, different amounts of 
the clove paste was used to devalue the foods. For each food, 11 grams (g) of oil were 
used per 5g of ground cloves. The table below shows the quantities of the cloves paste 
required to devalue 100g of each food. 
Crisps Nachos Popcorn Cashews 
100g 100g 460g 50g 
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Appendix 2: Exclusion data  
Experiment 3: 
 
Mean percent choice of the valued key in three stimulus conditions of the transfer test in 
participants who failed the contingency knowledge tests (N = 10). 
 
Valued Neutral Devalued 
66.25 (9.37) 51.25 (11.10) 41.25 (11.98) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs. 
Experiment 5: 
 
Mean percent choice of the valued key during the trained and instructed transfer test in 
excluded participants (N = 6). 
Trained transfer test Instructed transfer test 
Valued Neutral Devalued Valued Neutral Devalued 
43.75 (9.13) 39.58 (5.02) 58.33 (8.64) 83.33 (9.36) 63.54 (6.73) 37.50 (14.16) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs. 
Experiment 6: 
 
Mean percent choice of the valued key in the three stimulus conditions of the transfer 
test in participants who failed the contingency knowledge tests (N = 18).  
Valued Neutral Devalued 
62.89 (7.50) 66.67 (7.09) 72.92 (5.42) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs.  
Experiment 7: 
Mean percent choice of R1 in the two stimulus conditions of the transfer test in 
participants who failed the contingency knowledge tests (N = 7).  
S1+S4 S2+S3 
54.46 (13.76) 45.54 (10.97) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs.  
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Experiment 9: 
 
Mean percent choice of R1 during the transfer test in participants who failed the 
contingency knowledge tests. 
Group S1+S3 S2+S3 
Single-cue (N = 9) 40.28 (12.29) 50.00 (14.01) 
Compound-cue (N = 5) 58.75 (4.24) 51.25 (7.76) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs.  
 
Experiment 11: 
 
Mean percent choice of R1 during the transfer test in participants who failed the 
contingency knowledge tests. 
 
Group S1+S3 S2+S3 
No Load (N = 10) 55.00 (6.64) 53.75 (6.86) 
Load (N = 6) 30.21 (12.12) 39.58 (11.93) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs. 
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Appendix 3: Experiment 4 descriptive data 
Mean percent choice of the valued key during the trained and instructed transfer tests in 
each instruction group of Experiment 4. 
 Trained transfer test Instructed transfer test 
Instruction Valued Neutral Devalued Valued Neutral Devalued 
O-R 95.83 
(2.22) 
75.00 
(5.81) 
27.08 
(11.68) 
100.00 
(0.00) 
93.75 
(3.17) 
75.52 
(11.93) 
R-O 92.61 
(6.78) 
60.23 
(10.16) 
17.05 
(8.52) 
97.16 
(2.29) 
91.48 
(3.70) 
62.50 
(13.40) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote SEMs. 
 
 
